{"id":40931,"date":"2023-03-20T09:59:08","date_gmt":"2023-03-20T09:59:08","guid":{"rendered":"https:\/\/rdnews.al\/?p=40931"},"modified":"2023-03-20T09:59:08","modified_gmt":"2023-03-20T09:59:08","slug":"ta-mendosh-luften-per-te-mos-e-bere-strategji-berthamore-nga-viti-1945","status":"publish","type":"post","link":"https:\/\/foltore.al\/index.php\/2023\/03\/20\/ta-mendosh-luften-per-te-mos-e-bere-strategji-berthamore-nga-viti-1945\/","title":{"rendered":"Ta mendosh luft\u00ebn p\u00ebr t\u00eb mos e b\u00ebr\u00eb: Strategji b\u00ebrthamore nga viti 1945"},"content":{"rendered":"

\u00a0<\/em>\u201cSi vis pacem, para bellum<\/em>\u201d. Megjith\u00ebse e formuluar rreth 2000 vite m\u00eb par\u00eb, shprehja latine duket si e b\u00ebr\u00eb me mas\u00eb p\u00ebr t\u00eb p\u00ebrshkruar rolin shkurajues t\u00eb arm\u00ebs atomike n\u00eb historin\u00eb e marr\u00ebdh\u00ebnieve nd\u00ebrkomb\u00ebtare. \u201cBomba\u201d \u00ebsht\u00eb p\u00ebrdorur vet\u00ebm 2 her\u00eb n\u00eb histori, por ka peshuar shum\u00eb mbi politikat e fuqive t\u00eb m\u00ebdha, duke e penguar p\u00ebrdorimin e luft\u00ebs totale.<\/strong><\/p>\n

Superfuqia e arm\u00ebs perceptohet m\u00eb par\u00eb se akoma t\u00eb jet\u00eb konceptuar: i gjendet gjurm\u00eb n\u00eb nj\u00eb let\u00ebr t\u00eb fizikanit Leo Szilard, e kund\u00ebrfirmosur nga Albert Einstein dhe e drejtuar presidentit Franklin Delano Roosevelt n\u00eb 1939, si edhe n\u00eb debatet q\u00eb i paraprin\u00eb p\u00ebrdorimit t\u00eb saj, menj\u00ebher\u00eb pas eksperimentit t\u00eb par\u00eb t\u00eb arrir\u00eb t\u00eb Alamogordo (16 korrik 1945). Grupi nd\u00ebrkomb\u00ebtar i k\u00ebrkuesve, i mbledhur duke filluar nga 1941 n\u00eb New Mexico n\u00eb kontekstin e \u201cProjektit Manhattan\u201d, kishte plot\u00ebsisht vet\u00ebdije p\u00ebr karakterin vendimtar t\u00eb bomb\u00ebs atomike dhe ishte i obsesionuar nga frika se nazist\u00ebt mund t\u00eb arrinin ta kishin p\u00ebrpara aleat\u00ebve. Lufta n\u00eb Europ\u00eb mbaron p\u00ebrpara se arma arrin t\u00eb p\u00ebrfundohet nga gjerman\u00ebt dhe n\u00eb at\u00eb koh\u00eb aleat\u00ebt qen\u00eb tashm\u00eb n\u00eb dijeni se shkenc\u00ebtar\u00ebt gjerman\u00eb nuk i kishin finalizuar k\u00ebrkimet e tyre.<\/p>\n

Vet\u00ebm nj\u00eb bomb\u00eb m\u00eb e fuqishme?<\/strong><\/p>\n

Pasi ka hipotezuar nj\u00eb demonstrim t\u00eb thjesht\u00eb t\u00eb arm\u00ebs n\u00eb Shtetet e Bashkuara apo mbi nj\u00eb zon\u00eb jo t\u00eb populluar t\u00eb Japonis\u00eb \u2013 praktikisht nj\u00eb eksperiment i ri, por publik \u2013 drejtuesit aleat\u00eb vendos\u00ebn t\u00eb l\u00ebshonin t\u00eb dy bombat e disponueshme (q\u00eb p\u00ebrdornin dy teknologji t\u00eb ndryshme), mbi objektiva real\u00eb. U hartua nj\u00eb list\u00eb, e orientuar nga qytete industrial\u00eb; zgjedhja e objektivave finale do t\u00eb varet nga kushtet e fluturimit dit\u00ebn e l\u00ebshimit. N\u00ebse d\u00ebmet dhe numri i viktimave kan\u00eb qen\u00eb m\u00eb t\u00eb m\u00ebdha n\u00eb Hiroshima (6 gusht 1945) se n\u00eb Nagasaki (9 gusht), megjith\u00ebnse e bomba e dyt\u00eb me plutonium ishte m\u00eb e fuqishme se e para me uranium, kjo u var kryesisht nga topografia e zon\u00ebs s\u00eb bombarduar, p\u00ebr shkak t\u00eb rilevimit m\u00eb t\u00eb thyer t\u00eb qytetit Nagasaki, i ndodhur n\u00eb ishullin Kyushu.<\/p>\n

