{"id":46485,"date":"2023-05-22T08:49:58","date_gmt":"2023-05-22T08:49:58","guid":{"rendered":"https:\/\/rdnews.al\/?p=46485"},"modified":"2023-05-22T08:49:58","modified_gmt":"2023-05-22T08:49:58","slug":"amerika-shpejton-ne-ukraine-per-te-mos-bere-luften-e-madhe","status":"publish","type":"post","link":"https:\/\/foltore.al\/index.php\/2023\/05\/22\/amerika-shpejton-ne-ukraine-per-te-mos-bere-luften-e-madhe\/","title":{"rendered":"\u201cAmerika shpejton n\u00eb Ukrain\u00eb p\u00ebr t\u00eb mos b\u00ebr\u00eb Luft\u00ebn e Madhe\u201d"},"content":{"rendered":"

Bashk\u00ebbisedim me Jeffrey Mankoff, hulumtues n\u00eb Center for Strategic Research t\u00eb National Defense University<\/strong><\/p>\n

Shtetet e Bashkuara jan\u00eb n\u00eb avantazh n\u00eb konkurrenc\u00ebn strategjike me Kin\u00ebn dhe Rusin\u00eb?<\/strong><\/p>\n

P\u00ebr momentin, Shtetet e Bashkuara jan\u00eb n\u00eb pozicion t\u00eb mir\u00eb. Lufta n\u00eb Ukrain\u00eb ka qen\u00eb nj\u00eb fiasko strategjike p\u00ebr Rusin\u00eb. Moska ka humbur 180 mij\u00eb ushtar\u00eb, mij\u00ebra tanke dhe sisteme t\u00eb tjera t\u00eb sofistikuara, ekonomia e saj \u00ebsht\u00eb e goditur nga sanksionet q\u00eb n\u00eb perspektiv\u00eb do t\u00eb ndikojn\u00eb n\u00eb aft\u00ebsin\u00eb p\u00ebr t\u00eb rigjeneruar resurset luftarake: do t\u00eb dal\u00eb nga konflikti e dob\u00ebsuar n\u00eb m\u00ebnyr\u00eb dramatike. Do t\u00eb ruaj\u00eb arm\u00ebn b\u00ebrthamore dhe mjetet p\u00ebr t\u00eb k\u00ebrc\u00ebnuar fqinj\u00ebt, por ai k\u00ebrc\u00ebnim do t\u00eb jet\u00eb tejet i reduktuar respektivisht paraluft\u00ebs. Edhe Kina \u00ebsht\u00eb e dob\u00ebsuar gjat\u00eb viteve t\u00eb fundit. Konsolidimi i pushtetit t\u00eb Xi Jinping ka ndodhur n\u00eb kurriz t\u00eb autoritarizmit kolektiv t\u00eb nd\u00ebrtuar nga pararend\u00ebsit e tij; k\u00ebshtu q\u00eb \u00ebsht\u00eb m\u00eb e leht\u00eb t\u00eb kryhen gabime, si politika \u00abzero Covid\u00bb, q\u00eb e ka zvog\u00ebluar rritjen dhe ushqyer frustrimet sociale. M\u00eb p\u00ebrpara akoma, Republika Popullore po hynte tashm\u00eb n\u00eb kurthin e fuqive me t\u00eb ardhura t\u00eb mesme, kalimin e v\u00ebshtir\u00eb nga zhvillimi n\u00eb p\u00ebrhapjen e mund\u00ebsive dhe t\u00eb kapaciteteve teknologjike. Faktikisht, p\u00ebr Pekinin kishte p\u00ebrfunduar epoka e objektivave t\u00eb leh\u00ebta. Jan\u00eb zvog\u00ebluar edhe investimet infrastrukturore e p\u00ebrdorura p\u00ebr t\u00eb inkurajuar apo detyruar vendet e tjera t\u00eb ndiqnin vullnetin kinez. Frika q\u00eb Pekini t\u00eb p\u00ebrdor\u00eb resurse financiare p\u00ebr t\u00eb modifikuar shtylla t\u00eb r\u00ebnd\u00ebsishme t\u00eb sistemit nd\u00ebrkomb\u00ebtar \u00ebsht\u00eb sot m\u00eb pak urgjente. E gjitha kjo e p\u00ebrkeq\u00ebsuar ekuilibrin e p\u00ebrgjithsh\u00ebm p\u00ebr Republik\u00ebn Popullore.<\/p>\n

Kina n\u00eb v\u00ebshtir\u00ebsi mund t\u00eb jet\u00eb m\u00eb e rrezikshme?<\/strong><\/p>\n

Pik\u00ebrisht. Hendeku midis Kin\u00ebs dhe Shteteve t\u00eb Bashkuara n\u00eb k\u00ebto vite ishte zvog\u00ebluar, por besoj se po kthehet t\u00eb rritet. P\u00ebr k\u00ebt\u00eb drejtuesit kinez\u00eb mund t\u00eb jen\u00eb t\u00eb shtyr\u00eb t\u00eb b\u00ebjn\u00eb di\u00e7ka p\u00ebr ta kompensuar humbjen e iniciativ\u00ebs. Vazhdojn\u00eb t\u00eb investojn\u00eb r\u00ebndsh\u00ebm n\u00eb forcat e armatosura, sidomos n\u00eb Marin\u00eb, me iden\u00eb e rimarrjes s\u00eb Taivanit. N\u00eb Uashington ekziston preokupimi p\u00ebr k\u00ebt\u00eb perspektiv\u00eb. N\u00ebse shikohet nga ekuilibri ushtarak nuk \u00ebsht\u00eb m\u00eb e qart\u00eb n\u00ebse Shtetet e Bashkuara, Taivani dhe aleat\u00ebt jan\u00eb n\u00eb gjendje ta mundin nj\u00eb sulm kinez.<\/p>\n

Cili \u00ebsht\u00eb objektivi, n\u00ebse ekziston, i Shteteve t\u00eb Bashkuara n\u00eb k\u00ebt\u00eb konkurrenc\u00eb?<\/strong><\/p>\n

