{"id":3552,"date":"2022-01-31T10:10:46","date_gmt":"2022-01-31T10:10:46","guid":{"rendered":"https:\/\/rdnews.al\/?p=3552"},"modified":"2022-01-31T10:10:46","modified_gmt":"2022-01-31T10:10:46","slug":"ndjenja-e-rreshtimit-rus-ne-ukraine-dhe-kapacitetet-ushtarake-te-moskes","status":"publish","type":"post","link":"https:\/\/foltore.al\/index.php\/2022\/01\/31\/ndjenja-e-rreshtimit-rus-ne-ukraine-dhe-kapacitetet-ushtarake-te-moskes\/","title":{"rendered":"Ndjenja e rreshtimit rus n\u00eb Ukrain\u00eb dhe kapacitetet ushtarake t\u00eb Mosk\u00ebs"},"content":{"rendered":"

Intervist\u00eb me Pietro Batacchi<\/strong><\/em><\/p>\n

N\u00eb k\u00ebto jav\u00eb, rreziku i nj\u00eb lufte n\u00eb Europ\u00ebn Lindore, duket i lart\u00eb. L\u00ebvizjet e trupave ruse p\u00ebrgjat\u00eb kufirit ukrainas, por edhe n\u00eb Bjellorusi dhe n\u00eb Krime, shtyjn\u00eb q\u00eb t\u00eb mendohet se Moska po p\u00ebrgatitet t\u00eb kryej\u00eb nj\u00eb operacion ushtarak kund\u00ebr fqinjit t\u00eb tij per\u00ebndimor. Ekspert\u00ebt dhe analist\u00ebt ushtarak\u00eb e t\u00eb gjith\u00eb bot\u00ebs pyesin se cilat jan\u00eb q\u00ebllimet reale t\u00eb Putinit n\u00eb Ukrain\u00eb dhe mbi kapacitetin efektiv e forcave t\u00eb Mosk\u00ebs p\u00ebr t\u00eb kryer nj\u00eb operacion ushtarak me shkall\u00eb t\u00eb gjer\u00eb kund\u00ebr Kievit. P\u00ebr t\u00eb provuar q\u00eb t\u00eb b\u00ebjm\u00eb qart\u00ebsi mbi k\u00ebto pik\u00ebpyetje, i jemi drejtuar Doktor Pietro Batacchi, ekspert i \u00e7\u00ebshtjeve ushtarake dhe drejtor i Revist\u00ebs Italian Difesa, botimit lider t\u00eb sektorit n\u00eb Itali.<\/p>\n

Dre<\/strong>j<\/strong>tor,<\/strong> \u00e7far\u00eb mendoni p\u00ebr situat\u00ebn aktuale<\/strong>?<\/strong> Besoni se Rusia mendon realisht t\u00eb kryej\u00eb nj\u00eb operacion ushtarak n\u00eb shkall\u00eb t\u00eb gjer\u00eb n\u00eb Ukrain\u00eb<\/strong>?<\/strong><\/p>\n

