{"id":19724,"date":"2022-08-04T08:55:19","date_gmt":"2022-08-04T08:55:19","guid":{"rendered":"https:\/\/rdnews.al\/?p=19724"},"modified":"2022-08-04T08:55:19","modified_gmt":"2022-08-04T08:55:19","slug":"te-permbyset-plani-si-deep-state-frenon-tranzicionin-demokratik-ne-sudan","status":"publish","type":"post","link":"https:\/\/foltore.al\/index.php\/2022\/08\/04\/te-permbyset-plani-si-deep-state-frenon-tranzicionin-demokratik-ne-sudan\/","title":{"rendered":"T\u00eb p\u00ebrmbyset plani, si Deep State frenon tranzicionin demokratik n\u00eb Sudan"},"content":{"rendered":"<p>Center for Advanced Defense Studies \u2013 C4ADS \u2013 ka botuar koh\u00ebt e fundit raportin \u201cBreaking the Bank. How Military Control of the Economy obstructs democracy in Sudan\u201d q\u00eb b\u00ebn nj\u00eb kuad\u00ebr komplet sesi nj\u00eb kartel i formuar nga aktor\u00eb t\u00eb rekrutuar nga shteti po bllokon faktikisht tranzicionin demokratik n\u00eb Sudan. Aktor\u00eb t\u00eb till\u00eb p\u00ebrb\u00ebjn\u00eb deep state e vendit, duke i kontrolluar strukturat kryesore shtet\u00ebrore, pse jo edhe pjes\u00eb t\u00eb t\u00ebra t\u00eb ekonomis\u00eb, p\u00ebrfshi konglomerate bujq\u00ebsore, banka dhe kompani importi mjek\u00ebsor.<\/p>\n<p><strong><em>Deep State<\/em><\/strong><strong> sudanez<\/strong><\/p>\n<p><em>Deep State<\/em> sudanez, sipas p\u00ebrkufizimit t\u00eb dh\u00ebn\u00eb n\u00eb raport, p\u00ebrb\u00ebhet nga \u201c<em>funksionar\u00eb t\u00eb shkall\u00ebs s\u00eb mesme \u2013 t\u00eb lart\u00eb t\u00eb siguris\u00eb dhe t\u00eb sh\u00ebrbimeve civile q\u00eb abuzojn\u00eb me sistemin shtet\u00ebror p\u00ebr t\u00eb ruajtur rrjetin e tyre t\u00eb pushtetit ekonomik dhe politik<\/em>\u201d. Brenda tij ka fraksione t\u00eb ndryshme, midis t\u00eb cilave kryesore jan\u00eb forcat e armatosura sudaneze (<em>Sudanese Armed Forces<\/em> \u2013 SAF), forcat e mb\u00ebshtetjes s\u00eb shpejt\u00eb (<em>Rapid Support Forces<\/em> \u2013 RSF) dhe, m\u00eb s\u00eb vonshmi, komandant\u00ebt rebel\u00eb q\u00eb luftonin kund\u00ebr qeveris\u00eb federale sudaneze.<\/p>\n<p>N\u00eb vijim t\u00eb grushtit t\u00eb shtetit t\u00eb vitit 1989,\u00a0 ish presidenti Omar Al-Bashir ka ngritur n\u00eb k\u00ebmb\u00eb nj\u00eb sistem pushteti ku nj\u00eb elit\u00eb e ngusht\u00eb e af\u00ebrt me t\u00eb ka mundur t\u00eb lul\u00ebzoj\u00eb, duke konsoliduar kontrollin e saj n\u00eb sektor\u00ebt ky\u00e7 t\u00eb ekonomis\u00eb dhe duke e p\u00ebrkthyer pushtetin ekonomik n\u00eb influenc\u00eb politike n\u00ebp\u00ebrmjet em\u00ebrimit t\u00eb funksionar\u00ebve n\u00eb pozicione ky\u00e7e t\u00eb administrat\u00ebs publike. N\u00eb dit\u00ebt e sotme <em>deep state<\/em> p\u00ebrfiton nga mekanizmat e stabilizuar gjat\u00eb epok\u00ebs Bashir. Kompanit\u00eb petrolifere, p\u00ebr t\u00eb dh\u00ebn\u00eb nj\u00eb shembull, mbesin n\u00eb duar shtet\u00ebrore, duke u mund\u00ebsuar elitave ushtarake t\u00eb kontrollojn\u00eb fluksin e kapitaleve t\u00eb huaja dhe duke i drejtuar drejt arkave t\u00eb veta. SAF dhe RSF posedojn\u00eb banka, kompani t\u00eb r\u00ebnd\u00ebsishme dhe nyje transporti duke krijuar monopole vertiaklisht t\u00eb integruara q\u00eb e tejkalojn\u00eb konkurrenc\u00ebn e bizneseve civile komb\u00ebtare.