Me arm\u00ebn atomike, \u201cbombardimi strategjik\u201d arrinte efikasitetin q\u00eb kishin njoftuar teoricien\u00ebt e arm\u00ebs n\u00eb fillimet e shekullit dhe n\u00eb ve\u00e7anti gjenerali italian Giulio Douhet, autor i \u201dDominimit t\u00eb ajrit\u201d (1921). M\u00eb 14 gusht 1945 perandori i Japonis\u00eb njoftonte kapitullimin q\u00eb qeveria e tij kishte refuzuar n\u00eb fillimin e muajit n\u00eb kund\u00ebrp\u00ebrgjigje t\u00eb Aleat\u00ebve, pas Konferenc\u00ebs s\u00eb Potsdamit. R\u00ebnia e ushtris\u00eb s\u00eb Man\u00e7uris\u00eb p\u00ebrball\u00eb ofensiv\u00ebs sovjetike t\u00eb 8 gushtit 1945 nuk do t\u00eb kishte qen\u00eb sigurisht i mjaftuesh\u00ebm i vet\u00ebm sa p\u00ebr t\u00eb \u00e7armatosur vullnetin e mbrojtjes s\u00eb arqipelagut \u201cderi n\u00eb njeriun e fundit\u201d, sikur perspektiva e bombardimit aotmik e p\u00ebrs\u00ebritur nuk do ta kishte b\u00ebr\u00eb k\u00ebt\u00eb mbrojtje totalisht t\u00eb kot\u00eb.<\/p>\n

P\u00ebr amerikan\u00ebt, arma atomike paraqiste nj\u00eb avantazh t\u00eb dyfisht\u00eb: reduktimin e humbjeve njer\u00ebzore q\u00eb pushtimi i Japnis\u00eb do t\u00eb provokonte dhe t\u00eb shmangte detyrimin e ndarjes s\u00eb arqipelagut me sovjetik\u00ebt, si\u00e7 kishte ndodhur n\u00eb Europ\u00eb. Bombardimet atomike jan\u00eb njehrazi akti i fundit i Luft\u00ebs s\u00eb Dyt\u00eb Bot\u00ebrore dhe i pari i Luft\u00ebs s\u00eb Ftoht\u00eb: presidenti i ri n\u00ebnkupton ta p\u00ebrdor\u00eb monopolin t\u00eb cilin disponon vendi i tij mbi arm\u00ebn atomike p\u00ebr t\u2019i kufizuar amibiciet sovjetike. Nga ana tjet\u00ebr, amerikan\u00ebt mendojn\u00eb se monopoli i tyre do t\u00eb zgjas\u00eb gjat\u00eb, fakt q\u00eb favorizon pranimin e statutisit t\u00eb tyre t\u00eb ri si fuqi bot\u00ebrore. Shpejt do t\u00eb zhg\u00ebnjehen, duke filluar nga 1949, duke zbuluar nd\u00ebrkoh\u00eb efikasitetin e spiunazhit sovjetik dhe t\u00ebrheqjen e ideologjis\u00eb komuniste ndaj elitave per\u00ebndimore: afera Alger Hiss, diplomatit amerikan dhe spiunit n\u00eb sh\u00ebrbimin e sovjetik\u00ebve, dhe zbulimet e para mbi 5 agjent\u00ebt dopioxhhokist\u00eb t\u00eb Cambridge, kontribuan n\u00eb nj\u00eb pjes\u00eb t\u00eb madhe n\u00eb krijimin e nj\u00eb konteksti anksiogjen n\u00eb Shtetet e Bashkuara, n\u00eb zbulimin (nga ana e Truman) e eksperimentit t\u00eb par\u00eb atomik t\u00eb Bashkimit Sovjetik, t\u00eb fitores s\u00eb Maos n\u00eb Kin\u00eb dhe t\u00eb fillimit t\u00eb luft\u00ebs n\u00eb Kore, kontekst q\u00eb \u00e7oi n\u00eb histerin\u00eb antikomuniste (dhe antielitare) t\u00eb makkartizmit.<\/p>\n

Nga 8 gushti 1945, hyrja n\u00eb er\u00ebn e re u n\u00ebnvizua n\u00eb nj\u00eb editorial t\u00eb ri t\u00eb Albert Camus n\u00eb t\u00eb p\u00ebrditshmen \u201cCombat\u201d: \u201cN\u00eb nj\u00eb t\u00eb ardhme pakashum\u00eb t\u00eb af\u00ebrt, do t\u00eb duhet t\u00eb zgjidhet midis vet\u00ebvrasjes kolektive apo p\u00ebrdorimit inteligjent t\u00eb arritjeve shkencore. [\u2026] Padyshim q\u00eb i ofrohet njer\u00ebzimit mund\u00ebsia e tij e fundit\u201d. Por n\u00ebse impakti moral perceptohet menj\u00ebher\u00eb, risia strategjike dhe kthesa n\u00eb nj\u00eb logjik\u00eb shkurajimi n\u00eb imponohen menj\u00ebher\u00eb. N\u00eb k\u00ebt\u00eb periudh\u00eb, ushtarak\u00ebt kan\u00eb tendenc\u00ebn ta konsiderojn\u00eb arm\u00ebn e re si nj\u00eb bomb\u00eb thjesht m\u00eb t\u00eb fuqishme, dometh\u00ebn\u00eb mund\u00ebsin\u00eb e sigurimit t\u00eb efekteve fizike m\u00eb t\u00eb m\u00ebdha, me kosto m\u00eb t\u00eb ul\u00ebta.<\/p>\n