Tendencialisht do t\u00eb thoja jo. Nuk besoj se Rusia synon t\u00eb imbarkohet n\u00eb nj\u00eb operacion t\u00eb k\u00ebsaj natyre. Besoj se aksionet n\u00eb t\u00eb cilat po asistojm\u00eb jan\u00eb p\u00ebr t\u2019u interpretuar m\u00eb shum\u00eb si nj\u00eb ushtrim t\u00eb diplomacis\u00eb koercitive, dometh\u00ebn\u00eb nga nj\u00eb diplomaci e forcuar nga k\u00ebrc\u00ebnimi i p\u00ebrdorimit t\u00eb forc\u00ebs. Edhe pse objektivat e Rusis\u00eb jan\u00eb t\u00eb qarta \u2013 Moska synon q\u00eb ta rind\u00ebrtoj\u00eb influenc\u00ebn e tij n\u00eb fqinjin e af\u00ebrt, p\u00ebr sa e mundur \u2013 nuk besoj se k\u00ebta mund t\u00eb justifikojn\u00eb sot t\u00eb justifikojn\u00eb nj\u00eb pushtim t\u00eb fqinjit t\u00eb tij per\u00ebndimor. Jam ndoshta i vetmi q\u00eb e them, por besoj se se veprimi i Kremlinit \u00ebsht\u00eb i prirur q\u00eb t\u00eb t\u00eb shmang\u00eb pik\u00ebrisht skenarin e kund\u00ebrt me at\u00eb q\u00eb hipotezohet sot. Po flas p\u00ebr nj\u00eb aksion t\u00eb mundsh\u00ebm ushtarak nga ana e Ukrain\u00ebs p\u00ebr t\u00eb rimarr\u00eb Donjeckun dhe zonat n\u00ebn kontrollin e separatist\u00ebve t\u00eb Donbasit. Moska d\u00ebshiron ta shmang\u00eb k\u00ebt\u00eb tentativ\u00eb. Sikur t\u00eb m\u00eb duhej t\u00eb b\u00ebja nj\u00eb bast, do t\u00eb synoja p\u00ebr k\u00ebt\u00eb hipotez\u00eb t\u00eb dyt\u00eb.<\/p>\n

P\u00ebrtej vullnetit ose jo p\u00ebr t\u2019u imbarkuar n\u00eb k\u00ebt\u00eb lloj nd\u00ebrmarrjeje, i disponon Rusia kapacitetet p\u00ebr t\u00eb kryer nj\u00eb operacion n\u00eb shkall\u00eb t\u00eb gjer\u00eb n\u00eb Ukrain\u00eb<\/strong>?\u00a0<\/strong><\/p>\n

Absolutisht q\u00eb po. Moska i ka kapacitetet dhe forcat p\u00ebr ta b\u00ebr\u00eb. Rusia ka rreshtuar n\u00eb kufi rreth 100000 njer\u00ebz, ndoshta m\u00eb shum\u00eb, dhe padyshim q\u00eb mund t\u00eb b\u00ebj\u00eb nj\u00eb aksion p\u00ebr t\u00eb marr\u00eb t\u00eb pakt\u00ebn nj\u00eb fet\u00eb t\u00eb territorit ukrainas, p\u00ebr ta zgjeruar kushinet\u00ebn q\u00eb p\u00ebrfaq\u00ebsohet sot nga zonat e Donbasit n\u00ebn kontrollin e separatist\u00ebve prorus\u00eb dhe kund\u00ebrshtari nuk do t\u2019i kishte kapacitetet p\u00ebr ta kund\u00ebrshtuar me efikasitet nj\u00eb aksion t\u00eb k\u00ebsaj natyre nga ana e Kremlinit.<\/p>\n

N\u00eb ver\u00ebn e <\/strong>2014 <\/strong>dh<\/strong>e<\/strong> n\u00eb dimrin e <\/strong>2015 for<\/strong>cat ruse kan\u00eb kryer dy ofensiva t\u00eb r\u00ebnd\u00ebsishme n\u00eb Ukrain\u00eb. M\u00eb pas, n\u00eb 2015, kan\u00eb nd\u00ebrhyr\u00eb n\u00eb <\/strong>Siri, <\/strong>n\u00eb mb\u00ebshtetje t\u00eb regjimit t\u00eb al <\/strong>Assad. <\/strong>Sa kan\u00eb influencuar k\u00ebt\u00eb p\u00ebrvoja n\u00eb forcat tok\u00ebsore ruse<\/strong>?<\/strong> Ka ndryshuar shum\u00eb komponentja tok\u00ebsore e Mosk\u00ebs gjat\u00eb k\u00ebtyre viteve<\/strong>?<\/strong><\/p>\n