N\u00eb frontin e Indo \u2013 Paq\u00ebsorit, shkurajimi i kinez\u00ebve nga sulmimi i Taivanit n\u00eb periudh\u00ebn e afatshkurt\u00ebr dhe reduktimi n\u00eb periudh\u00eb afatmesme i investimeve ushtarake t\u00eb nevojshme p\u00ebr forcat e armatosura n\u00eb gjendje t\u00eb nd\u00ebrtojn\u00eb nj\u00eb zon\u00eb influence. N\u00eb frontin europian, d\u00ebshtimi i pushtimit rus dhe dob\u00ebsimi i Mosk\u00ebs si kund\u00ebrshtar strategjik, duke e b\u00ebr\u00eb m\u00eb pak t\u00eb aft\u00eb q\u00eb t\u00eb k\u00ebrc\u00ebnoj\u00eb fqinj\u00ebt. N\u00ebse do t\u00eb mund t\u00eb gjeja em\u00ebruesin e vog\u00ebl t\u00eb p\u00ebrbashk\u00ebt, Shtetet e Bashkuara duan t\u2019i pengojn\u00eb rus\u00ebt e kinez\u00ebt q\u00eb t\u00eb ken\u00eb mjetet p\u00ebr t\u00eb nd\u00ebrtuar sfera influence. Duan d\u00ebshtimin e aspiratave neoperandorake t\u00eb Rusis\u00eb s\u00eb Putinit dhe t\u00eb Republik\u00ebs Popullore Kineze.<\/p>\n

I keni mjetet p\u00ebr arritjen e k\u00ebtyre objektivave?<\/strong><\/p>\n

Qart\u00ebsisht q\u00eb i kemi kundrejt Rusis\u00eb, e cila do t\u00eb dal\u00eb nga lufta me influenc\u00eb m\u00eb t\u00eb ul\u00ebt ndaj fqinj\u00ebve, me p\u00ebrjashtimin jo t\u00eb r\u00ebnd\u00ebsish\u00ebm t\u00eb Bjellorusis\u00eb. Koncepti i Bot\u00ebs Ruse (Russkij Mir) do t\u00eb dal\u00eb i kompromentuar. Me Kin\u00ebn \u00ebsht\u00eb m\u00eb e v\u00ebshtir\u00eb p\u00ebr t\u2019u th\u00ebn\u00eb. Ka nj\u00eb konsensus t\u00eb fort\u00eb brenda Shteteve t\u00eb Bashkuara mbi nevoj\u00ebn e pengimit t\u00eb nj\u00eb sulmi ndaj Taivanit dhe n\u00eb rastin e zmbrapsjes. Por sikur t\u00eb arrihej n\u00eb larjen e hesapeve, nuk e di n\u00ebse do t\u00eb jemi n\u00eb gjendje t\u00eb mbizot\u00ebrojm\u00eb ushtarakisht. P\u00ebr shembull, p\u00ebr kinez\u00ebt \u00ebsht\u00eb shum\u00eb m\u00eb e leht\u00eb t\u00eb sigurohet kontrolli i uj\u00ebrave q\u00eb ndajn\u00eb ishullin sesa p\u00ebr amerikan\u00ebt t\u2019ua mohojn\u00eb. P\u00ebr k\u00ebt\u00eb, objektivi yn\u00eb par\u00ebsor \u00ebsht\u00eb shkurajimi, duke shpjeguar se kostot e nj\u00eb sulmi do t\u00eb ishin tejet t\u00eb larta. N\u00ebse kinez\u00ebt do t\u00eb sulmonin, do t\u00eb humbisnim qysh n\u00eb nisje. Nuk do t\u00eb thot\u00eb se automatikisht do ta humbisnim luft\u00ebn, por se do t\u00eb ishte shum\u00eb m\u00eb e v\u00ebshtir\u00eb t\u00eb luftohej krahasuar me at\u00eb n\u00eb Ukrain\u00eb.<\/p>\n

N\u00eb ar\u00ebsyetimin tuaj mbi gjendjen e sh\u00ebndetit t\u00eb Kin\u00ebs peshon shum\u00eb faktori i legjitimimit popullor t\u00eb qeveris\u00eb. Edhe Shtetet e Bashkuara kan\u00eb problemet e tyre t\u00eb konsensusit.<\/strong><\/p>\n

Po, nj\u00eb nga rreziqet m\u00eb t\u00eb m\u00ebdha q\u00eb kalojn\u00eb Shtetet e Bashkuara \u00ebsht\u00eb n\u00eb frontin e brendsh\u00ebm dhe ka t\u00eb b\u00ebj\u00eb me brisht\u00ebsin\u00eb e rendit politik amerikan. Forcat q\u00eb kan\u00eb shkaktur rebelimin e kulmuar me sulmin ndaj Kongresit e vitit 2021 jan\u00eb leht\u00ebsuar, jo ezauruar. Biden \u00ebsht\u00eb presidenti i fundit i gjenerat\u00ebs s\u00eb Luft\u00ebs s\u00eb Ftoht\u00eb. Ka nj\u00eb ide t\u00eb Shteteve t\u00eb Bashkuara, t\u00eb rolit t\u00eb tyre n\u00eb bot\u00eb, t\u00eb raportit me Europ\u00ebs, e vendit t\u00eb qeveris\u00eb federale n\u00eb sistemin e brendsh\u00ebm q\u00eb nuk ndahet gjer\u00ebsisht me popullsin\u00eb si dikur. Kur n\u00eb pushtet do t\u00eb ngjitet nj\u00eb president tjet\u00ebr, i cil\u00ebsdo parti, kjo ide do t\u00eb jet\u00eb shum\u00eb m\u00eb e kontestuar. Pyetja m\u00eb e gjer\u00eb ka t\u00eb b\u00ebj\u00eb me legjitmimin e institucioneve amerikane dhe t\u00eb rolit n\u00eb bot\u00eb q\u00eb ka luajtur Amerika gjat\u00eb dhe pas Luft\u00ebs s\u00eb Ftoht\u00eb. Krah\u00ebt ekstrem\u00eb e t\u00eb dyja partive, gjithnj\u00eb e m\u00eb shum\u00eb t\u00eb populluara, kan\u00eb figura influente q\u00eb thon\u00eb se Shtetet e Bashkuara do t\u00eb duhet t\u00eb b\u00ebjn\u00eb m\u00eb pak n\u00eb planet dhe t\u00eb preokupohen m\u00eb shum\u00eb p\u00ebr problemet e tyre t\u00eb brendshme. Kurse mosdakord\u00ebsia mbi struktur\u00ebn e brendshme t\u00eb politik\u00ebs amerikane rrezikon t\u00eb gjeneroj\u00eb tensione q\u00eb mund t\u00eb shkaktojn\u00eb me shpejt\u00ebsi kaosin. N\u00eb rastin e paq\u00ebndrueshm\u00ebris\u00eb autentike, aft\u00ebsia jo p\u00ebr t\u00eb sh\u00ebrbyer si garant\u00eb t\u00eb sistemit nd\u00ebrkomb\u00ebtar do t\u00eb ishte e paprekur.<\/p>\n