N\u00eb Bigger bang for the Buck<\/em><\/strong><\/p>\n

\u00cbsht\u00eb n\u00eb k\u00ebt\u00eb logjik\u00eb q\u00eb gjenerali Douglas MacArthur, i v\u00ebn\u00eb n\u00eb v\u00ebshtir\u00ebsi n\u00eb Kore nga nd\u00ebrhyrja e \u201cvullnetar\u00ebve kinez\u00eb\u201d n\u00eb n\u00ebntorin e 1950, nxit bombardimin e bazave dhe p\u00ebrq\u00ebndrimit t\u00eb trupave kineze me arm\u00ebn atomike. Duke ia refuzuar k\u00ebt\u00eb mund\u00ebsi, presidenti Truman kryen nj\u00eb revolucion t\u00eb dyfisht\u00eb: inauguron er\u00ebn e luft\u00ebs s\u00eb \u201ckufizuar\u201d, duke l\u00ebn\u00eb t\u00eb kuptohet se ekziston nj\u00eb nivel k\u00ebrc\u00ebnimi p\u00ebrtej t\u00eb cilit p\u00ebrdorimi i arm\u00ebs atomike nuk \u00ebsht\u00eb i justifikuar; rivendos logjik\u00ebn e Clausewitz, duke n\u00ebnvizuar se \u00ebsht\u00eb q\u00ebllimi politik dhe jo efikasiteti ushtarak kriteri final i vler\u00ebsimit t\u00eb shkall\u00ebs s\u00eb luft\u00ebs legjitime p\u00ebr t\u2019u ushtrurar n\u00eb nj\u00eb konflikt. Kjo logjik\u00eb, q\u00eb luft\u00ebrat bot\u00ebrore, sidomos e dyta, e kishin kaluar ar\u00ebsyen e dimensionit \u201ctotal\u201d t\u00eb tyre q\u00eb justifikonte nj\u00eb ngritje t\u00eb ekstremit deri n\u00eb asgj\u00ebsimin e armikut, duhej t\u00eb kryente at\u00eb t\u00eb \u201cshkurajimit\u201d: posti i vet\u00ebn n\u00eb loj\u00ebn politike e p\u00ebrshtatshme p\u00ebr fuqin\u00eb shkat\u00ebrrimtare t\u00eb arm\u00ebs atomike ishte mbrojtja e sovranitetit final t\u00eb saj, e pavar\u00ebsis\u00eb s\u00eb saj dhe modelit social t\u00eb saj, dometh\u00ebn\u00eb rezistenca ndaj nj\u00eb pushtimi t\u00eb drejt\u00ebp\u00ebrdrejt\u00eb apo e aneksimit t\u00eb aleat\u00ebve kryesore dhe thelb\u00ebsor\u00eb, t\u00eb identifikuar n\u00ebp\u00ebrmjet aleancave formale, i s\u00eb cil\u00ebs e para p\u00ebrfaq\u00ebsohet nga Aleanca Atlantike (NATO, 1949).<\/p>\n

Evolucioni teknologjik dhe gjeopolitik do t\u00eb kontribuoj\u00eb t\u00eb b\u00ebj\u00eb k\u00ebt\u00eb konceptim t\u00eb nd\u00ebrthurur me arm\u00ebn b\u00ebrthamore: n\u00eb fillimet e viteve \u201990 kalimi nga bomba A (fiksioni i atomit) tek bomba H (e mb\u00ebshtetur mbi energjin\u00eb e fuzionit) e shum\u00ebfishon akoma fuqin\u00eb e saj \u2013 kalohet na shkalla me kiloton (ekuivalent me 1000 ton eksploziv klasik TNT) n\u00eb megaton (milion ton). T\u00eb dy t\u00eb m\u00ebdhenjt\u00eb tashm\u00eb mund t\u00eb hipotezojn\u00eb nj\u00eb \u201cshkat\u00ebrrim reciprok t\u00eb siguruar\u201d, e p\u00ebrmbledhur me akronimin anglisht MAD (Mutual Atomic Destruction ose i \u201c\u00e7mendur\u201d), q\u00eb n\u00ebnvizon edhe karakterin e pakuptimt\u00eb t\u00eb nj\u00eb lufte q\u00eb do t\u00eb prodhonte vet\u00ebm fitimtar\u00eb. Ama me kushtin e disponimit t\u00eb nj\u00eb disponimit t\u00eb nj\u00eb vektori p\u00ebr ta hedhur bomb\u00ebn mbi armikun! Nga ky k\u00ebndv\u00ebshtrim amerikan\u00ebt jan\u00eb pak m\u00eb p\u00ebrpara, pasi qysh nga Lufta e Dyt\u00eb Bot\u00ebrore dispononojn\u00eb nj\u00eb flot\u00eb bombarduesish me nj\u00eb aft\u00ebsi t\u00eb madhe ngarkese dhe rreze t\u00eb gjat\u00eb veprimi: nga B29 e 1945 tek B52 e v\u00ebn\u00eb n\u00eb sh\u00ebrbim 10 vite m\u00eb von\u00eb. Sovjetik\u00ebt do t\u00eb duhet t\u00eb presin fundin e viteve \u201950 dhe dominimin e plot\u00eb t\u00eb tyre n\u00eb sektorin e raketave nd\u00ebrkontinentale, i demonstruar nga l\u00ebshimi i satelitit Sputnik m\u00eb 1957, p\u00ebr t\u00eb rivendosur nj\u00eb simetri n\u00eb shkruajimin b\u00ebrthamor.<\/p>\n

