{"id":21250,"date":"2022-08-23T08:11:15","date_gmt":"2022-08-23T08:11:15","guid":{"rendered":"https:\/\/rdnews.al\/?p=21250"},"modified":"2022-08-23T08:11:15","modified_gmt":"2022-08-23T08:11:15","slug":"strategjia-e-sigurise-dhe-e-mbrojtjes-per-mesdheun-dhe-prioritetet-e-instrumentit-ushtarak-italian","status":"publish","type":"post","link":"https:\/\/foltore.al\/index.php\/2022\/08\/23\/strategjia-e-sigurise-dhe-e-mbrojtjes-per-mesdheun-dhe-prioritetet-e-instrumentit-ushtarak-italian\/","title":{"rendered":"Strategjia e Siguris\u00eb dhe e Mbrojtjes p\u00ebr Mesdheun dhe prioritetet e instrumentit ushtarak italian"},"content":{"rendered":"<p>Nd\u00ebrsa Europa duket se po e sposton shikimin nga lindja, Mbrojtja italiane rilan\u00e7on strategjin\u00eb e re p\u00ebr Mesdheun, duke theksuar edhe nj\u00eb her\u00eb akoma se cila \u00ebsht\u00eb zona me interes strategjik prioritar p\u00ebr Rom\u00ebn. Objektivi \u00ebsht\u00eb t\u00eb merret nj\u00eb rol m\u00eb i r\u00ebnd\u00ebsish\u00ebm n\u00eb k\u00ebt\u00eb kuadrant dhe t\u00eb promovoj\u00eb nj\u00eb vler\u00ebsim m\u00eb t\u00eb madh brenda organizatave nd\u00ebrkomb\u00ebtare referuese. P\u00ebr t\u2019i arritur k\u00ebto objektiva, Italia duhet t\u00eb kapitalizoj\u00eb operacionet ushtarake tashm\u00eb n\u00eb zhvillim dhe t\u00eb ruaj\u00eb nj\u00eb aft\u00ebsi nd\u00ebrhyr\u00ebse q\u00eb i mund\u00ebson t\u00eb parandaloj\u00eb situata paq\u00ebdnrueshm\u00ebrie n\u00eb zon\u00eb, por instrumenti ushtarak italian vuan nga probleme t\u00eb v\u00ebshtira q\u00eb i shp\u00ebtojn\u00eb shum\u00eb v\u00ebzhguesve dhe q\u00eb nuk duken t\u00eb zgjidhsh\u00ebm n\u00eb periudh\u00eb afatshkurt\u00ebr.<\/p>\n<p>Pak jav\u00eb m\u00eb par\u00eb, ministri i Mbrojtjes Lorenzo Guerini ka paraqitur tri direktiva ministrore q\u00eb fiksojn\u00eb prioritetet e dikasterit p\u00ebr 3 vje\u00e7arin e ardhsh\u00ebm. B\u00ebhet fjal\u00eb p\u00ebr Direktiv\u00ebn e Politik\u00ebs Ushtarake Komb\u00ebtare, e Aktit t\u00eb Drejtimit p\u00ebr Fillimin e Ciklit t\u00eb Interguar t\u00eb Programimit Strategjik dhe Formimin e Bilancit t\u00eb Parashikimit dhe t\u00eb Strategjis\u00eb s\u00eb Siguris\u00eb dhe Mbrojtjes p\u00ebr Mesdheun. Nd\u00ebrsa t\u00eb dy dokumentet e para, bashk\u00eb me Direktiv\u00ebn e P\u00ebrgjithshme mbi Aktivitetin Administrativ dhe mbi Menaxhimin p\u00ebr Ushtrimin Financiar, futen midis direktivave q\u00eb ministri i Mbrojtjes zakonisht paraqet n\u00eb kuad\u00ebr t\u00eb procesit t\u00eb Ciklit t\u00eb Planifikimit t\u00eb P\u00ebrgjithsh\u00ebm t\u00eb Mbrojtjes, Strategjis\u00eb s\u00eb Siguris\u00eb dhe Mbrojtjes p\u00ebr Mesdheun p\u00ebrfaq\u00ebson nj\u00eb azhurnim t\u00eb nj\u00eb dokumenti ekzistues, Strategjis\u00eb s\u00eb Mbrojtjes p\u00ebr Mesdheun. Duke qen\u00eb nj\u00eb akt i miratuar nga Ministria e Mbrojtjes, Strategjia furnizon linjat drejtuese politiko \u2013 ushtarake, pa paracaktuar asnj\u00eb objektiv specifikisht ushtarak. Identifikimi i k\u00ebtyre i jepet n\u00eb nivel strategjiko \u2013 ushtarak shefit t\u00eb Shtatmadhoris\u00eb s\u00eb Mbrojtjes. Botimi i dokumentit nuk vjen papritur: ministri Guerini e kishte njoftuar tashm\u00eb nisjen e nj\u00eb procesi rishikimi t\u00eb Strategjis\u00eb s\u00eb Mbrojtjes p\u00ebr Mesdheun me rastin e prezantimit t\u00eb linjave programatike t\u00eb mandatit t\u00eb tij t\u00eb dyt\u00eb.