{"id":41575,"date":"2023-03-25T12:45:08","date_gmt":"2023-03-25T12:45:08","guid":{"rendered":"https:\/\/rdnews.al\/?p=41575"},"modified":"2023-03-25T12:47:14","modified_gmt":"2023-03-25T12:47:14","slug":"kina-dhe-rusia-limitet-e-shumta-e-partnieritetit-pa-limite","status":"publish","type":"post","link":"https:\/\/foltore.al\/index.php\/2023\/03\/25\/kina-dhe-rusia-limitet-e-shumta-e-partnieritetit-pa-limite\/","title":{"rendered":"Kina dhe Rusia: limitet e shumta e partnieritetit pa limite"},"content":{"rendered":"

Takimi Xi \u2013 Putin i 21 marsit, i mbajtur n\u00eb Mosk\u00eb, \u00ebsht\u00eb sigurisht nj\u00eb fakt politikisht i r\u00ebnd\u00ebsish\u00ebm q\u00eb konfirmon ekzistenc\u00ebn e nj\u00eb partneriteti t\u00eb v\u00ebrtet\u00eb kino \u2013 rus. B\u00ebhet fjal\u00eb p\u00ebr nj\u00eb marr\u00ebdh\u00ebnie strategjike e dominuar padyshim nga Kina, me nj\u00eb ekonomi (dhe nj\u00eb popullsi) rreth 10 her\u00eb m\u00eb t\u00eb madhe se ajo ruse, p\u00ebrve\u00e7se me koeficent\u00eb rritjeje dhe nj\u00eb potencial patjet\u00ebr superior.\u00a0<\/strong><\/p>\n

Ky raport bilateral \u00ebsht\u00eb edhe rasti unik n\u00eb bot\u00eb i nj\u00eb vendi q\u00eb pranon faktikisht nj\u00eb pozicion\u00a0junior partner<\/em>\u00a0kundrejt Pekinit; n\u00eb t\u00eb v\u00ebrtet\u00eb n\u00ebnvizon at\u00eb se Republika Popullore praktikisht nuk ka aleat\u00eb dhe deri Koreja e Veriut nuk konsiderohet aspak e detyruar n\u00eb asnj\u00eb m\u00ebnyr\u00eb ndaj fqinjit t\u00eb madh t\u00eb saj. Motivi i k\u00ebsaj zgjedhjeje ruse \u00ebsht\u00eb mjaft i qart\u00eb: Putini \u00ebsht\u00eb n\u00eb nj\u00eb situat\u00eb v\u00ebshtir\u00ebsie t\u00eb r\u00ebnd\u00eb dhe i duhet t\u00eb pranoj\u00eb ndihm\u00ebn e fuqis\u00eb s\u00eb vetme n\u00eb bot\u00eb e gatshme t\u2019ia jap\u00eb \u2013 vende t\u00eb tjera me t\u00eb cilat Moska mban raporte t\u00eb p\u00ebrzem\u00ebrta jan\u00eb shum\u00eb pak t\u00eb dobishme (p\u00ebr shembull Bjellorusia), apo pak influent\u00eb (p\u00ebr shembull Algjeria), apo deri m\u00eb tani t\u00eb mbivler\u00ebsuar (p\u00ebr shembull Turqia). Sigurisht jan\u00eb shum\u00eb qeveri t\u00eb gatshme t\u00eb blejn\u00eb nga Rusia gaz dhe naft\u00eb (mendohet p\u00ebr Indin\u00eb), si edhe armatime; por kjo nuk mjafton t\u00eb nd\u00ebrtohen aleanca dhe as koalicione fleksib\u00ebl. Me pak fjal\u00eb, Kina \u00ebsht\u00eb basti i madh p\u00ebr t\u00eb zgjidhur fatet e Federat\u00ebs Ruse pas \u201cdowngrading<\/em>\u201d t\u00eb r\u00ebnd\u00eb t\u00eb p\u00ebsuar me ng\u00ebr\u00e7in ushtarak n\u00eb Ukranin\u00eb dhe sanksionet per\u00ebndimore.<\/p>\n