Arma atomike rr\u00ebshqet progresivisht drejt statusit t\u00eb nj\u00eb arme \u201cmosp\u00ebrdorimi\u201d, q\u00eb ve\u00e7 t\u00eb tjerash nuk rezulton ende e fituar n\u00eb fillimet e viteve \u201960, ku p\u00ebrdorimi i saj mbetet i hipotezuar dhe i integruar edhe n\u00eb strategjin\u00eb diplomatike: politika e \u201cNew Look\u201d e administrat\u00ebs Eisenhower (1953 \u2013 1960) bazohet mbi \u201craprezaljen masive\u201d dhe mbi nj\u00eb rritje t\u00eb aresnalit b\u00ebrthamor, n\u00eb kurriz t\u00eb mjeteve kovencionale, dhe mbi p\u00ebrdorimin e saj si mjet presioni n\u00eb kriza, n\u00eb nj\u00eb strategji \u201cmbi pragun e humner\u00ebs\u201d, sipas formul\u00ebs s\u00eb sekretarit t\u00eb Shtetit John Foster Dulles, e ilustruar nga krizat rreth Tajvanit (1954 \u2013 1958). N\u00eb at\u00eb koh\u00eb Nikita Hrushovit do t\u2019i duhet t\u00eb veproj\u00eb shum\u00eb p\u00ebr ta kalitur mosdurimin e Mao Ce Dunit, q\u00eb i kualifikon Shtetet e Bashkuara si \u201ctig\u00ebr prej letre\u201d, por duke shtuar \u201cama me dh\u00ebmb\u00eb b\u00ebrthamor\u00eb\u201d.<\/p>\n

Pik\u00ebrisht kjo strategji aplikohet n\u00ebn John Fitzgerald Kennedy n\u00eb kriz\u00ebn e raketave t\u00eb Kub\u00ebs t\u00eb viti 1962. Suksesi i Kennedy \u2013 p\u00ebr disa aspekte relativ, pasi Hrushovi siguron n\u00eb \u00e7do rast mbijetes\u00ebn e garantuar (shenjt\u00ebrimin) e regjimit kastrist t\u00eb Kub\u00ebs \u2013 bazohet jo m\u00eb pak mbi nj\u00eb gabim vler\u00ebsimi t\u00eb situat\u00ebs reale, pasi amerikan\u00ebt e kapin informacionin q\u00eb bombat b\u00ebrthamore jan\u00eb n\u00eb rrug\u00ebn e transportit n\u00eb karvanin kund\u00ebr t\u00eb cilit ata po organizojn\u00eb bllokimin detar, nd\u00ebrsa ka mund\u00ebsi ato ndodhen n\u00eb ishullin karaibik.<\/p>\n

Kriza e Kub\u00ebs zbulon megjithat\u00eb rreziqet e shp\u00ebrthimit t\u00eb nj\u00eb shk\u00ebmbimi b\u00ebrthamor n\u00eb nj\u00eb kriz\u00eb t\u00eb keqmenaxhuar apo, m\u00eb m\u00eb keq, prej paparashikueshm\u00ebris\u00eb apo nj\u00eb aksidenti t\u00eb past\u00ebr, nj\u00eb ngjarje q\u00eb trazon tashm\u00eb shtatmadhorit\u00eb dhe kulturat popullore (si\u00e7 demonstrohet gjer\u00ebsisht nga dy filmat e dal\u00eb n\u00eb 1964: \u201cDoctor Starngelove\u201d i Stanley Kubrik, dhe \u201cFail safe\u201d i Sidney Lumet). P\u00ebr t\u00eb shmangur nj\u00eb ndodhi t\u00eb till\u00eb, t\u00eb dy t\u00eb m\u00ebdhenjt\u00eb adoptojn\u00eb masa besimi reciprok dhe nj\u00eb dialog t\u00eb drejtp\u00ebrdrejt\u00eb, fal\u00eb instalimit t\u00eb nj\u00eb \u201ctelefoni t\u00eb kuq\u201d (fillimisht nj\u00eb teleks) midis Sht\u00ebpis\u00eb s\u00eb Bardh\u00eb dhe Kremlinit, por Robert MacNamara, sekretari i Mbrojtjes i Kennedy dhe i Lyndon B. Johnson, e evoluon doktrin\u00ebn b\u00ebrthamore amerikane nga \u201craprezaljet masive\u201d, t\u00eb parashikuara nga \u201cNew Look\u201d m\u00eb 1962, n\u00eb \u201cp\u00ebrgjigjen graduale\u201d. Ideja \u00ebsht\u00eb se p\u00ebrgjigja ndaj nj\u00eb agresioni nuk mund t\u00eb kufizohet n\u00eb nj\u00eb alternativ\u00eb t\u00eb vetme \u2013 un\u00eb nuk b\u00ebj asgj\u00eb apo un\u00eb vetrifikoj (proces t\u00eb cilit i n\u00ebnshtrohen shum\u00eb materiale n\u00ebn efektin e temperaturave shum\u00eb t\u00eb larta t\u00eb shkaktuara nga shp\u00ebrthimi atomik), me rrezikun q\u00eb t\u00eb asgj\u00ebsohem edhe un\u00eb \u2013 por kalon n\u00ebp\u00ebr etapa t\u00eb ndryshme, t\u00eb sh\u00ebnuara nga nj\u00eb progresion n\u00eb n\u00eb shkall\u00eb t\u00eb arm\u00ebve b\u00ebrthamore p\u00ebr t\u2019u p\u00ebrdorur: fillimisht shp\u00ebrthime taktike (antiforc\u00eb, dometh\u00ebn\u00eb t\u00eb integruara n\u00eb fush\u00ebn e betej\u00ebs), dometh\u00ebn\u00eb parastrategjike (duke synuar n\u00eb baza, nivele komandimi e mb\u00ebshtetjeje, n\u00eb thell\u00ebsi, t\u00eb dispozitivit armik) dhe, s\u00eb fundi, arm\u00eb strategjike (me nj\u00eb logjik\u00eb antiqytet dhe nj\u00eb paraliz\u00eb t\u00eb nivelit politik). \u00c7do etap\u00eb do t\u00eb jepte koh\u00ebn t\u00eb eksplorohej fusha e negociatave p\u00ebr t\u00eb shkarkuar \u201cngjitjen drejt ekstremeve\u201d.<\/p>\n