<\/p>\n<p>Duhet sakt\u00ebsuar se kur Mbrojtja italiane flet p\u00ebr Mesdhe, ajo i referohet nj\u00eb zone shum\u00eb m\u00eb t\u00eb gjer\u00eb se ajo q\u00eb p\u00ebrfshin vendet e lagura nga ky det. Nj\u00eb zon\u00eb e till\u00eb, q\u00eb ministria i p\u00ebrkufizon tradicionalisht \u201cMesdheu i Zgjeruar\u201d, shkon nga Lindja e Mesme dhe Gjiri Arabik deri n\u00eb Gjirin e Guines\u00eb, duke p\u00ebrshkuar t\u00eb gjith\u00eb rripin e sub \u2013 Saharas\u00eb n\u00ebp\u00ebrmjet Sahelit deri n\u00eb Gjirin e Guines\u00eb. Kjo zon\u00eb prej disa vitesh \u00ebsht\u00eb p\u00ebrcaktuar si zon\u00eb me interes strategjik kryesor p\u00ebr Rom\u00ebn. N\u00eb k\u00ebt\u00eb kuadrant, Roma duhet t\u00eb mbroj\u00eb interesa komb\u00ebtare me r\u00ebnd\u00ebsi ekstreme. Paras\u00ebgjithash, sepse Mesdheu p\u00ebrfaq\u00ebson nj\u00eb prej rrug\u00ebve t\u00eb kalimit kryesore t\u00eb fluksit t\u00eb mallrave bot\u00ebrore, me 20% t\u00eb trafikut detar q\u00eb kalon n\u00ebp\u00ebr k\u00ebto uj\u00ebra. Pastaj, Mesdheu \u00ebsht\u00eb themelor p\u00ebr Italin\u00eb pasi vendo jon\u00eb imporon nga vendet e pranishme n\u00eb k\u00ebt\u00eb zon\u00eb nj\u00eb pjes\u00eb t\u00eb madhe t\u00eb nevoj\u00ebs energjitike t\u00eb saj \u2013 sidomos nga Iraku dhe Algjeria. Nga Mesdheu vijn\u00eb edhe sfidat m\u00eb t\u00eb m\u00ebdha p\u00ebr sigurin\u00eb komb\u00ebtare t\u00eb Italis\u00eb. Sot ky kuadrant karakterizohet nga prania e situatave t\u00eb shumta jostabiliteti t\u00eb p\u00ebrhapur, si lufta e zgjatur q\u00eb prek Libin\u00eb prej vitesh, fenomeni i pirateris\u00eb n\u00eb Gjirin e Guines\u00eb, paq\u00ebndrueshm\u00ebria jemenase dhe refleksionet e saj ndaj Bab El Mandeb, vet\u00ebm p\u00ebr t\u00eb cituar disa. P\u00ebr m\u00eb tep\u00ebr, gjat\u00eb viteve t\u00eb fundit, si\u00e7 pohohet nga ministria gjat\u00eb prezantimit t\u00eb Linjave Programatike, \u201cMesdheu i sot\u00ebm nuk \u00ebsht\u00eb m\u00eb i nj\u00ebjti\u201d, motiv p\u00ebr t\u00eb cilin p\u00ebrshtatja e Strategjis\u00eb s\u00eb Mbrojtjes p\u00ebr Mesdheun \u00ebshte nj\u00eb kalim i nevojsh\u00ebm dhe jo i shtysh\u00ebm. Elementi kryesor i risis\u00eb konsiston n\u00eb veprimin gjithnj\u00eb e m\u00eb k\u00ebrc\u00ebnues t\u00eb disa fuqive t\u00eb m\u00ebdha, si Rusia dhe Kina, gjithnj\u00eb e m\u00eb shum\u00eb t\u00eb pranishme n\u00eb Afrik\u00eb, por edhe i fuqive me kalib\u00ebr m\u00eb t\u00eb ul\u00ebt, si Turqia, jo e p\u00ebrmendur n\u00eb m\u00ebnyr\u00eb eksplicite. Ato p\u00ebrdorin taktika q\u00eb futen n\u00eb kategorin\u00eb e s\u00eb ashtuquajtur\u00ebs \u201cluft\u00eb hibride\u201d, duke ju mund\u00ebsuar k\u00ebtyre aktor\u00ebve t\u00eb veprojn\u00eb n\u00eb nj\u00eb lloj zone t\u00eb hirt\u00eb, q\u00eb u lejon t\u2019i \u00e7ojn\u00eb rivalitetet n\u00eb limitet e p\u00ebrplasjes s\u00eb hapur, duke e tejkaluar vet\u00ebm rast\u00ebsisht, duke provokuar nj\u00eb lloj erozioni midis kufijve t\u00eb atyre q\u00eb duhet t\u00eb jen\u00eb siguria e brendshme dhe ajo nd\u00ebrkomb\u00ebtare, si edhe duke e b\u00ebr\u00eb gjithnj\u00eb e m\u00eb t\u00eb sfumuar dallimin midis mbrojtjes dhe siguris\u00eb. Paq\u00ebndrueshm\u00ebria e p\u00ebrhapur n\u00eb Mesdheun e Zgjeruar v\u00eb n\u00eb l\u00ebvizje nj\u00eb seri dinamikash jasht\u00ebzakonisht k\u00ebrc\u00ebnuese p\u00ebr Rom\u00ebn. Qartazi, midis kryesore fenomenti migrator, sfid\u00eb par\u00ebsore p\u00ebr Italin\u00eb n\u00eb konfrontimet e an\u00ebs jugore. Kjo paq\u00ebndrueshm\u00ebri favorizon pastaj proliferimin e l\u00ebvizjeve me matric\u00eb xhihadiste, sidomos n\u00eb zon\u00ebn e Sahelit, dhe ushqen rrezikun e terrorizimit nd\u00ebrkomb\u00ebtar.