N\u00eb nj\u00eb kontekst t\u00eb till\u00eb, Xi Jinping po dikton kushtet e tij, q\u00eb progresivisht do t\u00eb tentojn\u00eb ta n\u00ebnshtrojn\u00eb t\u00eb gjith\u00eb ekonomin\u00eb ruse (sidomos resurset natyrore siberiane) ndaj nevojave kineze. Do t\u00eb jet\u00eb \u00e7mimi p\u00ebr t\u2019u paguar p\u00ebr m\u00eb tep\u00ebr ende i pap\u00ebrcaktuar, duke par\u00eb se t\u00eb dy lider\u00ebt n\u00eb takimin e Kremlinit kan\u00eb l\u00ebshuar deklarata zyrtare mjaft ambige: mir\u00ebkuptimi i tyre \u00ebsht\u00eb \u201cn\u00eb t\u00eb gjith\u00eb fush\u00ebn\u201d, por nuk \u00ebsht\u00eb nj\u00eb aleanc\u00eb politiko \u2013 ushtarake (at\u00ebhere t\u00eb vjen t\u00eb pyes\u00ebsh se \u00e7far\u00eb \u00ebsht\u00eb); t\u00eb dy vendet konsiderohen \u201cfuqi t\u00eb m\u00ebdha kufitare\u201d, por kjo \u00ebsht\u00eb nj\u00eb e dh\u00ebn\u00eb gjeografike tashm\u00eb e njohur lidhur me afr\u00ebsin\u00eb dhe nj\u00eb dhurat\u00eb retorike ndaj Rusis\u00eb lidhur me statusin e \u201cfuqis\u00eb s\u00eb madhe\u201d; s\u00eb fundi, \u201cplani i paqes\u201d kinez p\u00ebr Ukrain\u00ebn, i paraqitur n\u00eb shkurt me 12 pikat e tij, konsiderohet nj\u00eb baz\u00eb e mir\u00eb negociuese, por Kina rezervohet t\u00eb mbaj\u00eb nj\u00eb \u201cpozicion i paansh\u00ebm\u201d n\u00eb konflikt. Sinqerisht mbetesh dyzues p\u00ebrpara konfrontimet t\u00eb shumta verbale. Si\u00e7 do ta shohim m\u00eb posht\u00eb, nj\u00eb shpjegim i mundsh\u00ebm \u00ebsht\u00eb se pik\u00ebrisht Pekini nuk ka n\u00eb realitet idet\u00eb krejt\u00ebsisht t\u00eb qarta mbi t\u00eb ardhmen e af\u00ebrt dhe duan t\u2019i mbajn\u00eb duart e lira, nga nj\u00eb pozicion force relative.<\/p>\n

Nd\u00ebrkaq, disa v\u00ebzhgues kan\u00eb v\u00ebrejtur me t\u00eb drejt\u00eb se po realizohet plot\u00ebsisht shk\u00ebputja e Rusis\u00eb nga Europa, dometh\u00ebn\u00eb fundi i nj\u00eb vizioni t\u00eb mundsh\u00ebm \u201ceuraziatik\u201d i p\u00ebrgjithsh\u00ebm. E v\u00ebrtet\u00eb, por nuk n\u00ebnkupton se Per\u00ebndimi e ka hedhur Mosk\u00ebn n\u00eb krah\u00ebt e Pekinit: asnj\u00eb \u201cl\u00ebshim\u201d specifik europian apo amerikan do t\u00eb mund t\u00eb k\u00ebnaq\u00eb ambicien putiniane p\u00ebr rind\u00ebrtimin e nj\u00eb perandorie (ruso \u2013 sovjetike) t\u00eb humbur, n\u00eb mos tjet\u00ebr p\u00ebrve\u00e7se pjes\u00eb t\u00eb k\u00ebsaj perandorie jan\u00eb ankoruar tashm\u00eb fuqimisht n\u00eb Bashkimin Europian, gjithashtu edhe n\u00eb NATO, n\u00eb baz\u00eb t\u00eb vullnetit t\u00eb lir\u00eb t\u00eb shprehur nga popuj sovran\u00eb. Vet\u00eb Ukraina \u00ebsht\u00eb nj\u00eb shtet i njohur jo vet\u00ebm nga Kombet e Bashkuara, por nga vet\u00eb Federata Ruse me dy traktate dypal\u00ebshe (1994 dhe 1997). Sigurisht nuk \u00ebsht\u00eb komuniteti euroamerikan apo G7 q\u00eb kan\u00eb vendosur q\u00eb Rusia t\u00eb pushtoj\u00eb nj\u00eb vend fqinj dhe m\u00ebnyra me t\u00eb cil\u00ebn forcat e armatosura ruse punojn\u00eb p\u00ebr t\u00eb shkat\u00ebrruar k\u00ebt\u00eb vend e b\u00ebn thjesht t\u00eb pamundur nj\u00eb raport paritar me lidershipin aktual t\u00eb Mosk\u00ebs. N\u00eb thelb, vizioni efektiv \u201ceuraziatik\u201d q\u00eb Rusia ndjek nuk \u00ebsht\u00eb n\u00eb pajtim as me at\u00eb t\u00eb Bashkimit Europian, as t\u00eb NATO, dhe nuk demonstrohet nj\u00eb opsion i praktikuesh\u00ebm.<\/p>\n

