Nj\u00eb proces eventual i aderimit t\u00eb Ukrain\u00ebs n\u00eb Bashkimin Europian paraqet nj\u00eb seri rreziqesh t\u00eb r\u00ebnda dhe dizavantazhes dometh\u00ebn\u00ebse p\u00ebr sigurin\u00eb europiane dhe p\u00ebr funksionaliteti, stabilitetin dhe kohezionin e vet\u00eb k\u00ebtij t\u00eb fundit, t\u00eb tilla sa ta shk\u00ebshillojn\u00eb n\u00eb m\u00ebnyr\u00eb realiste fillimin e nj\u00eb rrug\u00ebtimi t\u00eb k\u00ebsaj natyre.<\/p>\n
Bashkimi Europian me Ukrain\u00ebn n\u00eb luft\u00eb me Mosk\u00ebn<\/strong><\/p>\n N\u00eb hipotez\u00ebn ku do t\u00eb arrihej nj\u00eb arm\u00ebpushim n\u00eb luft\u00ebn ruso \u2013 ukrainase dhe nj\u00eb lloj ngrirjeje t\u00eb konfliktit, p\u00ebr shembull n\u00ebp\u00ebrmjet nj\u00eb arm\u00ebpushimi, por pa nj\u00eb traktat t\u00eb v\u00ebrtet\u00eb paqeje, do t\u00eb mbizot\u00ebronte p\u00ebr nj\u00eb koh\u00eb nj\u00eb konflikt i r\u00ebnd\u00eb dhe i gjer\u00eb territorial midis Kievit dhe Mosk\u00ebs mbi territoret ukrainase t\u00eb pushtuara manu militari<\/em> nga kjo e fundit. Hyrja n\u00eb Bashkimin Europian e nj\u00eb Ukraine me nj\u00eb pjes\u00eb dometh\u00ebn\u00ebse t\u00eb territorit t\u00eb saj n\u00ebn pushtimin rus, direkt apo n\u00ebp\u00ebrmjet republikave separatiste, do ta \u00e7onte Bashkimin Europian dhe secilin prej shteteve an\u00ebtare t\u00eb tij \u2013 p\u00ebrfshi Italin\u00eb \u2013 t\u00eb jet\u00eb pjes\u00eb e nj\u00eb konflikti territorial dhe e nj\u00eb konflikti t\u00eb ngrir\u00eb me nj\u00eb fuqi rajonale t\u00eb gatshme n\u00eb p\u00ebrdorimin e forc\u00ebs s\u00eb armatosur, me t\u00eb gjitha dizavantazhet dhe rreziqet e rastit. N\u00eb radh\u00eb t\u00eb par\u00eb, sikur Moska t\u00eb vendoste ta prishte arm\u00ebpushimin dhe t\u00eb l\u00ebvizte drejt nj\u00eb lufte t\u00eb re n\u00eb Ukrain\u00eb, gj\u00eb aspak e pamundur duke par\u00eb precedent\u00ebt nga 2014 deri m\u00eb sot, shtetet e Bashkimit Europian do t\u00eb thirreshin t\u00eb nd\u00ebrhynin n\u00eb kuptimet e klauzolave t\u00eb solidaritetit dhe asistenc\u00ebs reciproke t\u00eb traktateve europiane dhe n\u00eb p\u00ebrgjith\u00ebsi t\u00eb nj\u00eb impenjimi politik midis vet\u00eb an\u00ebtar\u00ebve t\u00eb vet\u00eb Bashkimit Europian. Sikur kjo t\u00eb ndodhte, forcat e armatosura italiane dhe t\u00eb vendeve t\u00eb tjera do t\u00eb ndodheshin n\u00eb luft\u00eb me ato ruse, n\u00eb nj\u00eb konflikt me intensitet jo m\u00eb t\u00eb ul\u00ebt me k\u00ebt\u00eb n\u00eb zhvillim dhe me humbjet relative.\u00a0Jo nj\u00eb \u201cluft\u00eb ekonomike\u201d apo \u201cluft\u00eb treg\u00ebtare\u201d, por nj\u00eb konflikt ushtarak n\u00eb kuptimin e v\u00ebrtet\u00eb t\u00eb fjal\u00ebs n\u00eb truallin urainas edhe nga trupa europiane.