Shkurajimi p\u00ebrfundon p\u00ebr t\u2019u imponuar<\/strong><\/p>\n

Nj\u00eb sofistikim i till\u00eb n\u00eb skenar b\u00ebhej e mundur nga evolucionet teknologjike, sidomos miniaturizmi i arm\u00ebve, por k\u00ebto p\u00ebrcaktojn\u00eb dy pasoja: nevoj\u00eb disponimi t\u00eb nj\u00eb arsenali b\u00ebrthamor t\u00eb plot\u00eb p\u00ebr t\u00eb qen\u00eb n\u00eb gjendje t\u00eb godasin n\u00eb \u00e7do nivel me instrumentin m\u00eb t\u00eb p\u00ebrshtatsh\u00ebm dhe t\u2019i b\u00ebjn\u00eb konfliktet \u201cinfra b\u00ebrthamore\u201d m\u00eb t\u00eb besuesh\u00ebm, duke i delimituar dhe p\u00ebrmbajtur rreziqet e eskalimit dhe t\u00eb humbjes s\u00eb kontrollit. Kjo doktrin\u00eb rezultonte p\u00ebrsoshm\u00ebrisht komode p\u00ebr dy fuqit\u00eb e m\u00ebdha, q\u00eb n\u00eb fund arrinin t\u00eb binin dakord mbi nevoj\u00ebn e shkurajimit reciprok, por n\u00eb m\u00ebnyr\u00eb t\u00eb besueshme; nj\u00eb shkurajim q\u00eb nuk duhet t\u00eb b\u00ebhej sinonim me paraliz\u00ebn. N\u00eb t\u00eb kund\u00ebrt, nj\u00eb doktrin\u00eb e till\u00eb rezultonte pak e vler\u00ebsuar, p\u00ebrve\u00e7se nga Kina, edhe nga aleat\u00ebt e amerikan\u00ebve, sidomos nga Europa, q\u00eb i frik\u00ebsohej se mos b\u00ebhej s\u00ebrish fush\u00eb beteje. Faktikisht, marr\u00ebveshja i priste rrug\u00ebn shpres\u00ebs s\u00eb fuqive t\u00eb reja b\u00ebrthamore (Franc\u00eb, Angli dhe Kin\u00eb) p\u00ebr t\u2019u b\u00ebr\u00eb fuqi b\u00ebrthamore t\u00eb pavarura: k\u00ebto t\u00eb fundit, t\u00eb hyra n\u00eb klubin b\u00ebrthamor n\u00eb vitet \u201960, duke mos disponuar arsenale b\u00ebrthamore t\u00eb mbidimensionuara si dy t\u00eb m\u00ebdhat\u00eb, e bazonin strategjin\u00eb e tyre sidomos mbi \u201cpushtetin nivelues t\u00eb atomit\u201d, q\u00eb p\u00ebrkthehej n\u00eb nj\u00eb sulmt t\u00eb p\u00ebrgjithsh\u00ebm jo t\u00eb diskriminuar antiqytet dhe duke mbetur n\u00eb nive\u00eb t\u00eb t\u00eb gjith\u00eb ose asgj\u00ebs\u00eb s\u00eb \u201craprezaljeve masive\u201d.<\/p>\n

Rreziku i nj\u00eb konflikti atomik t\u00eb p\u00ebrgjith\u00ebsuar, i shkaktuar nga iniciativa e keqinterpretuar e nj\u00eb \u201cfuqie t\u00eb vog\u00ebl\u201d b\u00ebrthamore i shtyn Shtetet e Bashkuara dhe Bashkimin Sovjetik t\u00eb favorizojn\u00eb \u00e7do lloj mase kufizuese p\u00ebr t\u00eb kund\u00ebrshtuar lindjen e fuqive t\u00eb reja atomike: ndalim t\u00eb eksperimenteve b\u00ebrthamore atmosferike (1963), denuklearizim t\u00eb hap\u00ebsir\u00ebs e t\u00eb trupave qiellor\u00eb dhe sidomos Traktati i Mosproliferimit (TNP, 1968) i konkluduar n\u00eb kuad\u00ebr t\u00eb Kombeve t\u00eb Bashkuara, por ndaj t\u00eb cilit as Franca, as Kina nuk kan\u00eb aderuar n\u00eb at\u00eb koh\u00eb (do t\u00eb aderojn\u00eb m\u00eb 1992), si edhe India, Pakistani apo Izraeli, q\u00eb jan\u00eb b\u00ebr\u00eb m\u00eb pas fuqi atomike. Koreja e Veriut, firmatare n\u00eb 1968, \u00ebsht\u00eb t\u00ebrhequr nga Traktati n\u00eb 2003 dhe ka proceduar n\u00eb 3 eksperimente b\u00ebrthamore n\u00ebntok\u00ebsore n\u00eb 2006, 2009 dhe 2013.<\/p>\n