<\/p>\n<p><strong>Objektivat e Rom\u00ebs n\u00eb Mesdheun e Zgjeruar<\/strong><\/p>\n<p>Strategjia p\u00ebrcakton dy objektiva t\u00eb m\u00ebdha t\u00eb Mbrojtjes n\u00eb Mesdheun e Zgjeruar. I pari ka t\u00eb b\u00ebj\u00eb me aleancat brenda t\u00eb cilave ka l\u00ebvizur tradicionalisht politika e Mbrojtjes italiane, sidomos NATO dhe Bashkimin Europian. Si\u00e7 p\u00ebrcaktohet n\u00eb m\u00ebnyr\u00eb eksplicite nga ministri n\u00eb hapje t\u00eb dokumentit, objektivi i Rom\u00ebs \u00ebsht\u00eb t\u00eb promovohet nj\u00eb aft\u00ebsi leximi e krizave q\u00eb i jep vler\u00eb Jugut dhe i jep pesh\u00eb m\u00eb t\u00eb madhe k\u00ebtij kuadranti n\u00eb refleksionet strategjine si n\u00eb aspektin e NATO, ashtu edhe t\u00eb Bashkimit Europian. P\u00ebr t\u00eb promovuar vizionin komb\u00ebtar n\u00eb Europ\u00eb, Roma duet t\u00eb vazhdoj\u00eb t\u00eb jap kontributin e saj n\u00eb forcimin e Politik\u00ebs t\u00eb Siguris\u00eb dhe Mbrojtjes s\u00eb P\u00ebrbashk\u00ebt, duke promovuar n\u00eb k\u00ebt\u00eb m\u00ebnyr\u00eb p\u00ebrpjekjet e Bashkimit Europian n\u00eb arritjen e nj\u00eb autonomie strategjike m\u00eb t\u00eb madhe. Me fjal\u00eb t\u00eb tjera, \u201carritja e nj\u00eb autonomie komb\u00ebtare m\u00eb substanciale \u00ebsht\u00eb funksionale me arritjen e nj\u00eb shkalle m\u00eb t\u00eb lart\u00eb autonomie t\u00eb Bashkimit Europian\u201d. N\u00ebse d\u00ebshirohet t\u00eb ushtrohet nj\u00eb pesh\u00eb e r\u00ebnd\u00ebsishme n\u00eb zgjedhjet e Bashkimit Europian n\u00eb dimensionet e mbrojtjes dhe t\u00eb siguris\u00eb, k\u00ebshtu q\u00eb Rom\u00ebs do t\u2019i duhet t\u00eb disponoj\u00eb nj\u00eb instrument ushtarak i gatsh\u00ebm dhe efikas.<\/p>\n<p>Objektivi i dyt\u00eb i vendosur nga Mbrojtja n\u00eb Strategji \u00ebsht\u00eb ai i marrjes s\u00eb nj\u00eb roli m\u00eb t\u00eb r\u00ebnd\u00ebsish\u00ebm dhe t\u00eb matur p\u00ebr stabilitetin e zon\u00ebs. Arritja e k\u00ebtij objektivi substancializohet n\u00eb dy dimensione kryesore. I pari \u00ebsht\u00eb ai bashk\u00ebpunues. Duke adoptuar nj\u00eb qasje sistemike q\u00eb p\u00ebrfshin t\u00eb gjitha resurset e vendit funksionale p\u00ebr ta mb\u00ebshtetur vendin n\u00eb k\u00ebt\u00eb ambicie, Mbrojtja do t\u00eb duhet t\u00eb dij\u00eb t\u2019i shfryt\u00ebzoj\u00eb m\u00eb mir\u00eb iniciativat e shumta q\u00eb futen n\u00eb aspektin e \u201cdiplomacis\u00eb ushtarake\u201d t\u00eb nisura nga Roma n\u00eb vitet e kaluara. Dimensioni i dyt\u00eb brenda t\u00eb cilat kristalizohet objektivi italian p\u00ebr ta rritur r\u00ebnd\u00ebsin\u00eb e saj n\u00eb Mesdheun e Zgjeruar \u00ebsht\u00eb past\u00ebrtisht operative. Roma duhet t\u2019i shoq\u00ebroj\u00eb aktivitetit t\u00eb saj t\u00eb diplomacis\u00eb ushtarake aft\u00ebsin\u00eb e nd\u00ebrhyrjes kur dhe ku \u00ebsht\u00eb e nevojshme n\u00eb prani t\u00eb \u201canomalive\u201d p\u00ebr t\u00eb kontribuar n\u00eb stabilitetin e rajonit. Q\u00eb t\u00eb mund ta luaj\u00eb k\u00ebt\u00eb funksion me efikasitet, forcat e armatosura italiane duhet t\u00eb disponojn\u00eb kapacitete ushtarake t\u00eb p\u00ebrshtatshme dhe t\u00eb superioritetit informativ q\u00eb i mundosj t\u00eb veproj\u00eb menj\u00ebher\u00eb dhe me mjetet e duhura.