N\u00ebse amerikan\u00ebt e kontestojn\u00eb iden\u00eb e nj\u00eb hegjemonie amerikane, duken gjith\u00ebsesi t\u00eb vendosur p\u00ebr ta mbrojtur primatin e tyre nga rival\u00ebt.<\/strong><\/p>\n

Po, ama primat p\u00ebr t\u00eb b\u00ebr\u00eb \u00e7far\u00eb? Dhe me \u00e7far\u00eb objektivi? Ky \u00ebsht\u00eb debati. Nuk e p\u00eblqej shprehjen \u00abrend liberal nd\u00ebrkomb\u00ebtar\u00bb sepse nuk \u00ebsht\u00eb domosdoshm\u00ebrisht as liberal, as global, ama ideja \u00ebsht\u00eb se nga viti 1945 Shtetet e Bashkuara kan\u00eb nisur t\u00eb ngren\u00eb institucione dhe norma t\u00eb menduara p\u00ebr ta forcuar primatin amerikan dhe p\u00ebr t\u00eb strukturuar marr\u00ebdh\u00ebniet midis vendeve t\u00eb bot\u00ebs q\u00eb t\u00eb pasqyronin interesat dhe vlerat tona. N\u00eb gjenerat\u00ebn e fundit, pra jo vet\u00ebm n\u00ebn Trump, jemi p\u00ebrq\u00ebndruar mbi ruajtjen e primatit, duke e siguruar se disponojm\u00eb forc\u00ebn ushtarake m\u00eb efikase dhe q\u00eb Kina t\u00eb mos e nd\u00ebrtonte nj\u00eb sfer\u00eb ekonomike p\u00ebr t\u00eb na sfiduar. Megjithat\u00eb, besimi n\u00eb k\u00ebt\u00eb sistem normash dhe institucionesh ka ardhur duke r\u00ebn\u00eb. Me Biden \u00ebsht\u00eb asistuar n\u00eb nj\u00eb rikthim t\u00eb k\u00ebsaj tradite, i s\u00eb cil\u00ebs presidenti \u00ebsht\u00eb nj\u00eb produkt, por \u00ebsht\u00eb nj\u00eb rikthim n\u00eb t\u00eb ardhmen, dometh\u00ebn\u00eb nm\u00eb nj\u00eb bot\u00eb q\u00eb nd\u00ebrkoh\u00eb ka ndryshuar shum\u00eb dhe jo rast\u00ebsisht ka ndryshuar Amerika. Biden \u00ebsht\u00eb nj\u00eb atlantist i hekurt, e kupton se pasja nga ana e tij e nj\u00eb pjese t\u00eb nj\u00eb Europe t\u00eb begat\u00eb \u00ebsht\u00eb shum\u00ebfishuesi m\u00eb i r\u00ebnd\u00ebsish\u00ebm i fuqis\u00eb q\u00eb mund t\u00eb shpresoj\u00eb. Nuk e di n\u00ebse gjeneratat e reja, pavar\u00ebsisht orientimit politik, e ndajn\u00eb k\u00ebt\u00eb bindje t\u00eb thell\u00eb. Shpresoj q\u00eb lufta n\u00eb Ukrain\u00eb mund t\u00eb ndryshoj\u00eb di\u00e7ka, duke treguar se Rusia \u00ebsht\u00eb nj\u00eb k\u00ebrc\u00ebnim konkret p\u00ebr interesat tona dhe t\u00eb europian\u00ebve, pra q\u00eb \u00ebsht\u00eb e r\u00ebnd\u00ebsishme t\u00eb kesh nj\u00eb Europ\u00eb n\u00eb gjendje t\u00eb siguroj\u00eb sigurin\u00eb e saj. Sinjalet jan\u00eb inkurajuese: ekziston nj\u00eb mb\u00ebshtetje mjaft transversale n\u00eb Amerik\u00eb p\u00ebr t\u00eb vazhduar t\u00eb furnizohet Ukraina me arm\u00eb dhe para p\u00ebr ta zmbrapsur agresionin. P\u00ebr her\u00eb t\u00eb par\u00eb shum\u00eb njer\u00ebz shohin se Europa dhe NATO jan\u00eb t\u00eb r\u00ebnd\u00ebsishme p\u00ebr sigurin\u00eb komb\u00ebtare amerikane.<\/p>\n

Nj\u00ebkoh\u00ebsisht, shum\u00eb n\u00eb Europ\u00eb dyshojn\u00eb p\u00ebr besueshm\u00ebrin\u00eb e Shteteve t\u00eb Bashkuara. Ndodhia e tankeve \u00ebsht\u00eb nj\u00eb shembull i mir\u00eb: gjerman\u00ebt kan\u00eb pretenduar se edhe amerikan\u00ebt t\u2019i d\u00ebrgonin sepse nuk i konsiderojn\u00eb t\u00eb mjaftueshme garancit\u00eb mbrojt\u00ebse t\u00eb Uashingtonit?<\/strong><\/p>\n

Po. \u00cbsht\u00eb e pamohueshme se deri m\u00eb 24 shkurt kishte dyshime mbi impenjimin amerikan ndaj NATO. Kujtojm\u00eb fjal\u00ebt e Angela Merkel: europian\u00ebt duhet t\u00eb m\u00ebsohen t\u00eb marrin p\u00ebrgjegj\u00ebsi sepse Amerika nuk do t\u00eb jet\u00eb gjithmon\u00eb at\u00eb p\u00ebr ne. Shkaku i k\u00ebtij pozicioni ka shum\u00eb t\u00eb b\u00ebj\u00eb me Trump dhe q\u00ebndrimin e tij ndaj Europ\u00ebs, por Trump \u00ebsht\u00eb simptoma e nj\u00eb shk\u00ebputjeje m\u00eb t\u00eb thell\u00eb, q\u00eb mund t\u00eb riparaqitet n\u00eb t\u00eb ardhmen me nj\u00eb administrat\u00eb jo kaq t\u00eb lidhur me NATO si kjo aktualja. P\u00ebr vdekje cerebrale t\u00eb Aleanc\u00ebs nuk flitet m\u00eb, por vitet e kaluara kan\u00eb l\u00ebn\u00eb plag\u00eb q\u00eb do t\u00eb sh\u00ebrohen vet\u00ebm me kalimin e kohs\u00eb dhe nuk \u00ebsht\u00eb e sigurt\u00eb se nuk do t\u00eb rihapen.<\/p>\n