Aderimi i dy t\u00eb m\u00ebdhave n\u00eb strategjin\u00eb e shkurajimit shpjegon edhe konkludimin e negociatave strategjike bilaterale, t\u00eb filluara nga vitet \u201860: marr\u00ebveshjet SALT 1 (Strategic Arms Limitation Talks) dhe ABM (Anti Ballistic Missiles), q\u00eb shpesh ngat\u00ebrrohen, pasi t\u00eb firmosura n\u00eb t\u00eb nj\u00ebjt\u00ebn dit\u00eb (26 maj 1972) n\u00eb Mosk\u00eb, por q\u00eb kan\u00eb t\u00eb b\u00ebjn\u00eb me lloje amr\u00ebsh shum\u00eb t\u00eb ndryshme. SALT 1 parashikon nj\u00eb tavan t\u00eb numrit global t\u00eb raketave q\u00eb disponojn\u00eb dy fuqit\u00eb e m\u00ebdha, me nj\u00eb ndarje t\u00eb diferencuar sipas vektor\u00ebve (aj\u00ebr \u2013 tok\u00eb, tok\u00eb \u2013 tok\u00eb apo det \u2013 tok\u00eb), por me nj\u00eb ekuivalenc\u00eb globale t\u00eb arsenaleve t\u00eb tyre: praktikisht b\u00ebhet fjal\u00eb p\u00ebr njohjen e parimit t\u00eb barazis\u00eb midis t\u00eb dy antagonist\u00ebve. Traktati ABM ndalon rreshtimin e sistemeve t\u00eb interceptimit t\u00eb raketave nd\u00ebrkontinentale, me p\u00ebrjashtim t\u00eb dy vendeve n\u00eb \u00e7do vend p\u00ebr t\u00eb mbrojtur kryeqytetin dhe nj\u00eb baze p\u00ebr l\u00ebshimin e raketave dhe ndalon \u00e7do k\u00ebrkim t\u00eb m\u00ebtejsh\u00ebm n\u00eb k\u00ebt\u00eb lloj amr\u00ebsh; vulnerabiliteti reciprok i kund\u00ebrshtar\u00ebve duhet t\u00eb ruhet derikur funksioni i shkurajimit reciprok, siguria e t\u00eb q\u00ebnit t\u00eb asgj\u00ebsuar n\u00eb rast t\u00eb nj\u00eb sulmi atomik, duke frenuar n\u00eb kt\u00eb m\u00ebnyr\u00eb \u00e7do mund\u00ebsi agresioni \u2013 b\u00ebhet fjal\u00eb praktikisht p\u00ebr t\u00eb famshmin \u201cekuilib\u00ebr t\u00eb terrorit\u201d. Efektivisht, hyrja n\u00eb sh\u00ebrbim gjat\u00eb viteve \u201960 e t\u00eb parave SNLE (N\u00ebndet\u00ebse B\u00ebrthamore L\u00ebshues Raketash) i b\u00ebnte t\u00eb pashmangshme raprezaljet ndaj nj\u00eb sulmi edhe b\u00ebrthamor: k\u00ebto platforma t\u00eb l\u00ebvizshme, t\u00eb pajisura me raketa fillimisht me rreze prej 2000 \u2013 2500 kilometrash, jan\u00eb praktikisht jo t\u00eb individualizueshme (zbulueshme) dhe, p\u00ebr pasoj\u00eb, t\u00eb pamundura p\u00ebr t\u2019u neutralizuar n\u00eb m\u00ebnyr\u00eb parandaluese, n\u00eb kund\u00ebrshtim nga bombarduesit strategjik\u00eb apo vet\u00eb raketat nd\u00ebrkontinentale.<\/p>\n

Prandaj traktatet e Mosk\u00ebs kan\u00eb qen\u00eb jet\u00ebshkurt\u00ebr. T\u00eb firmosur para pak kohe, SALT 1 ishte tejkaluar tashm\u00eb nga tekonologjia e raketave me testata t\u00eb shum\u00ebfishta me guid\u00eb t\u00eb pavarur (MIRV); k\u00ebto raketa t\u00eb reja do t\u00eb \u00e7ojn\u00eb n\u00eb firmosjen e Traktatit SALT 2 m\u00eb 1979, ku tavani i arsenaleve nuk do t\u00eb shprehet m\u00eb n\u00eb raketa, por n\u00eb testata b\u00ebrthamore. Edhe pse ky traktat nuk do t\u00eb ratifikohet nga Senati amerikan p\u00ebr raprezalje ndaj pushtimit sovjetik t\u00eb Afganistanit, Traktati SALT 2 do t\u00eb rezultoj\u00eb pakashum\u00eb i respektuar nga t\u00eb dyja pal\u00ebt. Traktati ABM aplikohet n\u00eb fakt deri n\u00eb vitet \u201880: programi k\u00ebrkimor IDS (Iniciativa e Mbrojtjes Strategjike), i mbiquajtur edhe \u201cLufta Yjore\u201d nga ana e shtypit, me rastin e njoftimit t\u00eb tij nga ana e presidentit Ronald Reagan m\u00eb 1983, p\u00ebrb\u00ebn nj\u00eb deformim t\u00eb par\u00eb, por q\u00eb nuk shpaloset n\u00eb asnj\u00eb mas\u00eb vendimtare n\u00eb terren, p\u00ebrpara se presidenti George Bush junior t\u00eb mos e denoncoj\u00eb hapur traktatin m\u00eb 2002. Faktikisht, denoncimi i Traktatit do t\u00eb p\u00ebrb\u00ebj\u00eb aktin paraprak p\u00ebr t\u00eb mund\u00ebsuar dislokimin e nj\u00eb mburoje antiraket\u00eb n\u00eb Shtetet e Bashkuara dhe n\u00eb Europ\u00eb.<\/p>\n