<\/p>\n<p>P\u00ebr k\u00ebt\u00eb motiv, prania e ushtarak\u00ebve italian\u00eb \u00ebsht\u00eb e nevojshme p\u00ebr t\u00eb siguruar prani, survejim, vigjilenc\u00eb dhe shkurajim n\u00eb zonat me interes. V\u00ebmendje e ve\u00e7ant\u00eb do t\u00eb duhet t\u2019u kushtojet dy zonave me interesave t\u00eb ve\u00e7anta p\u00ebr Rom\u00ebn, dometh\u00ebn\u00eb Kanalin e Sicilis\u00eb, <em>choke point<\/em> kryesore e Mesdheut, dhe zonat e ndodhura n\u00eb Zon\u00ebn Ekonomike Ekskluzive, para pak kohe e miratuar nga parlamenti (Ligji 91\/2021). N\u00eb k\u00ebt\u00eb zona nd\u00ebrhyr\u00ebse operacionet do t\u00eb jen\u00eb kryesisht multidominim. Kjo n\u00ebnkupton se kryerja e tyre do t\u00eb k\u00ebrkoj\u00eb nj\u00eb qasje q\u00eb do t\u00eb duhet t\u00eb k\u00ebrkoj\u00eb dhe pmri\u00ebrosj\u00eb kuptimin dhe p\u00ebrdorimin e kapaciteteve t\u00eb ndryshme, si ushtarake, ashtu edhe civile, p\u00ebr t\u00eb zhvilluar nj\u00ebkoh\u00ebsisht m\u00eb shum\u00eb aksione konvergjente dhe prodhuar m\u00eb shum\u00eb efekte n\u00eb dimensione t\u00eb ndryshme. S\u00eb fundi, dokumento p\u00ebrcakton se realizimi e gjith\u00eb k\u00ebtyre detyrave nga ana e forcave t\u00eb armatosura do t\u00eb k\u00ebrkoj\u00eb nj\u00eb seri nd\u00ebrhyrjesh t\u00eb prirura q\u00eb t\u00eb \u201cpromovojn\u00eb zhvillimin teknologjik t\u00eb instrumentit ushtarak\u201d, n\u00eb munges\u00eb t\u00eb t\u00eb cilave ato v\u00ebshtir\u00eb se do t\u00eb mund t\u00eb ruanin kapacitete t\u00eb r\u00ebnd\u00ebsishme p\u00ebr t\u00eb realizuar detyrat e p\u00ebrcaktuara n\u00eb dokument.<\/p>\n<p><strong>Pengesat p\u00ebr t\u2019u tejkaluar <\/strong><\/p>\n<p>Si\u00e7 sqarohet n\u00eb dokument, Strategjia nuk synon t\u2019i lan\u00e7oj\u00eb asnj\u00eb ve\u00e7anti inciativ\u00ebs s\u00eb re n\u00eb Mesdheun e Zgjeruar. Ajo propozon t\u2019i p\u00ebrshtatet Strategjis\u00eb s\u00eb m\u00ebparshme duke i dh\u00ebn\u00eb \u201cnj\u00eb dimension ushtarak m\u00eb t\u00eb gjer\u00eb\u201d, duke kapitalizuar operacionet tashm\u00eb n\u00eb zhvillim dhe duke promovuar nj\u00eb qasje sistemike dhe sinergjike midis Mbrojtjes dhe dikastereve t\u00eb tjera t\u00eb interesuara n\u00eb m\u00ebnyr\u00eb t\u00eb till\u00eb q\u00eb t\u00eb arrij\u00eb objektivat e ravij\u00ebzuara nga ministri. N\u00eb muajt e ardhsh\u00ebm, Mbrojtja do t\u00eb miratoj\u00eb nj\u00eb direktiv\u00eb operative q\u00eb t\u00eb p\u00ebrkufizoj\u00eb instrumentat e nevojsh\u00ebm p\u00ebr arritjen e k\u00ebtyre objektivave. N\u00eb pritje t\u00eb njohjes s\u00eb k\u00ebrkesave t\u00eb nivelit strategjiko \u2013 ushtarak \u2013 shefi i Shtamadhoris\u00eb s\u00eb Mbrojtjes \u2013 \u00ebsht\u00eb e mundur t\u00eb identifikohen ato q\u00eb sipas autorit jan\u00eb pengesat kryesore ndaj objektivave t\u00eb fiksuar n\u00eb Strategji.<\/p>\n<p>Mund t\u00eb dallohen dy tipologji kryesore pengesash, nj\u00eb q\u00eb p\u00ebrfshin ato me natyr\u00eb ekzogjene t\u00eb Mbrojtjes, nj\u00eb tjet\u00ebr ato me natyr\u00eb endogjene. Ato q\u00eb i p\u00ebrkasin kategoris\u00eb s\u00eb par\u00eb jan\u00eb n\u00eb thelb tre. E para \u00ebsht\u00eb v\u00ebmendja e re e drejtuar NATO dhe Bashkimit Europian drejt an\u00ebs lindore t\u00eb Europ\u00ebs, e shkaktuar nga sulmi rus ndaj Ukrain\u00ebs. Sekretari i P\u00ebrgjithsh\u00ebm i NATO ka njoftuar tashm\u00eb dislokimin e 4 <em>battlegroup<\/em> t\u00eb reja n\u00eb an\u00ebn lindore, duke konfirmuar r\u00ebnd\u00ebsin\u00eb e re t\u00eb k\u00ebtij fronti. N\u00ebse Italia ka pasur v\u00ebshtir\u00ebsi n\u00eb vitet e fundit t\u00eb promovoj\u00eb r\u00ebnd\u00ebsin\u00eb e an\u00ebs jugore n\u00eb gjirin e t\u00eb dyja k\u00ebtyre organizatave, sidomos n\u00eb NATO, ngjarjet e fundit n\u00eb Ukrain\u00eb e b\u00ebjn\u00eb p\u00ebrpjekjen e Rom\u00ebs akoma edhe m\u00eb t\u00eb v\u00ebshtir\u00eb. Por nd\u00ebrkaq n\u00ebse nga nj\u00ebra an\u00eb lufta e t\u00ebrheq v\u00ebmendjen e NATO dhe t\u00eb shum\u00eb vendeve europiane, nga ana tjet\u00ebr ajo po ka