Lidhur me tanket: nj\u00eb vendim simbolik, por sh\u00ebnon nj\u00eb ndryshim hapi. Lufta ruso \u2013 ukrainase \u00ebsht\u00eb gjithnj\u00eb e m\u00eb shum\u00eb nj\u00eb luft\u00eb ruso \u2013 per\u00ebndimore? <\/strong><\/p>\n

Ka qen\u00eb gjithmon\u00eb dhe vazhdon t\u00eb jet\u00eb nj\u00eb luft\u00eb af\u00ebrsie midis Rusis\u00eb dhe Per\u00ebndimit, si\u00e7 ishte ajo n\u00eb Afganistan e viteve \u201880. Moska nuk k\u00ebrc\u00ebnon vet\u00ebm Kievin, por edhe sigurin\u00eb e p\u00ebrgjithshme n\u00eb Europ\u00eb, dometh\u00ebn\u00eb interesat themelore t\u00eb Shteteve t\u00eb Bashkuara. Lloji i armatimeve t\u00eb furnizuar do t\u2019i ndryshoj\u00eb raportet e forc\u00ebs n\u00eb terren, jo natyr\u00ebn e k\u00ebtij konflikti. P\u00ebrkundrazi, sipas meje ritmi me t\u00eb cilin u kemi d\u00ebrguar arm\u00eb ukrinasve ka qen\u00eb m\u00eb i leht\u00eb nga sa mund ta lejonim. Qasja e rritjes s\u00eb kalibruar \u00ebsht\u00eb n\u00eb thelb reagues dhe nuk u lejon ukrainasve t\u00eb marrin iniciativ\u00ebn, por mendoj se po fillon t\u00eb ndryshoj\u00eb, edhe pse ndryshimi nuk \u00ebsht\u00eb pjekur akoma. R\u00ebnd\u00ebsia e vendimit mbi tanket q\u00ebndron n\u00eb faktin se tani e mb\u00ebshtesim hapur tentativ\u00ebn e Kievit p\u00ebr t\u00eb kryer s\u00eb af\u00ebrmi nj\u00eb kund\u00ebrsulm n\u00eb shkall\u00eb t\u00eb gjer\u00eb.<\/p>\n

Pse Shtetet e Bashkuara kan\u00eb nevoj\u00eb t\u00eb p\u00ebrshpejtojn\u00eb?<\/strong><\/p>\n

Pjes\u00ebrisht sepse qeveria e ka tejkaluar frik\u00ebn fillestare e nxitjes s\u00eb nj\u00eb eskalimi. Pjes\u00ebrisht \u00ebsht\u00eb nj\u00eb pranim q\u00eb sa m\u00eb shum\u00eb lufta ec\u00ebn p\u00ebrpara dhe sa m\u00eb t\u00eb m\u00ebdha jan\u00eb kostot jo vet\u00ebm p\u00ebr Ukrain\u00ebn, por edhe p\u00ebr europian\u00ebt. Pjes\u00ebrisht influencon edhe Kin\u00ebn dhe vet\u00ebdija se nuk mund ta lejoj\u00eb zgjatjen e luft\u00ebs par\u00eb nevojn\u00ebn e mbajtjes gati n\u00eb Indo \u2013 Paq\u00ebsor.<\/p>\n

Cili \u00ebsht\u00eb debati i brendsh\u00ebm i administrat\u00ebs?<\/strong><\/p>\n