N\u00eb realitet nuk ka ndryshuar shum\u00eb. Doktrina e forcave tok\u00ebsore ruse \u00ebsht\u00eb gjithmon\u00eb e nj\u00ebjta. Pastaj, sidomos n\u00eb Siri, rolin e protagonistit e kan\u00eb luajtur komponentja ajrore dhe ajo detare, nd\u00ebrsa forcat tok\u00ebsore kan\u00eb luajtur nj\u00eb rol m\u00eb t\u00eb vog\u00ebl. Qartazi nj\u00eb konflikt ukrainas do t\u00eb ishte shum\u00eb ndryshe respektivisht atij sirian. M\u00eb shum\u00eb, ai do t\u00eb ishte pabesueshm\u00ebrisht shum\u00eb m\u00eb i ngjash\u00ebm me skenarin gjeorgjian t\u00eb 2008. Respektivisht k\u00ebsaj, komponentja tok\u00ebsore ruse ka zgjidhur probleme t\u00eb ndryshme dhe ka b\u00ebr\u00eb nj\u00eb hap t\u00eb r\u00ebnd\u00ebsish\u00ebm p\u00ebrpara.<\/p>\n

Cilat probleme i \u00ebsht\u00eb dashur t\u00eb zgjidh\u00eb<\/strong>?<\/strong><\/p>\n

B\u00ebhet fjal\u00eb sidomos p\u00ebr nivelin e efikasitetoit t\u00eb disa mjeteve dhe disa sistemeve. Megjith\u00ebse ka p\u00ebrfaq\u00ebsuar nj\u00eb revolucion n\u00eb kuptimin e v\u00ebrtet\u00eb t\u00eb fjal\u00ebs \u2013 komponentja tok\u00ebsore ruse \u00ebsht\u00eb ende n\u00eb pjes\u00ebn m\u00eb t\u00eb madhe e nd\u00ebrtuar nga sisteme t\u00eb trash\u00ebguara nga lufta sovjetike \u2013 modernizimi i inauguruar pas zgjedhjeve t\u00eb 2008 ka sjell\u00eb p\u00ebrmir\u00ebsime t\u00eb konsiderueshme tek forcat tok\u00ebsore ruse. P\u00ebrvoja e luft\u00ebs gjeorgjiane kan\u00eb mund\u00ebsuar m\u00eb pas t\u00eb pimir\u00ebsohet kapacitete t\u00eb konsiderueshme, si Komanda dhe Kontrolli. Duke filluar nga ai vit e prapa, jan\u00eb b\u00ebr\u00eb p\u00ebrparime t\u00eb m\u00ebdha n\u00eb frontin e luft\u00ebs elektronike dhe kibernetike, dy aspekte q\u00eb mund t\u00eb ken\u00eb nj\u00eb fush\u00eb ekspresioni edhe n\u00eb kuad\u00ebr t\u00eb nj\u00eb konflikti n\u00eb shkall\u00eb t\u00eb gjer\u00eb n\u00eb Ukrain\u00eb. N\u00eb k\u00ebto dy sektor\u00eb Rusia rezulton superiore jo vet\u00ebm karshi Ukrain\u00ebs, por edhe shum\u00eb forcave t\u00eb armatosura per\u00ebndimore.<\/p>\n

Shum\u00eb v\u00ebzhgues dhe komentator\u00eb t\u00eb marr\u00ebdh\u00ebnieve nd\u00ebrkomb\u00ebtare shpesh nuk e n\u00ebnvler\u00ebsojn\u00eb entitetin e k\u00ebrc\u00ebnimit rus, duke n\u00ebnvizuar inferioritetin e Mosk\u00ebs n\u00eb dimensionin ekonomik dhe demografik<\/strong>.<\/strong><\/p>\n