nj\u00eb impakt t\u00eb fort\u00eb negativ mbi stabilitetin e k\u00ebtyre zonave, sidomos p\u00ebr shkak t\u00eb reperkusioneve mbi treg\u00ebtin\u00eb bot\u00ebrore e munges\u00ebs s\u00eb tarifave t\u00eb mjaftueshme ushqimore. Lufta u ka b\u00ebr\u00eb t\u00eb qart\u00eb shum\u00eb vendeve t\u00eb kontinentit nevoj\u00ebn e diversifikimit t\u00eb burimeve t\u00eb tyre t\u00eb furnizimit energjitik, gj\u00eb q\u00eb mund t\u00eb \u00e7oj\u00eb n\u00eb tensione t\u00eb reja n\u00eb Mesdhe, sidomos n\u00eb basenin levantin. Pengesa e dyt\u00eb p\u00ebrfaq\u00ebsohet nga v\u00ebshtir\u00ebsit\u00eb q\u00eb ngadal\u00ebsojn\u00eb rrug\u00ebtimin e Bashkimit Europian drejt nj\u00eb autonomie m\u00eb t\u00eb madhe strategjike. K\u00ebto konsistojn\u00eb sidomos n\u00eb divergjenc\u00ebn e perceptimit t\u00eb k\u00ebrc\u00ebnimeve t\u00eb vendeve europiane dhe n\u00eb deficitet ushtarake e forcave t\u00eb armatosura t\u00eb tyre. P\u00ebr t\u00eb siguruar nj\u00eb kapacitet nd\u00ebrhyrjeje t\u00eb p\u00ebrshtatsh\u00ebm, Roma ka nevoj\u00eb p\u00ebr mb\u00ebshtetjen e vendeve t\u00eb tjera europiane. N\u00eb vitet e fundit, paaft\u00ebsia e k\u00ebtyre vendeve n\u00eb kryerjen e operacioneve ushtarake n\u00eb Afrik\u00eb, edhe me dimensione t\u00eb reduktuara, \u00ebsht\u00eb b\u00ebr\u00eb e qart\u00eb. Nj\u00eb shembull i qart\u00eb \u00ebsht\u00eb pasur n\u00eb luft\u00ebn libiane t\u00eb 2011, kur europian\u00ebt, n\u00eb ve\u00e7anti francez\u00ebt, kuptuan se pa ndihm\u00ebn e aseteve amerikane nuk do t\u00eb mund ta vazhdonin fushat\u00ebn n\u00eb Libi. Nj\u00eb shembull i dyt\u00eb \u00ebsht\u00eb m\u00eb i vonsh\u00ebm dhe \u00ebsht\u00eb operacioni \u201cBarkhane\u201d n\u00eb Mali. N\u00eb k\u00ebt\u00eb mision Parisi ka hasur v\u00ebshtir\u00ebsi n\u00eb mb\u00ebshtetjen e vetme p\u00ebrpjekjen loigjistike dhe operative t\u00eb nevojshme p\u00ebr t\u2019i garantuar stabilitetin dhe sigurin\u00eb e Malit. N\u00eb vitet e fundit Franca ka invokuar n\u00eb shum\u00eb seri p\u00ebrdorimin e forcave europiane, duke k\u00ebrkuar sidomos asete helikopterike. Task Force Takuba, e krijuar m\u00eb 2020, lindte pik\u00ebrisht p\u00ebr t\u2019u furnizuar mb\u00ebshtetje aseteve franceze n\u00eb Mali. Pengesa e tret\u00eb p\u00ebrfaq\u00ebsohet nga aktiviteti gjithnj\u00eb e m\u00eb i qart\u00eb i aktor\u00ebve t\u00eb rinj, q\u00eb sidomos n\u00eb Afrik\u00eb, po merr nj\u00eb rol tejet t\u00eb r\u00ebnd\u00ebsish\u00ebm. N\u00eb k\u00ebt\u00eb rast, referimi \u00ebsht\u00eb sidomos ndaj aksionit t\u00eb Rusis\u00eb, gjithnj\u00eb e m\u00eb aktive n\u00eb Mali, dhe t\u00eb Turqis\u00eb, q\u00eb tashm\u00eb ka p\u00ebrcaktuar nj\u00eb zon\u00eb t\u00eb q\u00ebndrueshme influence mbi Tripolitanin\u00eb, ku Roma vlen tashm\u00eb gjithnj\u00eb e m\u00eb pak. Aksioni i ushtruar nga k\u00ebta aktor\u00eb \u00ebsht\u00eb i rreziksh\u00ebm, sepse mb\u00ebshtetet n\u00eb pjes\u00ebn m\u00eb t\u00eb madhe mbi p\u00ebrdorimin e t\u00eb ashtuquajturave <em>proxy<\/em>, dometh\u00ebn\u00eb forca jo formalisht t\u00eb varura nga k\u00ebto dy vende.