Debati v\u00ebrtitet rreth objektivave tona finale, me resurset e disponueshme dhe me rreziqet. P\u00ebrsa i p\u00ebrket objektivave, tani pyetja \u00ebsht\u00eb: t\u00eb ndihmohen ukrainasit t\u00eb rimarrin territoret e humbura pas 24 shkurtit apo ato t\u00eb humbura n\u00eb 2014? Apo t\u2019u vendosen vet\u00ebm kosto shum\u00eb t\u00eb larta rus\u00ebve pa i lidhur me nj\u00eb objektiv t\u00eb sakt\u00eb gjeografik? Biden thot\u00eb se vendimi u takon ukrainasve dhe kjo \u00ebsht\u00eb vija publike. \u00cbsht\u00eb gjith\u00e7ka t\u00eb shikohet n\u00ebse do ta ndihmojm\u00eb Kievin ta rimarr\u00eb Krimen\u00eb. Faktor\u00eb t\u00eb ndrysh\u00ebm ndikojn\u00eb n\u00eb k\u00ebt\u00eb ngurrim. Paras\u00ebgjithash, nj\u00eb diferenc\u00eb statusi e r\u00ebnd\u00ebsishme midis gadishullit dhe territoreve t\u00eb tjera t\u00eb pushtuara: formalisht Rusia e ka aneksuar Krimen\u00eb, k\u00ebshtu q\u00eb mund ta perceptoj\u00eb ndryshe nga operacionet e tjera si nj\u00eb tentativ\u00eb p\u00ebr ta ripushtuar; sikur t\u00eb ishte k\u00ebshtu, mbi baz\u00ebn e doktrin\u00ebs b\u00ebrthamore t\u00eb saj, mund t\u2019i drejtohej atomikes. Pastaj, aspekti logjistik: nj\u00eb gj\u00eb \u00ebsht\u00eb t\u00eb b\u00ebsh manovra t\u00eb m\u00ebdha ushtarake n\u00eb ult\u00ebsirat lindore, nj\u00eb tjet\u00ebr t\u00eb futesh n\u00eb nj\u00eb gadishull malor dhe t\u00eb lidhur me kontinentin nga nj\u00eb ist\u00ebm shum\u00eb i ngusht\u00eb. S\u00eb fundi, \u00e7\u00ebshtja demografike, dometh\u00ebn\u00eb shumica ruse: \u00ebsht\u00eb e v\u00ebshtir\u00eb t\u00eb kuptohet se \u00e7far\u00eb preferohet duke par\u00eb se jetohet n\u00eb nj\u00eb regjim pushtimi prej 9 vitesh, por \u00ebsht\u00eb e mundur q\u00eb n\u00eb nj\u00eb referendum t\u00eb lir\u00eb shumica t\u00eb preferoj\u00eb Rusin\u00eb ndaj Ukrain\u00ebs. P\u00ebr k\u00ebt\u00eb ar\u00ebsye deri m\u00eb tani Shtetet e Bashkuara nuk e kan\u00eb lejuar Kievin t\u2019i p\u00ebrdor\u00eb armatimet e tyre p\u00ebr ta sh\u00ebnjestruar Krimen\u00eb. Ukrainasit e kan\u00eb goditur tashm\u00eb gadishullin disa her\u00eb dhe ur\u00ebn e Ker\u00e7it me objektivin e qart\u00eb q\u00eb t\u2019u demonstrojn\u00eb amerikan\u00ebve se i kan\u00eb kapacitetet p\u00ebr ta b\u00ebr\u00eb dhe se rus\u00ebt nuk reagojn\u00eb me raprezalje masive. N\u00eb pik\u00ebn q\u00eb sot qeveria e Uashingtonit fillon t\u00eb debatoj\u00eb n\u00ebse ta autorizoj\u00eb apo jo Kievin ta godas\u00eb Krimen\u00eb, por jemi vet\u00ebm n\u00eb fillim dhe nuk do t\u00eb thot\u00eb se do t\u00eb mb\u00ebshtesim nj\u00eb ripushtim ushtarak t\u00eb gadishullit. Komponenti tjet\u00ebr i debatit ka t\u00eb b\u00ebj\u00eb me rreziqet. Biden e ka th\u00ebn\u00eb shum\u00eb her\u00eb se nj\u00eb prej objektivave kryesor\u00eb t\u00eb tij \u00ebsht\u00eb t\u00eb pengoj\u00eb konfliktin t\u00eb shtrihet n\u00eb territorin e NATO, p\u00ebr t\u2019i mbajtur t\u00eb bashkuar aleat\u00ebt. P\u00ebr shembull, Spanja mund t\u00eb mos jet\u00eb e interesuar ta mbroj\u00eb Polonin\u00eb. Nuk \u00ebsht\u00eb nj\u00eb rrug\u00eb q\u00eb duam ta testojm\u00eb. Edhe p\u00ebr k\u00ebt\u00eb, n\u00eb fillim perceptimi i administrat\u00ebs ishte se Rusia do t\u00eb mund t\u00eb shikonte ndonj\u00eb furnizim me arm\u00eb ukrainasve si nj\u00eb provokim. Sot kemi par\u00eb se t\u00eb gjitha k\u00ebto vija t\u00eb kuqe t\u00eb Mosk\u00ebs nuk qen\u00eb edhe kaq t\u00eb kuqe: kapja shum\u00eb pas ides\u00eb s\u00eb kund\u00ebrt, se asnj\u00eb prej l\u00ebvizjeve tona \u00ebsht\u00eb e patolerueshme dhe se n\u00eb nj\u00eb moment t\u00eb caktuar Kremlini ndjehet i detyruar ta ngrej\u00eb postin e loj\u00ebs. Raketa e kund\u00ebrajrores ukrainase e r\u00ebn\u00eb n\u00eb territorin polak ka qen\u00eb nj\u00eb episod i rreziksh\u00ebm, t\u00eb cilin qeveria e Varshav\u00ebs e ka menaxhuar miri, pa ngut, duke sqaruar pfar\u00eb ka ndodhur. P\u00ebr momentin edhe Rusia e ka respektuar Nenin V t\u00eb Paktit Atlantik, duke nuhatur se jemi t\u00eb vendosur ta mbrojm\u00eb, por kjo nuk do t\u00eb thot\u00eb se nuk do t\u00eb ket\u00eb momente t\u00eb tjera t\u00eb rrezikshme.<\/p>\n

Ukrainasit thon\u00eb se pas tankseve do t\u00eb marrin \u00e7do lloj tjet\u00ebr arme. Jeni dakord?<\/strong><\/p>\n

Nuk mendoj se \u00ebsht\u00eb e urt\u00eb t\u2019u jap\u00ebsh atyre gjith\u00e7ka q\u00eb duan. Interesat ukrainase nuk jan\u00eb domosdoshm\u00ebrisht nj\u00eblloj me ato amerikane. Kievi duhet ta mendoj\u00eb se nuk \u00ebsht\u00eb preokupimi i vet\u00ebm i Shteteve t\u00eb Bashkuara. Konkurrenca me Kin\u00ebn nuk do t\u00eb zhduket sepse Ukraina ekziston. Uashingtoni duhet t\u00eb kalibroj\u00eb at\u00eb q\u00eb mund t\u2019u jap\u00eb ukrainasve me nj\u00eb pozicion shkurajues lobist n\u00eb Indo \u2013 Paq\u00ebsor dhe pastaj \u00ebsht\u00eb vija e kuqe themelore p\u00ebr t\u00eb mos e \u00e7uar luft\u00ebn n\u00eb Rusi. Sikur vija e kuqe spostohet dhe afrohet n\u00eb kufirin me Federat\u00ebn, edhe artileria me rreze t\u00eb shkurt\u00ebr q\u00eb u kemi dh\u00ebn\u00eb mund ta godas\u00eb territorin rus. Pra \u00e7\u00ebshtja nuk \u00ebsht\u00eb teknike, por gjeopolitike: duhet t\u2019i bindim ukrainasit t\u00eb mos e sh\u00ebnojn\u00eb Rusin\u00eb.<\/p>\n

N\u00ebse pas disa kohe vjen nj\u00eb ng\u00ebr\u00e7, Shteteve t\u00eb Bashkuara mund t\u2019u vij\u00eb mir\u00eb n\u00ebse Rusia arrin ta n\u00ebnshtroj\u00eb Ukrain\u00eb dhe Ukraina t\u00eb heq\u00eb dor\u00eb, jo fornalisht, por n\u00eb thelb, ndaj Krimes\u00eb?<\/strong><\/p>\n

Derikur Bideni t\u00eb jet\u00eb president besoj se vija publike do t\u00eb mbetet: \u00abAsgj\u00eb p\u00ebr Ukrain\u00ebn pa ukrainasit\u00bb. Ama prapa kuintave do t\u00eb vazhdojn\u00eb presionet, tashm\u00eb t\u00eb filluara, me q\u00ebllim q\u00eb Kievi t\u00eb demonstrohet m\u00eb i disponuesh\u00ebm p\u00ebr t\u00eb negociuar, sidomos n\u00ebse vjen nj\u00eb ng\u00ebr\u00e7 me kosto t\u00eb pamb\u00ebshtetshme. Problemi \u00ebsht\u00eb se nj\u00eb cedim i territoreve fikson nj\u00eb precedent t\u00eb tmerrsh\u00ebm, jo vet\u00ebm p\u00ebr Rusin\u00eb, por edhe me Kin\u00ebn. Pastaj \u00ebsht\u00eb edhe \u00e7\u00ebshtja e garancive: si t\u00eb pengohet q\u00eb lufta t\u00eb rifilloj\u00eb? Nuk m\u00eb p\u00eblqen kjo qasje, por n\u00ebse Europa, n\u00eb ndryshim nga ky vit, t\u00eb mos arrinte ta shmangte plumbin energjitik t\u00eb dimrit 2024, mund t\u00eb shkaktoj\u00eb presione popullore t\u00eb tilla sa t\u00eb \u00e7onin t\u00eb ndryshonte politik\u00ebn n\u00eb Ukrain\u00eb.<\/p>\n