<\/p>\n<p><strong>Tranzicioni demokratik: nga r\u00ebnia e Bashir n\u00eb grushtin e shtetit t\u00eb tetorit 2021<\/strong><\/p>\n<p>M\u00eb 11 prill t\u00eb 2019, Omar al-Bashir u largua me nj\u00eb grusht shteti t\u00eb udh\u00ebhequr nga oficer\u00eb t\u00eb lart\u00eb ushtarak\u00eb q\u00eb u rreshtuan me manifestuesit e zbritur n\u00eb sheshe kund\u00ebr regjimit autoritari. N\u00eb gushtin e po atij viti, ushtarak\u00ebt sudanez\u00eb n\u00ebnshkruan nj\u00eb marr\u00ebveshje <em>power-sharing<\/em> me lider\u00ebt politik\u00eb civil\u00eb, duke inauguruar k\u00ebshtu <em>Civil-Led Transitional Government<\/em> (CLTG). Mandati i CLTG ishte mbik\u00ebqyrja e pun\u00ebve shtet\u00ebrore deri n\u00eb zgjedhjet politike dhe shp\u00ebrb\u00ebrja e rrjetit t\u00eb pushtetit t\u00eb krijuar nga Bashir n\u00ebp\u00ebrmjet krijimit t\u00eb <em>Regime Dismantlement Committee<\/em> (RDC), nj\u00eb komitet kund\u00ebr korrupsionit dhe rikuperimi i pronave i p\u00ebrb\u00ebr\u00eb nga p\u00ebrfaq\u00ebsues t\u00eb partive politike, eksponent\u00ebve ushtarak\u00eb dhe t\u00eb inteligjenc\u00ebs. RDC ka miratuar m\u00eb shum\u00eb se 500 vendime duke rikuperuar me sukses miliarda dollar\u00eb t\u00eb fituara n\u00eb m\u00ebnyr\u00eb t\u00eb paligjshme nga regjimi Al-Bashir.<\/p>\n<p>N\u00eb faz\u00ebn fillestare t\u00eb tij, CLTG ka marr\u00eb mb\u00ebshtetjen e elit\u00ebs politiko \u2013 ushtarake, duke regjistruar progrese substanciale drejt demokratizimit t\u00eb vendit. Megjithat\u00eb, konglomeratet ekonomike e krijuara kryesisht nga RSF dhe SAF jan\u00eb prekru vet\u00ebm pjes\u00ebrisht nga tranzicioni politik. Megjith\u00ebse rrjetet e <em>deep state<\/em> dhe t\u00eb regjimit t\u00eb m\u00ebparsh\u00ebm jan\u00eb t\u00eb nd\u00ebrthurura fuqimisht, RDC \u00ebsht\u00eb shikuar mir\u00eb nga prekja e interesave jetike. Kjo ka hapur nj\u00eb p\u00ebr\u00e7arje publike midis an\u00ebtar\u00ebve t\u00eb RDC, <em>deep state<\/em> dhe Fprcave p\u00ebr Lirin\u00eb dhe Ndryshimin (FFC). Ushtarak\u00ebt kan\u00eb akuzuar RDC p\u00ebr korrupsion, nd\u00ebrsa civil\u00ebt kan\u00eb akuzuar ushtarak\u00ebt p\u00ebr nd\u00ebrhyrje t\u00eb panevojshme n\u00eb mandatin e pavarur t\u00eb RDC.<\/p>\n<p>M\u00eb 25 tetor 2021 k\u00ebt\u00eb tensione kan\u00eb shp\u00ebrthyer n\u00eb grushtin e shtetit t\u00eb gjeneralit Al-Burhan, q\u00eb ka \u00e7uar n\u00eb arrestimin e kryeministrit Hamdok, t\u00eb pjes\u00ebs m\u00eb t\u00eb madhe t\u00eb kabinetit t\u00eb tij dhe t\u00eb pakt\u00ebn 20 an\u00ebtar\u00ebve t\u00eb RDC. Nd\u00ebrsa ushtarak\u00ebt kan\u00eb cituar korrupsionin e lidershipit civil si motiv t\u00eb grushtit t\u00eb shtetit, ar\u00ebsyeja e thell\u00eb ka t\u00eb b\u00ebj\u00eb me tentativat e \u00e7montimit t\u00eb sistemit t\u00eb pushtetit politiko \u2013 ekonomik nga ana e RDC. N\u00eb thelb, grushti i shtetit ka p\u00ebrfaq\u00ebsuar pik\u00ebn e arritjes s\u00eb pashmangshme t\u00eb nj\u00eb serie tensionesh latente midis komponentes civile dhe asaj ushtarake p\u00ebr kontrollin dhe ndarjen e resurseve t\u00eb vendit.