<\/p>\n<p>Tipologjia e dyt\u00eb e pengesave \u00ebsht\u00eb me karakter endogjen. B\u00ebhet fjal\u00eb n\u00eb k\u00ebt\u00eb rast p\u00ebr gjith\u00eb ato probleme q\u00eb i pengojn\u00eb forcat e armatosura italiane t\u00eb zhvillojn\u00eb detyrat e p\u00ebrcaktuara n\u00eb Strategji. N\u00eb listimin e masave q\u00eb forcat e armatosura do t\u00eb duhej t\u00eb adoptojn\u00eb p\u00ebr ta konkretizuar sa paraqitet n\u00eb dokument, Strategjia propozon t\u00eb \u201cpromovoj\u00eb zhvillimin teknologjik t\u00eb instrumentit ushtarak\u2026 me q\u00ebllim q\u00eb Mbrojtja t\u00eb ruaj\u00eb aft\u00ebsi t\u00eb r\u00ebnd\u00ebsishme dhe t\u00eb sh\u00ebrbej\u00eb si t\u00ebrheq\u00ebs p\u00ebr sektorin prodhues komb\u00ebtar\u201d. Duke gjykuar nga bilancet e fundit t\u00eb Mbrojtjes, p\u00ebrpjekja e Ministris\u00eb n\u00eb k\u00ebt\u00eb kuptim duket se \u00ebsht\u00eb n\u00eb linj\u00eb me \u00e7ka deklarohet n\u00eb k\u00ebt\u00eb pik\u00eb, duke qen\u00eb se gjat\u00eb viteve t\u00eb fundit shpenzimet p\u00ebr investime jan\u00eb rritur ndjesh\u00ebm. Dokumenti Programatik Shum\u00ebvje\u00e7ar 2021 \u2013 2023 evidenton sesi krahasuar me 2020, n\u00eb 2021 z\u00ebri \u201cinvestim\u201d \u00ebsht\u00eb rritur me rreth 40%. Megjithat\u00eb, me q\u00ebllim q\u00eb Roma t\u00eb mund t\u00eb ruaj\u00eb kapacitetet e nevojshme ushtarake si n\u00eb dimensionin bashk\u00ebpunues \u2013 st\u00ebrvitje dhe asistim t\u00eb forcave lokale \u2013 ashtu edhe n\u00eb dimensionin operativ \u2013 aft\u00ebsi nd\u00ebrhyr\u00ebse \u2013 forcat e armatosura italiane duhet t\u00eb zgjidhin akoma probleme t\u00eb r\u00ebnd\u00ebsishme q\u00eb promovimi i zhvillimit teknologjik nuk duket n\u00eb gjendje t\u2019i zgjidh\u00eb.<\/p>\n<p>K\u00ebto jan\u00eb t\u00eb sintetizueshme n\u00eb tri pika. E para l\u00ebsht\u00eb mang\u00ebsia e fondeve, sidomos p\u00ebr ushtrin\u00eb. Si\u00e7 deklarohet n\u00eb Dokumentin Porgramatik Shum\u00ebvje\u00e7ar 2020 \u2013 2022, \u201csektori ushtrues i funksionit mbrojt\u00ebs p\u00ebrfaq\u00ebson nj\u00eb prej kritikave kryesore t\u00eb bilancit t\u00eb dikasterit\u201d. P\u00ebr shembull, n\u00eb 2021, fondet p\u00ebr ushtrimin e ushtris\u00eb italiane kan\u00eb qen\u00eb t\u00eb barabrata me 6% t\u00eb totalit t\u00eb buxhetit t\u00eb kushtuar forc\u00ebs s\u00eb armatosur, nj\u00eb p\u00ebrqindje jasht\u00ebzakonisht e ul\u00ebt, q\u00eb arrin t\u00eb kompensohet vet\u00ebm fal\u00eb fondeve t\u00eb v\u00ebna n\u00eb dispozicion nga dikastere t\u00eb tjera p\u00ebr financimin e impenjimeve n\u00eb atdhe dhe jasht\u00eb tij (rreth 410 milion shtes\u00eb). Shiofra e v\u00ebn\u00eb n\u00eb dispozicion p\u00ebr impenjimet n\u00eb atdhe, p\u00ebr m\u00eb tep\u00ebr \u2013 e barabart\u00eb me 58 milion \u2013 \u00ebsht\u00eb e drejtuar t\u00eb financoj\u00eb operacionin \u201cRrug\u00eb t\u00eb Sigurta\u201d, dometh\u00ebn\u00eb nj\u00eb operacion mb\u00ebshtet\u00ebs ndaj forcave t\u00eb policis\u00eb q\u00eb pengon st\u00ebrvitjen e specializuar t\u00eb ushtarak\u00ebve. Kjo munges\u00eb \u00ebsht\u00eb jasht\u00ebzakonisht e r\u00ebnd\u00eb, pasi pa fonde p\u00ebr ushtrin\u00eb forcat e armatosura nuk mund t\u00eb str\u00ebviten dhe nuk mund t\u00eb st\u00ebrvisin \u2013 mjetet nuk mund t\u2019i n\u00ebnshtrohen mir\u00ebmbajtjes dhe ushtarak\u00ebt humbasin aft\u00ebsin\u00eb e p\u00ebdrorimit t\u00eb pajisjeve t\u00eb tyre. Rritja e nivelit teknologjik p\u00ebr m\u00eb tep\u00ebr b\u00ebn q\u00eb mjetet dhe sistemet e arm\u00ebs n\u00eb dispozicion t\u00eb forcave t\u00eb armatosura jan\u00eb gjithnj\u00eb e m\u00eb komplekse, dometh\u00ebn\u00eb nevojtar\u00eb t\u00eb mir\u00ebmbajtjeve m\u00eb t\u00eb gjata e m\u00eb t\u00eb kushtueshme dhe t\u00eb personelit m\u00eb t\u00eb specializuar.