Lidhur me luft\u00ebn ekonomike. Sanksionet kafshojn\u00eb, por nuk po i ndryshojn\u00eb kalkulimet e Putinit. Jan\u00eb n\u00eb d\u00ebshtim?<\/strong><\/p>\n

Prej koh\u00ebsh kritikoj qasjen amerikane ndaj sanksioneve: nuk arrijn\u00eb t\u00eb shpjegojn\u00eb p\u00ebr \u00e7far\u00eb sh\u00ebrbejn\u00eb, p\u00ebrve\u00e7se p\u00ebr t\u00eb th\u00ebn\u00eb se po b\u00ebjm\u00eb di\u00e7ka, se jemi t\u00eb gjith\u00eb nga e nj\u00ebjta n\u00eb dhe t\u00eb mb\u00ebshtesimim me t\u00eb tjer\u00ebt pjes\u00ebn e madhe t\u00eb kostove, ama objektivat strategjike qartazi kan\u00eb d\u00ebshtuar. Sikur t\u00eb arrinte t\u00eb shmangej agresioni pas 24 shkurtit, kan\u00eb d\u00ebshtuar. N\u00ebse ishte t\u00eb shkaktoheshin protesta kund\u00ebr regjimit, kan\u00eb d\u00ebshtuar dhe ka mund\u00ebsi do t\u00eb vazhdojn\u00eb t\u00eb d\u00ebshtojn\u00eb. N\u00ebse ishte t\u00eb dob\u00ebsohej kapaciteti rus p\u00ebr t\u00eb rigjeneruar resurse t\u00eb dobishme p\u00ebr luft\u00ebn, do t\u00eb tjoja se kan\u00eb pasur sukses dhe do t\u00eb ken\u00eb akoma m\u00eb shum\u00eb n\u00ebse do t\u00eb mbesin n\u00eb fuqi.<\/p>\n

Por p\u00ebr momentin rus\u00ebt kompensojn\u00eb reduktimin e cil\u00ebsis\u00eb s\u00eb resurseve ushtarake me sasin\u00eb.<\/strong><\/p>\n

\u00cbsht\u00eb k\u00ebshtu dhe sa m\u00eb p\u00ebrpara t\u00eb shkoj\u00eb lufta, aq m\u00eb shum\u00eb kosto do t\u00eb ket\u00eb, p\u00ebr t\u00eb gjith\u00eb, ama n\u00ebse mendojm\u00eb n\u00eb termat e konkurrenc\u00ebs strategjike, \u00ebsht\u00eb natyrisht n\u00eb interesin ton\u00eb pasja e nj\u00eb Rusie m\u00eb t\u00eb dob\u00ebt. N\u00ebse Moska \u00ebsht\u00eb e detyruar t\u2019i marr\u00eb mikro\u00e7ip\u00ebt e raketave t\u00eb saj nga lavatri\u00e7et, \u00ebsht\u00eb e qart\u00eb se sanksionet po kan\u00eb nj\u00eb impakt q\u00eb n\u00eb n\u00eb pik\u00eb t\u00eb caktuar t\u00eb do t\u00eb ket\u00eb kosto t\u00eb pamb\u00ebshtetshme p\u00ebr industrin\u00eb dhe ekonomin\u00eb e saj. Nuk \u00ebsht\u00eb e th\u00ebn\u00eb se kjo do t\u2019i ndryshoj\u00eb planet e Putinit apo q\u00eb do t\u00eb shkaktoj\u00eb largimin e tij nga pushteti, por n\u00eb perspektiv\u00eb pozicioni rus rus do t\u00eb jet\u00eb i dob\u00ebsuar ndjesh\u00ebm. Kjo \u00ebsht\u00eb p\u00ebr mua objektivi i v\u00ebrtet\u00eb i sanksioneve. Nuk i ndihmon shum\u00eb ukrainasit, \u00ebsht\u00eb m\u00eb shum\u00eb p\u00ebr NATO dhe Shtetet e Bashkuara.<\/p>\n

Ju vjen p\u00ebr mbar\u00eb nj\u00eb Rusi kaq e varur nga Kina?<\/strong><\/p>\n

Derikur Putini \u00ebsht\u00eb n\u00eb pushtet, nuk do t\u00eb kemi shum\u00eb influenc\u00eb mbi Mosk\u00ebn. Anija kino \u2013 ruse \u00ebsht\u00eb nisur shum\u00eb koh\u00eb m\u00eb par\u00eb, do t\u00eb thoja n\u00eb 2014. Putini e ka pranuar se nuk mund t\u00eb kthehej n\u00eb rolin e bilancuesit midis Shteteve t\u00eb Bashkuara dhe Kin\u00ebs. T\u00eb pakt\u00ebn qysh nga 2011, \u00ebsht\u00eb i bindur se Per\u00ebndimi d\u00ebshiron ta rr\u00ebzoj\u00eb regjimin e tij. Nuk ka hap\u00ebsir\u00eb t\u00eb madhe manovre ndaj Pekinit, por nuk do t\u00eb kemi shum\u00eb kontroll mbi rrethanat q\u00eb do t\u00eb \u00e7onin n\u00eb nj\u00eb dalje t\u00eb tij. K\u00ebshtu q\u00eb nuk mendoj se n\u00eb k\u00ebt\u00eb moment q\u00ebndrimi yn\u00eb po e shtyn Rusin\u00eb drejt Kin\u00ebs, pasi t\u00eb dyja fuqit\u00eb\u00a0 jan\u00eb tashm\u00eb af\u00ebr. Ajo q\u00eb mund t\u00eb b\u00ebjm\u00eb \u00ebsht\u00eb t\u00eb reduktojm\u00eb vler\u00ebn e Mosk\u00ebs si partnere e Pekinit. \u00cbsht\u00eb nj\u00eb pjes\u00eb e motiveve prapa sanksioneve.<\/p>\n