Nga ana tjet\u00ebr, grupi drejtues p\u00ebrreth Putinit e ka spostuar q\u00ebllimisht qendr\u00ebn grvaitacionale nd\u00ebrkomb\u00ebtare t\u00eb vendit: n\u00eb vitin 2014 ishte an\u00ebtar i G8 (p\u00ebrve\u00e7se i G20) dhe deri n\u00eb fillimet e vitit 2022 kishte akoma nj\u00eb raport t\u00eb formalizuar me NATO (anipse duke mos qen\u00eb shtet an\u00ebtar); tani synon gjith\u00e7ka mbi \u201cpartneritetin<\/em>\u00a0pa limite\u201d me Kin\u00ebn. \u00cbsht\u00eb v\u00ebrtet Moska ajo q\u00eb \u00ebsht\u00eb hedhur midis krah\u00ebve t\u00eb Pekinit; nuk e dim\u00eb n\u00ebse p\u00ebr gabim apo p\u00ebr llogaritje, por gjith\u00ebsesi pa asnj\u00eb nevoj\u00eb p\u00ebr t\u00eb qen\u00eb e shtyr\u00eb n\u00eb k\u00ebt\u00eb drejtim. N\u00ebse mbahen t\u00eb qarta k\u00ebto pika, mund t\u00eb vler\u00ebsohet m\u00eb mir\u00eb edhe kuadri m\u00eb i gjer\u00eb strategjik q\u00eb fillon t\u00eb shfaqet nga partneriteti kino \u2013 rus, sidomos lidhur me rolin global t\u00eb Kin\u00ebs.<\/p>\n

T\u00eb dyja vendet bashkohen nga kund\u00ebrv\u00ebnia ndaj rendit amerikano \u2013 centrik, q\u00eb faktikisht e konsiderojn\u00eb n\u00eb \u00e7do aspekt t\u00eb shtyr\u00eb, por p\u00ebr ta z\u00ebvend\u00ebsuar me \u00e7far\u00eb? Pyetja \u00ebsht\u00eb e v\u00ebshtir\u00eb sidomos pse Kina, q\u00eb ka shum\u00eb p\u00ebr t\u00eb humbur n\u00eb rastin e nj\u00eb frakture t\u00eb zinxhirave fam\u00ebk\u00ebqinj global\u00eb t\u00eb vler\u00ebs, pasi jan\u00eb ingredienti thelb\u00ebsor i suksesve t\u00eb tij ekonomike n\u00eb 20 apo 30 vitet e fundit. Ekonomia e dyt\u00eb bot\u00ebrore ka sot nj\u00eb trajektore rritjeje t\u00eb paqart\u00eb pasi modeli i tij i zhvillimit ka ezauruar potencialin e vet duke arritur n\u00eb t\u00eb mir\u00ebnjohurin \u201ckurth t\u00eb pag\u00ebs mesatare\u201d; sh\u00ebrben nj\u00eb model ndryshe, q\u00eb n\u00eb \u00e7do rast do t\u00eb ket\u00eb nevoj\u00eb p\u00ebr tregjet globale dhe nuk do t\u00eb mund t\u00eb mb\u00ebshtetet vet\u00ebm mbi miq\u00ebsin\u00eb v\u00ebllaz\u00ebrore me N\u00ebn\u00ebn Rusi.<\/p>\n