<\/p>\n<p>Problemi i dyt\u00eb q\u00eb forcat e armatosura duhet t\u00eb zgjidhin \u00ebsht\u00eb mosha e personelit. N\u00eb vitin 2020, mosha mesatare e ushtris\u00eb, forc\u00ebs s\u00eb armatosur q\u00eb duke par\u00eb p\u00ebrpjekjen psikofizike t\u00eb k\u00ebrkuar, duhet t\u00eb jet\u00eb m\u00eb e reja, ishte e barabart\u00eb me 38 vje\u00e7, n\u00eb rritje konstante. Kjo e dh\u00ebn\u00eb \u00ebsht\u00eb shum\u00eb e r\u00ebnd\u00eb, pasi personeli i moshuar ka v\u00ebshtir\u00ebsi t\u00eb mb\u00ebshtes\u00eb kushtet psiko \u2013 fizike ekstreme q\u00eb paraqiten n\u00eb operacione. Ve\u00e7 k\u00ebsaj, ushtarak\u00ebt e k\u00ebsaj moshe kan\u00eb p\u00ebrgjith\u00ebsisht f\u00ebmij\u00eb dhe prind\u00ebr n\u00eb ngarkim, k\u00ebshtu q\u00eb jan\u00eb m\u00eb t\u00eb v\u00ebshtir\u00eb p\u00ebr t\u2019u rreshtuar n\u00eb operacione, sidomos n\u00ebse jan\u00eb afatgjat\u00eb.<\/p>\n<p>Problemi i tret\u00eb \u00ebsht\u00eb hiperaktivizmi i instrumentit ushtarak italian, edhe nj\u00eb her\u00eb akoma, sidomos i Ushtris\u00eb. N\u00eb 2019, gjenerali Farina, at\u00ebbot\u00eb Shefi i Shtatmadhoris\u00eb s\u00eb Ushtris\u00eb, ka deklaruar n\u00eb parlament se thelb\u00ebsisht i gjith\u00eb komponentes operative t\u00eb ushtris\u00eb italiane p\u00ebrdorej n\u00eb m\u00ebnyra t\u00eb ndryshme: p\u00ebrball\u00eb nj\u00eb numri t\u00eb disponuesh\u00ebm t\u00eb barabart\u00eb me rreth 40000 \u2013 45000 nj\u00ebsi \u2013 11 brigada me nga 4500 \u2013 5000 njer\u00ebz, si\u00e7 \u00ebsht\u00eb deklaruar nga gjenerali Di Stasio n\u00eb parlament \u2013 rreth 22000 njer\u00ebz u qen\u00eb kushtuar Rrug\u00ebve t\u00eb Sigurta. M\u00eb pas ka shtuar se \u201cduke konsideruar se p\u00ebrdorimi i mbi 3300 ushtarak\u00ebve jasht\u00eb vendit n\u00eb operacione k\u00ebrkon nj\u00eb basen t\u00eb krijuar prej t\u00eb pakt\u00ebn 10000 nj\u00ebsish\u00eb dhe po aq p\u00ebrdoren p\u00ebr impenjimet e marra n\u00eb kuad\u00ebr nd\u00ebrkomb\u00ebtar p\u00ebr t\u00eb p\u00ebrballuar situata t\u00eb paparashikueshme emergjence n\u00eb standby, deduktohet se numri i forcave efektive t\u00eb ushtris\u00eb mesatarisht t\u00eb p\u00ebrdorura afrohet me thuajse totalitetin e komponentes operative\u201d. Me nj\u00eb personel kaq t\u00eb moshuar dhe kaq pak fonde p\u00ebr st\u00ebrvitje, p\u00ebrdorimi i njer\u00ebzve n\u00eb operacione me nj\u00eb frekuenc\u00eb kaq t\u00eb lart\u00eb ndikon mbi cil\u00ebsin\u00eb e strvitjes dhe ul nivelin e motivimit dhe k\u00ebnaq\u00ebsis\u00eb s\u00eb personelit, me pasoja negative p\u00ebr efikasitetin e instrumentit ushtarak.<\/p>\n<p>Strategjia p\u00ebr Mesdheun \u00ebsht\u00eb nj\u00eb mesazh pozitiv p\u00ebr Rom\u00ebn. Mbrojtja ka (ri)v\u00ebn\u00eb t\u00eb zez\u00eb n\u00eb t\u00eb bardh\u00eb prioritetet strategjike t\u00eb saj, n\u00eb nj\u00eb periudh\u00eb ku duket se nuk flitet p\u00ebr gj\u00eb tjet\u00ebr p\u00ebrve\u00e7se Ukrain\u00ebn. Edhe nj\u00eb her\u00eb akoma, ajo sinjalizon centralitetin e k\u00ebtij kuadranti strategjik p\u00ebr Italin\u00eb. Nj\u00eb centralitet q\u00eb n\u00eb muajt e kaluar \u00ebsht\u00eb ritheksuar shum\u00eb her\u00eb, edhe tani q\u00eb lufta n\u00eb Ukrain\u00eb e sposton shikimin e europian\u00ebve n\u00eb lindje. \u00cbsht\u00eb nj\u00eb kalim i r\u00ebnd\u00ebsish\u00ebm, q\u00eb sinjalizon synimin e fort\u00eb nga ana e dikasterit p\u00ebr ta p\u00ebrdorur instrumentin ushtarak kryesisht n\u00eb sh\u00ebrbim t\u00eb interesit komb\u00ebtar, por p\u00ebr ta implementuar k\u00ebt\u00eb strategji Mbrojtja duhet t\u00eb tejkaloj\u00eb shum\u00eb pengesa, t\u00eb natyr\u00ebs ekzogjene dhe endogjene. M\u00eb t\u00eb r\u00ebnd\u00ebat kan\u00eb t\u00eb b\u00ebjn\u00eb me forcat e armatosura t\u00eb Rom\u00ebs: ato jan\u00eb t\u00eb prekura nga probleme t\u00eb r\u00ebnda q\u00eb ia minojn\u00eb efikasitetin. B\u00ebhet