<\/p>\n<p><strong>Roli i bizneseve t\u00eb kontrolluara nga shteti<\/strong><\/p>\n<p>N\u00eb raportin \u00ebsht\u00eb b\u00ebr\u00eb harta e ekosistemit t\u00eb bizneseve t\u00eb kontrolluara nga shteti (<em>State-controlled enterprises<\/em><strong> \u2013 <\/strong>SCE) n\u00eb Sudan p\u00ebr t\u2019u vler\u00ebsuar se n\u00eb \u00e7far\u00eb m\u00ebnyre establishmenti ushtarak ushtron kontrollin mbi ekonomin\u00eb e vendit, duke identifikuar 408 biznese t\u00eb kontrolluara nga shteti n\u00eb sektor\u00eb si bujq\u00ebsia, sistemi bankar, industria ushtarake dhe ajo e furnizimeve mjek\u00ebsore. Nj\u00eb SCE p\u00ebrkufizohet si <em>\u201cnj\u00eb kompani q\u00eb ka lidhje [strukturore] me an\u00ebtar\u00eb t\u00eb qeveris\u00eb sudaneze dhe\/ose t\u00eb <\/em>deep state<em>, p\u00ebrfshi SAF, RSF apo funksionar\u00eb t\u00eb inteligjenc\u00ebs dhe vulnerab\u00ebt ndaj manipulimit nga ana a e aktor\u00ebve t\u00eb till\u00eb\u201d<\/em>.<\/p>\n<p>\u00cbsht\u00eb k\u00ebtu me vend t\u00eb p\u00ebrmenden rastet m\u00eb t\u00eb r\u00ebnd\u00ebsishme t\u00eb shfaqura n\u00eb raport, dometh\u00ebn\u00eb ai i <em>Omdurman National Bank<\/em> (ONB) dhe i <em>Khaleej Bank<\/em>, q\u00eb SAF dhe RSF respektivisht e kontrollojn\u00eb p\u00ebr t\u00eb pasur akses n\u00eb rrjetet financiare globale. Sipas raportit, n\u00ebp\u00ebrmjet nj\u00eb rrjeti entesh bamir\u00ebsie false, SAF posedon 86% t\u00eb aksioneve t\u00eb ONB, nd\u00ebrsa <em>Khaleej Bank<\/em> kontrollohet n\u00ebp\u00ebrmjet nj\u00eb <em>joint venture<\/em> midis RSF dhe kompanive q\u00eb kan\u00eb si kryetar Emiratet e Bashkuara Arabe. N\u00eb m\u00ebnyr\u00eb t\u00eb ve\u00e7ant\u00eb, nga raporti del se familja e liderit t\u00eb RSF Mohamad Hamdan Dagalo, i quajtur \u201cHemeti\u201d, kontrollon 28% t\u00eb aksioneve t\u00eb <em>Khaleej Bank<\/em>. Ve\u00e7 k\u00ebsaj, n\u00eb k\u00ebshillin administrues t\u00eb <em>Zadna International Company for Investment Ltd<\/em>, nj\u00eb konglomerat bujq\u00ebsor pron\u00ebsi e ushtris\u00eb q\u00eb menaxhon programe ujitjeje dhe menaxhimi t\u00eb copave t\u00eb tok\u00ebs, q\u00ebndron v\u00ebllai i \u201cHemeti\u201d, Abdel Rahim Dagalo.<\/p>\n<p><strong>\u00c7far\u00eb konkluzonesh?<\/strong><\/p>\n<p>Raporti vjen k\u00ebshtu n\u00eb formulimin e konkluzioneve t\u00eb m\u00ebposht\u00ebme. <em>In primis<\/em>, kontrolli i ekonomis\u00eb nga ana e aktor\u00ebve civil\u00eb \u00ebsht\u00eb nj\u00eb parakusht themelor p\u00ebr tranzicionin demokratik n\u00eb Sudan. Qeveria ushtarake po i dob\u00ebson gradualisht reformat demokratike t\u00eb miratura nga qeveria e tranzicionit civil dhe duke forcuar pozicionin e establishmentit n\u00eb sektor\u00ebt ekonomik\u00eb ky\u00e7 t\u00eb vendit. Deri kur kjo logjik\u00eb do t\u00eb mbizot\u00ebroj\u00eb, ushtarak\u00ebt do t\u00eb vazhdojn\u00eb ta mbajn\u00eb krejt\u00ebsisht pushtetin, pa i l\u00ebn\u00eb asnj\u00eb hap\u00ebsir\u00eb civil\u00ebve.<\/p>\n<p>Lidhur me k\u00ebt\u00eb, vendet q\u00eb k\u00ebrkojn\u00eb t\u00eb mb\u00ebshtesin demokracin\u00eb n\u00eb Sudan kan\u00eb instrumentat p\u00ebr ta dob\u00ebsuar establishmentin sudanez pasi: <em>\u201cQeveri, organizata joqeveritare (ONG) dhe kompani private kan\u00eb nj\u00eb rol n\u00eb \u00e7montimin e <\/em>deep state<em> t\u00eb Sudanit n\u00ebprmjet sanksioneve ekonomike, reduktimit t\u00eb ndihmave dhe nj\u00eb <\/em>due diligence<em> m\u00eb t\u00eb madhe ndaj investimeve private\u201d<\/em>. Deri m\u00eb tani, aksionet e vendeve donatore kan\u00eb v\u00ebn\u00eb kryesisht n\u00eb sh\u00ebnjest\u00ebr organizatat qeveritare m\u00eb shum\u00eb sesa rrjetet financiare dhe bizneset q\u00eb i p\u00ebrkasin pushtetit ushtarak.