K\u00ebto diskutime b\u00ebheshin n\u00eb koh\u00ebrat e Luft\u00ebs s\u00eb Dyt\u00eb Bot\u00ebrore dhe e kemi fjal\u00eb si ka p\u00ebrfunduar. Rusia disponon disa instrumenta q\u00eb i mund\u00ebsojn\u00eb t\u00eb luajn\u00eb n\u00eb planin nd\u00ebrkomb\u00ebtar n\u00eb rol shum\u00eb m\u00eb superior se ajo q\u00eb praktikisht \u00ebsht\u00eb pesha e saj ekonomike dhe demografike. Faktor\u00ebt e v\u00ebrtet\u00eb t\u00eb fuqis\u00eb s\u00eb Rusis\u00eb jan\u00eb disponueshm\u00ebria e resurseve energjitike, gazi in primis, dhe zgjerimi gjeografik, q\u00eb i garanton thell\u00ebsin\u00eb strategjike. Pastaj \u00ebsht\u00eb arsenali b\u00ebrthamor \u2013 mbi t\u00eb cilin Moska po vazhdon t\u00eb investoj\u00eb q\u00eb t\u2019u mund\u00ebsoj\u00eb modernizimin \u2013 t\u00eb cilit i asociojm\u00eb statusin e an\u00ebtarit t\u00eb p\u00ebrhersh\u00ebm t\u00eb K\u00ebshillit t\u00eb Sigurimit t\u00eb OKB. K\u00ebta element\u00eb i mund\u00ebsojn\u00eb Rusis\u00eb t\u00eb luaj\u00eb nj\u00eb rol fuqie t\u00eb dor\u00ebs s\u00eb par\u00eb. Shtoj m\u00eb pas se ky vend mund t\u00eb mb\u00ebshtetet akoma sot mbi nj\u00eb klas\u00eb drejtuese ende me vler\u00eb, nj\u00eb lidership me ide shum\u00eb t\u00eb qarta dhe e aft\u00eb t\u00eb alokoj\u00eb resurset p\u00ebr arritjen e objektivave q\u00eb p\u00ebrkufizohen. T\u00eb mos harrojm\u00eb se nd\u00ebrhyrja ruse n\u00eb Siri, p\u00ebr shembull, ka ndryshuar fatet e luft\u00ebs dhe ka synuar regjimin e al Assad, q\u00eb ishte nj\u00eb hap nga r\u00ebnia. Rusia luan nj\u00ebl rol t\u00eb fort\u00eb edhe n\u00eb Libi, sidomos fal\u00eb kontraktor\u00ebve t\u00eb saj dhe po merr nj\u00eb rol gjithnj\u00eb e m\u00eb t\u00eb r\u00ebnd\u00ebsishme edhe n\u00eb realitete t\u00eb tjera t\u00eb kontinentit afrikan. Pastaj, respektivisht me Per\u00ebndimin, Moska ka treguar se ka nj\u00eb raport me p\u00ebrdorimin e forc\u00ebs m\u00eb pak preokupues respektivisht me at\u00eb q\u00eb kemi n\u00eb Per\u00ebndim, gj\u00eb q\u00eb i mund\u00ebson t\u00eb b\u00ebj\u00eb nj\u00eb p\u00ebrdorim m\u00eb aktiv dhe m\u00eb asertiv t\u00eb forcave t\u00eb saj t\u00eb armatosura. Nuk mund t\u00eb n\u00ebnvler\u00ebsohet ky vend.<\/p>\n

Lidhur me raportin me p\u00ebrdorimin e forc\u00ebs, sa vlen mb\u00ebshtetja e opinionit publik rus n\u00eb zgjedhjen e p\u00ebrdorimit t\u00eb instrumentit ushtarak<\/strong>?<\/strong> Shum\u00eb v\u00ebzhgues mendojn\u00eb se opinioni publik nuk do t\u00eb lejonte nj\u00eb nd\u00ebrhyrje masive n\u00eb Ukrain\u00eb<\/strong>. \u00a0<\/strong><\/p>\n