M\u00eb e dob\u00ebsuar Rusia dhe m\u00eb shum\u00eb Kina fiton influenc\u00eb n\u00eb ish periferit\u00eb perandorake t\u00eb saj, sidomos n\u00eb Azin\u00eb Qendrore. Ju vjen p\u00ebr mbar\u00eb?<\/strong><\/p>\n

Perandoria ruso \u2013 sovjetike \u00ebsht\u00eb n\u00eb t\u00ebrheqje graduale nga fundi i viteve \u201880. N\u00eb ish periferit\u00eb e saj, Moska ka ruajtur influenc\u00eb politike, ekonomike e sociale edhe pas fundit t\u00eb Bashkimit Sovjetik, por n\u00eb Azin\u00eb Qendrore klasat drejtuese po ndryshojn\u00eb: fillimisht ishte gjuha m\u00ebm\u00eb ruse, qen\u00eb nj\u00eb produkt i shkoll\u00ebs sovjetike, e shikonin Mosk\u00ebn si zgjidh\u00ebsen e problemeve; sot jan\u00eb m\u00eb pak t\u00eb lidhura me Rusin\u00eb. Ve\u00e7 k\u00ebsaj, lufta e ka p\u00ebrshpejtuar erozionin e sovranitetit efektin perandorak t\u00eb Mosk\u00ebs, me p\u00ebrjashtimin marxhinal t\u00eb Bjellorusis\u00eb. \u00cbsht\u00eb e qart\u00eb se n\u00eb Kaukaz, ku p\u00ebrplasjet midis Armenis\u00eb dhe Azerbaixhanit n\u00eb ndryshim nga e kaluara nuk e kan\u00eb par\u00eb nj\u00eb rol vendimtar t\u00eb Rusis\u00eb, e z\u00ebvend\u00ebsuar nga fuqi t\u00eb tjera. E gjitha kjo \u00ebsht\u00eb frut i dinamikave q\u00eb i shp\u00ebtojn\u00eb kontrollit ton\u00eb. Ve\u00e7 k\u00ebsaj, nuk \u00ebsht\u00eb e qart\u00eb n\u00ebse penetrimi kinez n\u00eb Azin\u00eb Qendrore \u00ebsht\u00eb krejt\u00ebsisht kund\u00ebr interesave tona. Sigurisht q\u00eb Pekini ka nj\u00eb influenc\u00eb t\u00eb caktuar grabitqare, iliberale dhe helmuese p\u00ebr pakicat q\u00eb i kan\u00eb shp\u00ebtuar Republik\u00ebs Popullore. Por qeverit\u00eb lokale pasja e raporteve t\u00eb diversifikuara me Kin\u00ebn, Turqin\u00eb dhe Per\u00ebndimin i stabilizon dhe i mbron nga k\u00ebrc\u00ebnimet ndaj pavar\u00ebsis\u00eb s\u00eb tyre. Shtetet e Bashkuara duhet t\u00eb jen\u00eb modest\u00eb n\u00eb Azin\u00eb Qendrore: nuk \u00ebsht\u00eb nj\u00eb prioritet dhe nuk do t\u00eb arrijn\u00eb kurr\u00eb ta barazojn\u00eb kurr\u00eb interesin dhe resurset e Pekinit p\u00ebr k\u00ebt\u00eb zon\u00eb, kaq e r\u00ebnd\u00ebsishme p\u00ebr stabilitetin e kufjve per\u00ebndimor\u00eb t\u00eb tij, gj\u00eb q\u00eb nuk do t\u00eb thot\u00eb se duhet t\u2019i harrojm\u00eb: duhet t\u00eb sigurohemi q\u00eb rajoni t\u00eb mos kaloj\u00eb nga nj\u00eb hegjemon tek tjetri.<\/p>\n

Eliminimi i identitetit perandorak t\u00eb Rusis\u00eb \u00ebsht\u00eb nj\u00eb objektiv i qeveris\u00eb s\u00eb Shteteve t\u00eb Bashkuara?<\/strong><\/p>\n

Duhet t\u00eb jet\u00eb. \u00cbsht\u00eb k\u00ebtu zanafilla e sfid\u00ebs ruse ndaj rendit me drejtim amerikan. Sepse \u00ebsht\u00eb mentaliteti yn\u00eb q\u00eb t\u00eb mos pranojm\u00eb perandori t\u00eb tjera, as midis aleat\u00ebve tan\u00eb. Boll t\u00eb shikojm\u00eb sesi kemi \u00ebeht\u00ebsuar shp\u00ebrb\u00ebrjen e perandoris\u00eb franceze gjat\u00eb shkolonizimit.<\/p>\n

I keni mjetet p\u00ebr ta ndryshuar k\u00ebt\u00eb identitet perandorak?<\/strong><\/p>\n

Jo.<\/p>\n

At\u00ebhere pse duhet t\u00eb ekzistoj\u00eb si objektiv di\u00e7ka p\u00ebr t\u00eb cil\u00ebn nuk i keni mjetet p\u00ebr ta arritur?<\/strong><\/p>\n

Nuk mund ta ndryshojm\u00eb domosdoshm\u00ebrisht at\u00eb q\u00eb ndodh n\u00eb Rusi dhe iden\u00eb e rus\u00ebve p\u00ebr vet\u00ebveten dhe vendin e tyre, por mund t\u00eb sigurojm\u00eb t\u00eb kufizojm\u00eb mjetet me t\u00eb cilat Moska kryen nj\u00eb politik\u00eb perandorake jasht\u00eb dhe n\u00eb koh\u00eb ky kufizim do t\u00eb ket\u00eb efekte ndaj zhvillimeve t\u00eb brendshme t\u00eb Rusis\u00eb. \u00cbsht\u00eb nj\u00eb influenc\u00eb indirekte, q\u00eb do t\u00eb mund t\u00eb prodhoj\u00eb pasoja n\u00eb harkun e disa gjeneratave. Pra nuk \u00ebsht\u00eb nj\u00eb objektiv afatshkurt\u00ebr.<\/p>\n

N\u00ebse nuk \u00ebsht\u00eb e mundur p\u00ebr Shtetet e Bashkuara t\u00eb bashk\u00ebekzistoj\u00eb me perandorit\u00eb e tjera, nuk \u00ebsht\u00eb mundur as nj\u00eb rend bot\u00ebror?<\/strong><\/p>\n