fjal\u00eb p\u00ebr probleme t\u00eb r\u00ebnd\u00ebsishme, q\u00eb p\u00ebr m\u00eb tep\u00ebr shpesh u shp\u00ebtojn\u00eb shum\u00eb v\u00ebzhguesve, t\u00eb cil\u00ebt shum\u00eb shpesh p\u00ebrq\u00ebndrohen mbi faktor\u00eb material\u00eb, si niveli teknologjik i pajimeve dhe harrojn\u00eb komponenten themelore e instrumentit ushtarak, dometh\u00ebn\u00eb at\u00eb njer\u00ebzore. P\u00ebr t\u2019i zgjidhur k\u00ebto probleme k\u00ebrkohet t\u00eb p\u00ebrhapen dije e \u00e7\u00ebshtjeve ushtarake, si n\u00eb klas\u00ebn politike, ashtu edhe n\u00eb shoq\u00ebri, n\u00eb m\u00ebnyr\u00eb t\u00eb till\u00eb sa mund t\u00eb nishin nj\u00eb debat serioz dhe kompetent mbi forcat tona t\u00eb armatosura, me q\u00ebllimin final t\u00eb dh\u00ebnies s\u00eb tyre efikasitetin p\u00ebr t\u00eb cil\u00ebn kan\u00eb nevoj\u00eb q\u00eb t\u00eb mund t\u00eb zhvillojn\u00eb detyrat e tyre institucionale par\u00ebsore.<\/p>\n<p>(nga <em>Geopoliticus<\/em>)<\/p>\n<p><strong>P\u00ebrgatiti<\/strong><\/p>\n<p><strong>ARMIN TIRANA<\/strong><\/p>\n","protected":false},"excerpt":{"rendered":"<p>Nd\u00ebrsa Europa duket se po e sposton shikimin nga lindja, Mbrojtja italiane rilan\u00e7on strategjin\u00eb e re p\u00ebr Mesdheun, duke theksuar edhe nj\u00eb her\u00eb akoma se cila \u00ebsht\u00eb zona me interes strategjik prioritar p\u00ebr Rom\u00ebn. Objektivi \u00ebsht\u00eb t\u00eb merret nj\u00eb rol m\u00eb i r\u00ebnd\u00ebsish\u00ebm n\u00eb k\u00ebt\u00eb kuadrant dhe t\u00eb promovoj\u00eb nj\u00eb vler\u00ebsim m\u00eb t\u00eb madh brenda &hellip;<\/p>\n","protected":false},"author":4,"featured_media":21251,"comment_status":"open","ping_status":"open","sticky":false,"template":"","format":"standard","meta":{"om_disable_all_campaigns":false,"_monsterinsights_skip_tracking":false,"_monsterinsights_sitenote_active":false,"_monsterinsights_sitenote_note":"","_monsterinsights_sitenote_category":0,"footnotes":""},"categories":[38],"tags":[],"aioseo_notices":[],"_links":{"self":[{"href":"https:\/\/foltore.al\/index.php\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/posts\/21250"}],"collection":[{"href":"https:\/\/foltore.al\/index.php\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/posts"}],"about":[{"href":"https:\/\/foltore.al\/index.php\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/types\/post"}],"author":[{"embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/foltore.al\/index.php\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/users\/4"}],"replies":[{"embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/foltore.al\/index.php\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/comments?post=21250"}],"version-history":[{"count":0,"href":"https:\/\/foltore.al\/index.php\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/posts\/21250\/revisions"}],"wp:featuredmedia":[{"embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/foltore.al\/index.php\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/media\/21251"}],"wp:attachment":[{"href":"https:\/\/foltore.al\/index.php\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/media?parent=21250"}],"wp:term":[{"taxonomy":"category","embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/foltore.al\/index.php\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/categories?post=21250"},{"taxonomy":"post_tag","embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/foltore.al\/index.php\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/tags?post=21250"}],"curies":[{"name":"wp","href":"https:\/\/api.w.org\/{rel}","templated":true}]}}