Nuk besoj n\u00eb k\u00ebt\u00eb teori. Opinioni publik rus, sidomos kur b\u00ebhet fjal\u00eb p\u00ebr nj\u00eb fushat\u00eb ushtarake fitimtare, e ka zakon q\u00eb shtr\u00ebngohet p\u00ebrreth lidershipit politik. Konsideratat mbi baz\u00ebn e t\u00eb cilave k\u00ebto teori p\u00ebrq\u00ebndrohen besueshm\u00ebrisht mbi p\u00ebrvoj\u00ebn sovjetike n\u00eb Afganistan. Sikur t\u00eb ishte k\u00ebshtu, do t\u00eb ishin t\u00eb pabaza. Ajo e kryer n\u00eb at\u00eb vend n\u00eb mesin e viteve \u201880 ishte n\u00eb fakt nj\u00eb fushat\u00eb d\u00ebshtake q\u00eb t\u00ebrhiqej prej koh\u00ebsh pa rezultat dhe q\u00eb po shkaktonte nj\u00eb num\u00ebr t\u00eb lart\u00eb humbjesh forcave sovjetike. Ajo q\u00eb mund t\u00eb paraqitej sot do t\u00eb ishte n\u00eb fakt nj\u00eb konflikt afatshkurt\u00ebr me objektiva t\u00eb kufizuar dhe t\u00eb p\u00ebrmbajtur.<\/p>\n

Praktikisht, nd\u00ebrhyrja n\u00eb <\/strong>Siri n<\/strong>\u00eb<\/strong> 2015,<\/strong> p\u00ebr m\u00eb tep\u00ebr e ndodhur n\u00eb nj\u00eb moment ku Rusia dergjej n\u00eb kushte ekonomike m\u00eb t\u00eb k\u00ebqija respektivisht k\u00ebtyre aktualeve<\/strong>,<\/strong> nuk m\u00eb duket se pengohet ve\u00e7an\u00ebrisht nga opinioni publik<\/strong>.<\/strong><\/p>\n

E p\u00ebrs\u00ebris, popullsia ruse ka nj\u00eb raport shum\u00eb ndryshe me p\u00ebrdorimin e forc\u00ebs respektivisht me at\u00eb q\u00eb njohim n\u00eb Per\u00ebndim. Sidomos n\u00ebse nd\u00ebrhyrja \u00e7on n\u00eb rezultate konkrete, popullsia nuk rreshtohet kund\u00ebr k\u00ebtyre inciativave.<\/p>\n

Le t\u00eb vijm\u00eb tek Ukraina. <\/strong>Kiev<\/strong>i ka filluar t\u00eb marr\u00eb mb\u00ebshtetje ushtarake nga Shtetet e Bashkuara duke filluar nga <\/strong>2014. N<\/strong>\u00eb<\/strong> 2017, <\/strong>U<\/strong>ashington<\/strong>i ka filluar t\u00eb furnizoj\u00eb forcat ukrainase me arm\u00eb vdekjeprur\u00ebse, duke u d\u00ebrguar edhe disa qindra raketa antitanke<\/strong>.<\/strong> N\u00eb k\u00ebto jav\u00eb pastaj, p\u00ebrve\u00e7 Shteteve t\u00eb Bashkuara, vende t\u00eb tjera per\u00ebndimore kan\u00eb filluar t\u2019i d\u00ebrgojn\u00eb material ushtarak Ukrain\u00ebs<\/strong>.<\/strong> Sa vlejn\u00eb k\u00ebto furnizime<\/strong>?<\/strong> Mund ta b\u00ebjn\u00eb diferenc\u00ebn n\u00eb terren<\/strong>?<\/strong><\/p>\n