Nuk mendoj se \u00ebsht\u00eb i mundur nj\u00eb koncert i fuqive allaKissinger. Derikur Rusia dhe Kina refuzojn\u00eb kufijt\u00eb e tyre aktual\u00eb, k\u00ebrkojn\u00eb t\u2019i zgjerojn\u00eb dhe t\u00eb n\u00ebnshtrojn\u00eb fqinj\u00ebt, nuk mundt\u00eb q\u00ebndrojn\u00eb n\u00eb nj\u00eb sistem q\u00eb e refuzon k\u00ebt\u00eb lloj logjike. Nuk do t\u00eb thot\u00eb se do t\u00eb q\u00ebndrojn\u00eb krejt\u00ebsisht jasht\u00eb, duke par\u00eb q\u00eb jan\u00eb pjes\u00eb e disa institucioneve nd\u00ebrkomb\u00ebtare, por sistemi nuk do t\u00eb jet\u00eb kurr\u00eb n\u00eb harmoni. Nuk \u00ebsht\u00eb rast\u00ebsi q\u00eb raportet tona me Turqin\u00eb, nj\u00eb aleat i v\u00ebshtirl, por gjith\u00ebsesi nj\u00eb aleat, jan\u00eb p\u00ebrkeq\u00ebsuar pik\u00ebrisht kur kan\u00eb dal\u00eb n\u00eb sip\u00ebrfaqe gjurm\u00ebt e s\u00eb kaluar\u00ebs perandorake t\u00eb saj. Ankaraja \u00ebsht\u00eb nj\u00eb rival i Mosk\u00ebs, luan nj\u00eb rol t\u00eb r\u00ebnd\u00ebsish\u00ebm n\u00eb luft\u00ebn e Ukrain\u00ebs, \u00ebsht\u00eb m\u00eb pak k\u00ebrc\u00ebnuese se rus\u00ebt dhe kinez\u00ebt p\u00ebr shkak t\u00eb mjeteve inferiore, mb\u00ebshtet n\u00eb pjes\u00ebn m\u00eb t\u00eb madhe interesat amerikane n\u00eb Lindjen e Mesme \u2013 me p\u00ebrjashtimin e r\u00ebnd\u00ebsish\u00ebm t\u00eb Siris\u00eb. Por ambiciet perandorake t\u00eb saj gjenerojn\u00eb f\u00ebrkime t\u00eb pashmangshme me Shtetet e Bashkuara dhe ka mund\u00ebsi q\u00eb me kalimin e koh\u00ebs do t\u00eb gjenerojn\u00eb tensione edhe m\u00eb intensive.<\/p>\n

N\u00eb librin tuan t\u00eb fundit, \u201cEmpires of Eurasia\u201d, keni shkruar se nj\u00eb perandori plazmon strukturat sociale dhe institucionet politike t\u00eb periferive. Pra edhe Shtetet e Bashkuara jan\u00eb perandori?<\/strong><\/p>\n

Po, kan\u00eb qen\u00eb dhe, n\u00eb nj\u00eb far\u00eb kuptimi, jan\u00eb akoma. Nuk na p\u00eblqen sesi sillen perandorit\u00eb e tjera pasi k\u00ebt\u00eb t\u00eb drejt\u00eb e duam p\u00ebr veten ton\u00eb. \u00cbsht\u00eb hipokrit? Po, por n\u00eb Uashington \u00ebsht\u00eb marxhinal kush beson v\u00ebrtet se Amerika nuk duhet t\u2019u thot\u00eb t\u00eb tjerve sesi t\u00eb menaxhojn\u00eb pun\u00ebt e tyre t\u00eb brendshme. Askush q\u00eb ka nj\u00eb influenc\u00eb politike mendon se Shtetet e Bashkuara nuk duhet t\u2019i inkurajojn\u00eb vendet e huaja nga transparenca, demokracia dhe gjith\u00e7ka tjet\u00ebr. As administrata Trump nuk e ka ndryshuar k\u00ebt\u00eb logjik\u00eb: kishte vlera t\u00eb ndryshme p\u00ebr t\u00eb p\u00ebrhapur, por gjithmon\u00eb p\u00ebr shp\u00ebrndarje b\u00ebhej fjal\u00eb.<\/p>\n

(nga Limes<\/em>)<\/p>\n

P\u00ebrgatiti<\/strong><\/p>\n

ARMIN TIRANA<\/strong><\/p>\n","protected":false},"excerpt":{"rendered":"

Bashk\u00ebbisedim me Jeffrey Mankoff, hulumtues n\u00eb Center for Strategic Research t\u00eb National Defense University Shtetet e Bashkuara jan\u00eb n\u00eb avantazh n\u00eb konkurrenc\u00ebn strategjike me Kin\u00ebn dhe Rusin\u00eb? P\u00ebr momentin, Shtetet e Bashkuara jan\u00eb n\u00eb pozicion t\u00eb mir\u00eb. Lufta n\u00eb Ukrain\u00eb ka qen\u00eb nj\u00eb fiasko strategjike p\u00ebr Rusin\u00eb. Moska ka humbur 180 mij\u00eb ushtar\u00eb, mij\u00ebra tanke …<\/p>\n","protected":false},"author":4,"featured_media":46486,"comment_status":"open","ping_status":"open","sticky":false,"template":"","format":"standard","meta":{"om_disable_all_campaigns":false,"_monsterinsights_skip_tracking":false,"_monsterinsights_sitenote_active":false,"_monsterinsights_sitenote_note":"","_monsterinsights_sitenote_category":0,"footnotes":""},"categories":[42],"tags":[],"aioseo_notices":[],"_links":{"self":[{"href":"https:\/\/foltore.al\/index.php\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/posts\/46485"}],"collection":[{"href":"https:\/\/foltore.al\/index.php\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/posts"}],"about":[{"href":"https:\/\/foltore.al\/index.php\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/types\/post"}],"author":[{"embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/foltore.al\/index.php\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/users\/4"}],"replies":[{"embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/foltore.al\/index.php\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/comments?post=46485"}],"version-history":[{"count":0,"href":"https:\/\/foltore.al\/index.php\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/posts\/46485\/revisions"}],"wp:featuredmedia":[{"embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/foltore.al\/index.php\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/media\/46486"}],"wp:attachment":[{"href":"https:\/\/foltore.al\/index.php\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/media?parent=46485"}],"wp:term":[{"taxonomy":"category","embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/foltore.al\/index.php\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/categories?post=46485"},{"taxonomy":"post_tag","embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/foltore.al\/index.php\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/tags?post=46485"}],"curies":[{"name":"wp","href":"https:\/\/api.w.org\/{rel}","templated":true}]}}