<\/p>\n<p>Prandaj, komuniteti nd\u00ebrkomb\u00ebtar mund ta kund\u00ebrshtoj\u00eb pushtetin elit\u00ebs sudaneze dhe mb\u00ebshtetur tranzionin demokratik n\u00ebp\u00ebrmjet masave t\u00eb m\u00ebposht\u00ebme: <em>t\u00eb godas\u00eb elitat ushtarake t\u00eb vendit dhe aktivitetet e tyre <\/em>n\u00ebp\u00ebrmjet sanksiones t\u00eb synuara kund\u00ebr bizneseve ekonomike t\u00eb shoq\u00ebruara me to; <em>reduktimin e rrezikut p\u00ebr investimet dhe ndihmat nd\u00ebrkomb\u00ebtare<\/em> n\u00ebp\u00ebrmjet garancive se k\u00ebt\u00eb jan\u00eb drejtp\u00ebrs\u00ebdrejti t\u00eb kanalizuara n\u00eb favor t\u00eb popullsis\u00eb lokale, duke shmangur mb\u00ebshtetjen ndaj kompanive t\u00eb asociuara me SAF, RSF dhe funksionar\u00eb publik\u00eb sudanez\u00eb; <em>forcim t\u00eb mb\u00ebshtetjes ndaj organizatave civile dhe gazetar\u00ebve <\/em>q\u00eb mb\u00ebshtesin transparenc\u00ebn dhe luftojn\u00eb korrupsionin n\u00eb Sudan.<\/p>\n<p>(nga <em>Geopoliticus<\/em>)<\/p>\n<p><strong>P\u00ebrgatiti<\/strong><\/p>\n<p><strong>ARMIN TIRANA<\/strong><\/p>\n","protected":false},"excerpt":{"rendered":"<p>Center for Advanced Defense Studies \u2013 C4ADS \u2013 ka botuar koh\u00ebt e fundit raportin \u201cBreaking the Bank. How Military Control of the Economy obstructs democracy in Sudan\u201d q\u00eb b\u00ebn nj\u00eb kuad\u00ebr komplet sesi nj\u00eb kartel i formuar nga aktor\u00eb t\u00eb rekrutuar nga shteti po bllokon faktikisht tranzicionin demokratik n\u00eb Sudan. Aktor\u00eb t\u00eb till\u00eb p\u00ebrb\u00ebjn\u00eb deep &hellip;<\/p>\n","protected":false},"author":4,"featured_media":19725,"comment_status":"open","ping_status":"open","sticky":false,"template":"","format":"standard","meta":{"om_disable_all_campaigns":false,"_monsterinsights_skip_tracking":false,"_monsterinsights_sitenote_active":false,"_monsterinsights_sitenote_note":"","_monsterinsights_sitenote_category":0,"footnotes":""},"categories":[42],"tags":[],"aioseo_notices":[],"_links":{"self":[{"href":"https:\/\/foltore.al\/index.php\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/posts\/19724"}],"collection":[{"href":"https:\/\/foltore.al\/index.php\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/posts"}],"about":[{"href":"https:\/\/foltore.al\/index.php\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/types\/post"}],"author":[{"embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/foltore.al\/index.php\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/users\/4"}],"replies":[{"embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/foltore.al\/index.php\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/comments?post=19724"}],"version-history":[{"count":0,"href":"https:\/\/foltore.al\/index.php\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/posts\/19724\/revisions"}],"wp:featuredmedia":[{"embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/foltore.al\/index.php\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/media\/19725"}],"wp:attachment":[{"href":"https:\/\/foltore.al\/index.php\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/media?parent=19724"}],"wp:term":[{"taxonomy":"category","embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/foltore.al\/index.php\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/categories?post=19724"},{"taxonomy":"post_tag","embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/foltore.al\/index.php\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/tags?post=19724"}],"curies":[{"name":"wp","href":"https:\/\/api.w.org\/{rel}","templated":true}]}}