Ato q\u00eb Kievi ka marr\u00eb dhe po merr jan\u00eb furnizime q\u00eb do ta kishin pesh\u00ebn e tyre n\u00eb terren. N\u00eb ve\u00e7anti kur b\u00ebhet fjal\u00eb p\u00ebr raketat antitanke Javelin, q\u00eb jan\u00eb sisteme arme t\u00eb besueshme, efikase dhe mund t\u00eb keni nj\u00eb impakt negativ p\u00ebr forcat e korracuara ruse. Qartazi q\u00eb ky nuk \u00ebsht\u00eb nj\u00eb lloj mb\u00ebshtetjeje t\u00eb till\u00eb sa t\u00eb mund ta riekuilibroj\u00eb situat\u00ebn n\u00eb terren. B\u00ebhet fjal\u00eb p\u00ebr nj\u00eb mb\u00ebshtetje me nivel t\u00eb ul\u00ebt. Duhet interpretuar m\u00eb shum\u00eb si nj\u00eb mesazh politik ndaj nj\u00eb aktori q\u00eb do t\u00eb donte t\u00eb hynte n\u00eb NATO, por q\u00eb sot, p\u00ebr motive t\u00eb ndryshme \u2013 midis t\u00eb cilave, p\u00ebrve\u00e7 q\u00ebndrimit rus, jan\u00eb p\u00ebrfshir\u00eb edhe nivele t\u00eb m\u00ebdha korrupsioni dhe joefikasitete t\u00eb instrumentit ushtarak \u2013 nuk mund t\u00eb shpresoj\u00eb t\u00eb hyj\u00eb. Shtetet e Bashkuara dhe vendet europiane furnizojn\u00eb k\u00ebt\u00eb mb\u00ebshtetje p\u00ebr t\u2019i treguar af\u00ebrsi Kievit, por p\u00ebrtej nuk mund t\u00eb shtyhen.<\/p>\n

Por forcat e armatosura ukrainase nga <\/strong>2014<\/strong> jan\u00eb p\u00ebrmir\u00ebsuar. Konflikti n\u00eb <\/strong>Donbas, n<\/strong>\u00eb zhvillim prej tashm\u00eb 8 vitesh, i ka mund\u00ebsuar forcave t\u00eb Kievit t\u00eb fitojn\u00eb nj\u00eb p\u00ebrvoj\u00eb t\u00eb q\u00ebndrueshme<\/strong>.<\/strong><\/p>\n

Po, konflikti n\u00eb Ukrain\u00eb ka p\u00ebrfaq\u00ebsuar me siguri p\u00ebr forcat ukrainase nj\u00eb palest\u00ebr t\u00eb r\u00ebnd\u00ebsishme. Ato kan\u00eb siguruar rezultate t\u00eb mira n\u00eb fush\u00eb, fal\u00eb edhe forcave t\u00eb tyre paraushtarake. Ama rezultatet nuk kan\u00eb qen\u00eb edhe kaq pozitive. Separatist\u00ebt prorus\u00eb, fal\u00eb mb\u00ebshtetjes s\u00eb Mosk\u00ebs, kan\u00eb arritur t\u00eb pushtojn\u00eb nj\u00eb pjes\u00eb t\u00eb mir\u00eb t\u00eb Donbasit, me zona shum\u00eb t\u00eb r\u00ebnd\u00ebsishme si ato qytetit t\u00eb Donjeckut.<\/p>\n

L<\/strong>uft<\/strong>a<\/strong> q\u00eb \u00ebsht\u00eb luftuar dhe q\u00eb po luftohet ende n\u00eb Donbas duket si i ngjan nj\u00eb lufte llogoresh<\/strong>.<\/strong> \u00c7far\u00eb lloj lufte \u00ebsht\u00eb<\/strong>?<\/strong><\/p>\n

N\u00eb thelb \u00ebsht\u00eb nj\u00eb luft\u00eb simetrike. E dh\u00ebna empirike tregon se rebel\u00ebt prorus\u00eb dhe forcat ukrainase jan\u00eb ndeshur duke p\u00ebrdorur arm\u00eb dhe sisteme arm\u00ebsh tradicionale. Nga ky k\u00ebndv\u00ebshtrim \u00ebsht\u00eb nj\u00eb luft\u00eb shum\u00eb konvencionale, megjith\u00ebse e asistuar nga nj\u00eb p\u00ebrdorim masiv i nj\u00ebsive paraushtarake. Nj\u00eb konflikt eventual si ai q\u00eb kemi hipotezuar do t\u00eb ishte akoma m\u00eb shum\u00eb.<\/p>\n

Do ta b\u00ebnin rus\u00ebt nj\u00eb luft\u00eb manov\u00ebr n\u00eb Ukrain\u00eb<\/strong>?<\/strong><\/p>\n