Rreshtimi k\u00ebtij sistemi t\u00eb mbrojtjes antiraket\u00eb rrezikon ta riv\u00ebr\u00eb n\u00eb diskutim strategjin\u00eb e shkurajimit? Ka mund\u00ebsi q\u00eb jo. Kapaciteti i saj mbetet i kufizuar, pasi ai fillimisht ka qen\u00eb i dimensionuar kund\u00ebr nj\u00eb sulmi t\u00eb realizuar nga nj\u00eb shtet \u201cbatak\u00e7i\u201d (p.sh. Koreja e Veriut), pra kund\u00ebr nj\u00eb numri t\u00eb kufizuar raketash. Rusia, me nj\u00eb arsenal q\u00eb num\u00ebron akoma m\u00eb shum\u00eb se 2600 raketa dhe rreth 2000 arm\u00eb taktike, nuk do t\u00eb kishte asnj\u00eb v\u00ebshtir\u00ebsi t\u2019i \u00e7ante mbrojtjet amerikane. N\u00eb t\u00eb kund\u00ebrt, vendet e tjera b\u00ebrthamore nuk do t\u00eb ishin minimalisht n\u00eb gjendje t\u2019i k\u00ebrc\u00ebnonin Shtetet e Bashkuara, n\u00eb rast se do ta kishin synimin dhe mund\u00ebsin\u00eb: k\u00ebrc\u00ebnimi koreanoverior do t\u00eb aplikohej p\u00ebr momentin sidomos n\u00eb nivel rajonal (Kore e Jugut, Japoni), por \u00e7\u00ebshtja paraqitet p\u00ebr Kin\u00ebn, vler\u00ebsimi i arsenalit b\u00ebrthamor t\u00eb s\u00eb cil\u00ebs rezulton shum\u00eb i mjegullt. Ushtria Popullore afrohet me standardet e fuqive t\u00eb m\u00ebdha \u2013 nj\u00eb SNLE kineze ka kryer nj\u00eb mision t\u00eb par\u00eb zyrtar shkurajimi gjat\u00eb 2015 \u2013 por vendi mund t\u00eb fus\u00eb n\u00eb ekuacionin strategjik nj\u00eb disimetri t\u00eb pazbatueshme, me natyr\u00eb demografike: me 1.4 miliard banor\u00eb, Kina \u00ebsht\u00eb 4 her\u00eb m\u00eb e populluar se Shtetet e Bashkuara dhe 10 her\u00eb se Rusia; shtrirja e territorit dhe masa e popullsis\u00eb s\u00eb saj mund t\u2019i shtyjn\u00eb drejtuesit e saj t\u00eb mendojn\u00eb se nj\u00eb sulm b\u00ebrthamor, edhe pse masiv, do t\u2019i linte pavar\u00ebsisht gjith\u00e7kaje mund\u00ebsin e mbijetes\u00ebs. Kjo ishte analiza e \u201cTimonierit t\u00eb Madh\u201d n\u00eb vitet \u201850. A mundet kjo logjik\u00eb t\u00eb frym\u00ebzoj\u00eb edhe \u201cTimonierin e Vog\u00ebl\u201d, q\u00eb ashtu si Mao p\u00ebrfiton nga nj\u00eb pushtet i p\u00ebrjetsh\u00ebm?<\/p>\n