Paraqitet at\u00ebhere nj\u00eb sfid\u00eb e madhe p\u00ebr rendin e supozuar global alternativ q\u00eb Pekini do t\u00eb donte t\u00eb nd\u00ebrtonte. Mbi t\u00eb gjitha sepse do t\u2019i duhet t\u00eb p\u00ebrfshij\u00eb t\u00eb pakt\u00ebn disa aleat\u00eb aktual\u00eb t\u00eb Shteteve t\u00eb Bashkuara, me tregjet e tyre t\u00eb pasura dhe teknologjit\u00eb e tyre; pastaj sepse do t\u2019i duhet t\u00eb t\u00ebrheq\u00eb bart\u00ebsit e resurseve natyrale t\u00eb ndomosdoshme n\u00eb Azi, Afrik\u00eb dhe Amerik\u00eb Latine, por q\u00eb nxjerrin akoma sot benefite t\u00eb konsiderueshme nga organizma nd\u00ebrkomb\u00ebtare si FMN dhe Banka Bot\u00ebrore, p\u00ebrve\u00e7se duan t\u00eb ruajn\u00eb aksesin e tyre t\u00eb drejt\u00ebp\u00ebrdrejt\u00eb n\u00eb flukset financiare dhe teknologjike per\u00ebndimore. Pjesa m\u00eb e madhe e vendeve q\u00eb Pekini ka k\u00ebrkuar t\u2019i p\u00ebrfshij\u00eb, p\u00ebr shembull, n\u00eb\u00a0Belt&Road Initiative<\/em>, kan\u00eb vazhduar gjithmon\u00eb dhe megjithat\u00eb t\u00eb luajn\u00eb n\u00eb shum\u00eb tavolina, duke e refuzuar opsionin e mbylljes n\u00eb nj\u00eb orbit\u00eb ekskluzive kineze.<\/p>\n

Me pak fjal\u00eb, kuadri nuk duket kaq i favorsh\u00ebm ndaj ambicieve globale t\u00eb Pekinit, n\u00ebse shikohet p\u00ebrtej episodeve t\u00eb ve\u00e7anta, p\u00ebr sa t\u00eb r\u00ebnd\u00ebsishme dhe vet\u00eb Xi Jinping e di shum\u00eb mir\u00eb se perspektivat ekonomike t\u00eb kompanive t\u00eb tij (t\u00eb tilla i konsideron, duke par\u00eb natyr\u00ebn e regjimit) varen n\u00eb pjes\u00ebn m\u00eb t\u00eb madhe nga nj\u00eb kontekst nd\u00ebrkomb\u00ebtar \u201cbeninj\u201d, q\u00eb nga ana e tij varet n\u00eb praktik\u00eb nga nj\u00eb nivel minimal i bashk\u00ebpunimit apo aq m\u00eb pak bashk\u00ebjetese me Shtetet e Bashkuara. K\u00ebtu lufta ruso \u2013 ukrainase ka shum\u00eb leksione p\u00ebr t\u00eb ofruar, duke par\u00eb reagimin absolutisht t\u00eb papritur t\u00eb Uashingtonit, Bashkimit Europian, NATO, G7 dhe t\u00eb nj\u00eb shumice t\u00eb madhe t\u00eb an\u00ebtar\u00ebve t\u00eb Kombeve t\u00eb Bashkuara. N\u00ebse nj\u00eb shtet k\u00ebrc\u00ebnon hapur nj\u00eb rregull themelore t\u00eb sistemit nd\u00ebrkomb\u00ebtar aktual, kund\u00ebrgoditja \u00ebsht\u00eb shum\u00eb e fort\u00eb dhe jet\u00ebgjat\u00eb. Pason q\u00eb, n\u00ebse Kina ka nevoj\u00eb p\u00ebr sistemin nd\u00ebrkomb\u00ebtar, nuk do t\u00eb mund t\u2019i ndje\u00eb interesat e veta duke e sulmuar frontalisht. Sidomos n\u00eb vijim t\u00eb nd\u00ebrmjet\u00ebsimit t\u00eb fundit kinez p\u00ebr t\u00eb rinisur raportet diplomatike midis Arabis\u00eb Saudite dhe Iranit \u2013 q\u00eb p\u00ebr m\u00eb tep\u00ebr qen\u00eb tashm\u00eb n\u00eb zhvillim t\u00eb fsheht\u00eb prej koh\u00ebsh dhe k\u00ebshtu nuk kishin nevoj\u00eb p\u00ebr nj\u00eb nd\u00ebrmjet\u00ebsim t\u00eb v\u00ebrtet\u00eb \u2013 mund t\u00eb pyetet n\u00ebse Pekini \u00ebsht\u00eb tashm\u00eb n\u00eb gjendje t\u00eb ushtroj\u00eb megjithat\u00eb nj\u00eb influenc\u00eb politike v\u00ebrtet globale.<\/p>\n