Pik\u00ebrisht. Ult\u00ebsirat e pamata ukrainase i paraqiten mir\u00eb formacioneve t\u00eb korracuara ruse. Lufta e Dyt\u00eb Bot\u00ebrore na e ka m\u00ebsuar mir\u00eb.<\/p>\n

S\u00eb fundi, le t\u00eb vijm\u00eb tek <\/strong>Europa. <\/strong>Si shpjegohet q\u00ebndrimi gjerman<\/strong>?<\/strong> \u00cbsht\u00eb i bashkuar Bashkimi Europian mbi \u00e7\u00ebshtjen<\/strong>? <\/strong><\/p>\n

Q\u00ebndrimi gjerman shpjegohet shum\u00eb leht\u00ebsisht n\u00ebse mbahet parasysh fakti q\u00eb Berlini varet shum\u00eb fort nga furnizimet me gazin rus p\u00ebr t\u00eb garantuar furnizimin e nevojsh\u00ebm energjitik t\u00eb vendit. Sidomos n\u00eb dim\u00ebr, kjo var\u00ebsi b\u00ebhet akoma edhe m\u00eb e r\u00ebnd\u00ebsishme. P\u00ebr sa i p\u00ebrket Bashkimit Europian n\u00eb p\u00ebrgjith\u00ebsi, t\u00eb mos harrojm\u00eb se ka vende t\u00eb ndryshme t\u00eb Bashkimit Europian q\u00eb kan\u00eb raporte t\u00eb tipit treg\u00ebtar shum\u00eb t\u00eb forta me Rusin\u00eb, midis tyre edhe Italia.<\/p>\n

(nga Geopoliticus<\/em>)<\/p>\n

P\u00ebrgatiti<\/strong><\/p>\n

ARMIN TIRANA<\/strong><\/p>\n","protected":false},"excerpt":{"rendered":"

Intervist\u00eb me Pietro Batacchi N\u00eb k\u00ebto jav\u00eb, rreziku i nj\u00eb lufte n\u00eb Europ\u00ebn Lindore, duket i lart\u00eb. L\u00ebvizjet e trupave ruse p\u00ebrgjat\u00eb kufirit ukrainas, por edhe n\u00eb Bjellorusi dhe n\u00eb Krime, shtyjn\u00eb q\u00eb t\u00eb mendohet se Moska po p\u00ebrgatitet t\u00eb kryej\u00eb nj\u00eb operacion ushtarak kund\u00ebr fqinjit t\u00eb tij per\u00ebndimor. Ekspert\u00ebt dhe analist\u00ebt ushtarak\u00eb e t\u00eb …<\/p>\n","protected":false},"author":4,"featured_media":3553,"comment_status":"open","ping_status":"open","sticky":false,"template":"","format":"standard","meta":{"om_disable_all_campaigns":false,"_monsterinsights_skip_tracking":false,"_monsterinsights_sitenote_active":false,"_monsterinsights_sitenote_note":"","_monsterinsights_sitenote_category":0,"footnotes":""},"categories":[38],"tags":[],"aioseo_notices":[],"_links":{"self":[{"href":"https:\/\/foltore.al\/index.php\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/posts\/3552"}],"collection":[{"href":"https:\/\/foltore.al\/index.php\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/posts"}],"about":[{"href":"https:\/\/foltore.al\/index.php\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/types\/post"}],"author":[{"embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/foltore.al\/index.php\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/users\/4"}],"replies":[{"embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/foltore.al\/index.php\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/comments?post=3552"}],"version-history":[{"count":0,"href":"https:\/\/foltore.al\/index.php\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/posts\/3552\/revisions"}],"wp:featuredmedia":[{"embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/foltore.al\/index.php\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/media\/3553"}],"wp:attachment":[{"href":"https:\/\/foltore.al\/index.php\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/media?parent=3552"}],"wp:term":[{"taxonomy":"category","embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/foltore.al\/index.php\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/categories?post=3552"},{"taxonomy":"post_tag","embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/foltore.al\/index.php\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/tags?post=3552"}],"curies":[{"name":"wp","href":"https:\/\/api.w.org\/{rel}","templated":true}]}}