P\u00ebrtej evolucioneve teknologjike, shkurajimi themelohet mbi perceptimin e vulnerabilitetit dhe mbi nj\u00eb probabilitet, jo asgj\u00eb, q\u00eb armiku t\u00eb shp\u00ebrthej\u00eb nj\u00eb kund\u00ebrsulm p\u00ebr raprezalje. N\u00ebse nj\u00ebri prej k\u00ebtyre parakushteve do t\u00eb pushonte s\u00eb q\u00ebni autonom dhe do t\u00eb futej n\u00eb vler\u00ebsimin e nj\u00eb raporti forcash dhe t\u00eb nj\u00eb shansi p\u00ebr fitore, si n\u00eb rastin e nj\u00eb konflikti konvencional. Ky kusht i ri ripropozon nj\u00eb situat\u00eb disekuilibri dhe mundl\u00ebsin\u00eb e p\u00ebrdorimit t\u00eb arm\u00ebve b\u00ebrthamore, n\u00eb nivel taktik, sidomos n\u00eb territorin europian. Ve\u00e7 t\u00eb tjerash duhet n\u00ebnvizuar se rreshtimi i sistemit IDS e mbulon akoma territorin e Europ\u00ebs Per\u00ebndimore nga nj\u00eb sulm b\u00ebrthamor rus, por p\u00ebr efekt t\u00eb Nenit 5 t\u00eb Traktatit t\u00eb NATO, nj\u00eb p\u00ebrdorim sa hipotetik, aq edhe i pamundur, b\u00ebrthamor taktik n\u00eb Ukrain\u00eb nuk do t\u00eb futej midis p\u00ebrgjigjeve t\u00eb mundshme automatike t\u00eb parashikuar nga traktati. P\u00ebr m\u00eb tep\u00ebr, p\u00ebr Europ\u00ebn ka ardhur momenti t\u00eb vendos\u00eb se \u00e7far\u00eb do t\u00eb b\u00ebj\u00eb kur t\u00eb rritet: krijimi i nj\u00eb ushtrie t\u00eb urueshme europiane, pa nj\u00eb komponente t\u00eb saj b\u00ebrthamore autonome, do ta shtrlngonte struktur\u00ebn e re vet\u00ebn n\u00eb shkurajimin konvencional dhe, p\u00ebr pasoj\u00eb, do t\u00eb ishte krejt\u00ebsisht dhe ka mund\u00ebsi vart\u00ebse e NATO. Ky vulnus i shpifur do t\u00eb kusht\u00ebzonte n\u00eb t\u00eb ardhmen edhe \u00e7far\u00ebdolloj vullneti api mund\u00ebsie p\u00ebr aksion politik autonom, dometh\u00ebn\u00eb p\u00ebr nj\u00eb politik\u00eb t\u00eb jashtme autonome. Me pak fjal\u00eb, nj\u00eb Europ\u00eb joautonome nuk do t\u00eb mund t\u00eb merrte iniciativa dhe do t\u00eb ishte gjithmon\u00eb e kusht\u00ebzuar nga q\u00ebndrimi i Shteteve t\u00eb Bashkuara, q\u00eb komandojn\u00eb NATO.<\/p>\n

Si\u00e7 na m\u00ebson historia, shkurajimi konvencional nuk ka funksionuar kurr\u00eb deri n\u00eb fund (n\u00eb m\u00ebnyr\u00eb absolute), pavar\u00ebsisht shprehjes latine si vis pacem para bellum, <\/em>q\u00eb p\u00ebrsa i p\u00ebrket pranimit t\u00eb saj konkret duhet t\u00eb azhurnohet jo n\u00eb bellum<\/em> e koh\u00ebs s\u00eb romak\u00ebve, por n\u00eb at\u00eb t\u00eb sot\u00ebm (dometh\u00ebn\u00eb p\u00ebrfshir\u00ebs t\u00eb gjith\u00eb rr\u00ebmuj\u00ebs ushtarake dhe, p\u00ebr pasoj\u00eb, edhe t\u00eb kapaciteteve ushtarake).<\/p>\n

(nga Storica<\/em>)<\/p>\n

P\u00ebrgatiti<\/strong><\/p>\n

ARMIN TIRANA<\/strong><\/p>\n","protected":false},"excerpt":{"rendered":"

\u00a0\u201cSi vis pacem, para bellum\u201d. Megjith\u00ebse e formuluar rreth 2000 vite m\u00eb par\u00eb, shprehja latine duket si e b\u00ebr\u00eb me mas\u00eb p\u00ebr t\u00eb p\u00ebrshkruar rolin shkurajues t\u00eb arm\u00ebs atomike n\u00eb historin\u00eb e marr\u00ebdh\u00ebnieve nd\u00ebrkomb\u00ebtare. \u201cBomba\u201d \u00ebsht\u00eb p\u00ebrdorur vet\u00ebm 2 her\u00eb n\u00eb histori, por ka peshuar shum\u00eb mbi politikat e fuqive t\u00eb m\u00ebdha, duke e penguar …<\/p>\n","protected":false},"author":4,"featured_media":40932,"comment_status":"open","ping_status":"open","sticky":false,"template":"","format":"standard","meta":{"om_disable_all_campaigns":false,"_monsterinsights_skip_tracking":false,"_monsterinsights_sitenote_active":false,"_monsterinsights_sitenote_note":"","_monsterinsights_sitenote_category":0,"footnotes":""},"categories":[42],"tags":[],"aioseo_notices":[],"_links":{"self":[{"href":"https:\/\/foltore.al\/index.php\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/posts\/40931"}],"collection":[{"href":"https:\/\/foltore.al\/index.php\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/posts"}],"about":[{"href":"https:\/\/foltore.al\/index.php\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/types\/post"}],"author":[{"embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/foltore.al\/index.php\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/users\/4"}],"replies":[{"embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/foltore.al\/index.php\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/comments?post=40931"}],"version-history":[{"count":0,"href":"https:\/\/foltore.al\/index.php\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/posts\/40931\/revisions"}],"wp:featuredmedia":[{"embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/foltore.al\/index.php\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/media\/40932"}],"wp:attachment":[{"href":"https:\/\/foltore.al\/index.php\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/media?parent=40931"}],"wp:term":[{"taxonomy":"category","embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/foltore.al\/index.php\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/categories?post=40931"},{"taxonomy":"post_tag","embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/foltore.al\/index.php\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/tags?post=40931"}],"curies":[{"name":"wp","href":"https:\/\/api.w.org\/{rel}","templated":true}]}}