P\u00ebrgjigja \u00ebsht\u00eb se padyshim po tentohet ta b\u00ebj\u00eb, edhe n\u00eb kontinentin afrikan, por kjo ndodh pasi q\u00eb ambiciet kineze jan\u00eb \u201cngrir\u00eb\u201d faktikisht brenda kuadrantit indopaq\u00ebsor, ka mund\u00ebsi vendimtar p\u00ebr ta transformuar Kin\u00ebn n\u00eb nj\u00eb fuqi \u201csistemike\u201d p\u00ebrgjat\u00eb rrug\u00ebve t\u00eb m\u00ebdha detare. Faktikisht k\u00ebtu n\u00eb dekad\u00ebn e fundit vende t\u00eb ndryshme ky\u00e7e p\u00ebr ekuilibrat makrorajonale kan\u00eb intensifikuar raportet e aleanc\u00ebs me Uashingtonin, pik\u00ebrisht n\u00eb funksion t\u00eb frenimit t\u00eb Republik\u00ebs Popullore. Ka qen\u00eb k\u00ebshtu pas nj\u00eb periudhe paqart\u00ebsie dhe midis p\u00ebrpjekjeve p\u00ebr t\u00eb shp\u00ebtuar t\u00eb pakt\u00ebn raportet treg\u00ebtare me Kin\u00ebn, p\u00ebr Japonin\u00eb dhe Koren\u00eb e Jugut, p\u00ebr ASEAN dhe Australin\u00eb, e deri p\u00ebr nj\u00eb \u201cmund\u00ebs t\u00eb lir\u00eb\u201d si India \u2013 q\u00eb pa buj\u00eb po e rrit nivelin e saj t\u00eb bashk\u00ebpunimit me Shtetet e Bashkuara, p\u00ebr shembull n\u00eb formatin \u201cQuad\u201d (Quadrilateral Security Dialogue<\/em>) bashk\u00eb me Australin\u00eb dhe Japonin\u00eb.<\/p>\n

Pra, realisht diplomacia kineze l\u00ebviz me dinamiz\u00ebm m\u00eb t\u00eb madh sesa n\u00eb t\u00eb kaluar\u00ebn e fundit, e pajisur me fuqin\u00eb ekonomiko \u2013 treg\u00ebtare dhe t\u00eb nj\u00eb lirie m\u00eb t\u00eb madhe manovre n\u00eb munges\u00eb t\u00eb \u00e7far\u00ebdo brenge ndaj rgjimeve politikeme t\u00eb cilat b\u00ebn traktativa. Ama nuk buron nj\u00eb garanci suksesi, n\u00ebse nd\u00ebrkoh\u00eb vet\u00eb qeverit\u00eb q\u00eb takojn\u00eb emisar\u00ebt kinez\u00eb preferojn\u00eb t\u00eb q\u00ebndrojn\u00eb larg nga nj\u00eb raport i formalizuar me Pekinin dhe kultivojn\u00eb nd\u00ebrkoh\u00eb shum\u00eb raporte t\u00eb tjera \u2013 t\u00eb kihet parasysh Arabia Saudite. Nj\u00eb konsiderat\u00eb konkluzive n\u00eb k\u00ebt\u00eb kuptim mund t\u00eb hedh\u00eb drit\u00eb mbi rolin e mundsh\u00ebm direkt t\u00eb Xi Jinping n\u00eb kriz\u00ebn ukrainase: mir\u00ebsevjen nj\u00eb dialog eventual me presidentin Zelensky q\u00eb ndoshta \u00e7on n\u00eb ndonj\u00eb propozim konkret p\u00ebr t\u2019ju paraqitur m\u00eb pas Rusis\u00eb \u2013 q\u00eb faktikisht Kievi e ka vler\u00ebsuar menj\u00ebher\u00eb si hipotez\u00eb pune \u2013 por duke e ditur se nj\u00eb plan negociues ende nuk \u00ebsht\u00eb. Diplomat\u00ebt kinez\u00eb duhet t\u00eb kuptojn\u00eb plot\u00ebsisht se nj\u00eb list\u00eb deklarimesh gjenerike parimore, midis tyre reciprokisht kontradiktore, nuk e b\u00ebn nj\u00eb plan paqeje. \u00cbsht\u00eb v\u00ebrtet shum\u00eb pak p\u00ebr k\u00eb aspiron t\u00eb krijoj\u00eb nj\u00eb \u201crend t\u00eb ri bot\u00ebror\u201d, sidomos n\u00ebse mendohet ta b\u00ebj\u00eb n\u00eb unison me Federat\u00ebn Ruse.<\/p>\n

(nga\u00a0Aspenia Institute<\/em>)<\/p>\n

P\u00ebrgatiti<\/strong><\/p>\n

ARMIN TIRANA<\/strong><\/p>\n","protected":false},"excerpt":{"rendered":"

Takimi Xi \u2013 Putin i 21 marsit, i mbajtur n\u00eb Mosk\u00eb, \u00ebsht\u00eb sigurisht nj\u00eb fakt politikisht i r\u00ebnd\u00ebsish\u00ebm q\u00eb konfirmon ekzistenc\u00ebn e nj\u00eb partneriteti t\u00eb v\u00ebrtet\u00eb kino \u2013 rus. B\u00ebhet fjal\u00eb p\u00ebr nj\u00eb marr\u00ebdh\u00ebnie strategjike e dominuar padyshim nga Kina, me nj\u00eb ekonomi (dhe nj\u00eb popullsi) rreth 10 her\u00eb m\u00eb t\u00eb madhe se ajo ruse, …<\/p>\n","protected":false},"author":4,"featured_media":41578,"comment_status":"open","ping_status":"open","sticky":false,"template":"","format":"standard","meta":{"om_disable_all_campaigns":false,"_monsterinsights_skip_tracking":false,"_monsterinsights_sitenote_active":false,"_monsterinsights_sitenote_note":"","_monsterinsights_sitenote_category":0,"footnotes":""},"categories":[42],"tags":[],"aioseo_notices":[],"_links":{"self":[{"href":"https:\/\/foltore.al\/index.php\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/posts\/41575"}],"collection":[{"href":"https:\/\/foltore.al\/index.php\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/posts"}],"about":[{"href":"https:\/\/foltore.al\/index.php\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/types\/post"}],"author":[{"embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/foltore.al\/index.php\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/users\/4"}],"replies":[{"embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/foltore.al\/index.php\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/comments?post=41575"}],"version-history":[{"count":0,"href":"https:\/\/foltore.al\/index.php\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/posts\/41575\/revisions"}],"wp:featuredmedia":[{"embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/foltore.al\/index.php\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/media\/41578"}],"wp:attachment":[{"href":"https:\/\/foltore.al\/index.php\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/media?parent=41575"}],"wp:term":[{"taxonomy":"category","embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/foltore.al\/index.php\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/categories?post=41575"},{"taxonomy":"post_tag","embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/foltore.al\/index.php\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/tags?post=41575"}],"curies":[{"name":"wp","href":"https:\/\/api.w.org\/{rel}","templated":true}]}}