<\/p>\n Sikur Bashkimi Europian t\u00eb hynte n\u00eb luft\u00eb n\u00eb favor t\u00eb nj\u00eb an\u00ebtari t\u00eb tij prej frik\u00ebs s\u00eb fuqis\u00eb konvencionale apo b\u00ebrthamore ruse apo thjesht prej mosvullnetit p\u00ebr t\u00eb duruar humbjet relative, vet\u00eb ai impenjim politik midis an\u00ebtar\u00ebve t\u00eb Bashkimit Europian do t\u00eb p\u00ebsonte nj\u00eb goditje vdekjeprur\u00ebse dhe do ta p\u00ebsonte kohezioni dhe stabiliteti i vet\u00eb atij. Mekanizmat aktual\u00eb institucional\u00eb dhe politike t\u00eb siguris\u00eb, solidaritetit dhe kohezionit t\u00eb brendsh\u00ebm nuk jan\u00eb menduar dhe nuk jan\u00eb p\u00ebrshtatur p\u00ebr nj\u00eb konflikt territorial dhe p\u00ebr nj\u00eb konflikt potencial t\u00eb Bashkimit Europian me nj\u00eb fuqi konvencionale dhe b\u00ebrthamore si Rusia. As n\u00eb rastin e sulmit rus ndaj nj\u00eb Ukraine an\u00ebtare e Bashkimit Europian mund t\u00eb llogaritet automatikisht n\u00eb nj\u00eb nd\u00ebrhyrje ushtarake direkt t\u00eb NATO, pasi Ukraina nuk \u00ebsht\u00eb dhe nuk do t\u00eb jet\u00eb an\u00ebtare e Aleanc\u00ebs Atlantike, dhe t\u00eb nj\u00ebjtat motive q\u00eb i kan\u00eb \u00e7uar Shtetet e Bashkuara dhe aleat\u00ebt e tjer\u00eb t\u00eb mos nd\u00ebrhyjn\u00eb direkt n\u00eb konfliktin n\u00eb zhvillim do t\u00eb ripropozoheshin n\u00eb t\u00eb ardhmen. Bashkimi Europian do t\u2019i duhej ta menaxhonte p\u00ebrfshirjen e tij ushtarake n\u00eb nj\u00eb luft\u00eb t\u00eb tret\u00eb ruso \u2013 ukrainase i vet\u00ebm, duke rrezikuar ka shum\u00eb mund\u00ebsi q\u00eb t\u00eb p\u00ebrfundonte si vazo e qeramik\u00ebs midis vazove t\u00eb hekurit. Kjo do t\u00eb ishte fitorja m\u00eb e madhe, me karakter strategjik dhe gjeopolitik, p\u00ebr nj\u00eb lidership rus n\u00eb kund\u00ebrshtim me Per\u00ebndimin si ai i Putinit dhe i ndjek\u00ebsve t\u00eb tij.<\/p>\n Axhenda europiane paralizuar nga hyrja e Kievit<\/strong><\/p>\n N\u00ebse edhe nj\u00eb arm\u00ebpushim eventual ruso \u2013 ukrainas t\u00eb ishte arritur dhe t\u00eb mbante p\u00ebr dekada edhe n\u00eb munges\u00eb t\u00eb nj\u00eb traktati paqeje n\u00eb kuptimin e v\u00ebrtet\u00eb t\u00eb fjal\u00ebs, si\u00e7 ka mbajtur Muri i Berlinit apo linja e demarkacionit asnj\u00ebher\u00eb e nj\u00ebhur midis dy Koreve, pasja e Kievit n\u00eb Bashkimin Europian do t\u00eb b\u00ebnte q\u00eb shum\u00eb politika t\u00eb r\u00ebnd\u00ebsishme europiane \u2013 p\u00ebrfshi at\u00eb t\u00eb jashtme, t\u00eb siguris\u00eb, t\u00eb fqinj\u00ebsis\u00eb dhe energjitike \u2013 do t\u00eb monopolizoheshin nga Rusia. Me 44 milion banor\u00ebt e saj, Ukraina do t\u00eb ishte n\u00eb fakt vendi i pest\u00eb p\u00ebr nga popullsia n\u00eb Bashkimin Europian, me pesh\u00ebn pasuese n\u00eb procesin vendimmarr\u00ebs si n\u00ebp\u00ebrmjet Parlamentit Europian \u2013 n\u00eb terma ul\u00ebsesh \u2013 n\u00eb K\u00ebshillin Europian \u2013 si vot\u00eb e ponderuar \u2013 dhe n\u00eb Komisionin Europian \u2013 me komisarin e saj. \u00cbsht\u00eb e leht\u00eb t\u00eb parashikohet se, duke jetuar dramatikisht n\u00eb vendin e saj pushtimin rus, Kievi do ta p\u00ebrb\u00ebnte n\u00eb m\u00ebnyr\u00eb legjitime pik\u00ebn kryesore dhe t\u00eb vendosur mbi nj\u00eb seri dosjesh, nga tranzicioni energjitik tek prioriteti i (mos) dh\u00ebnies s\u00eb Mesdheut. Duke konsideruar angazhime me pozicionet lidhur me Polonin\u00eb (shteti i gjasht\u00eb p\u00ebr nga popullsia n\u00eb Bashkimin Europian) dhe vendet balltike, ka shum\u00eb t\u00eb ngjar\u00eb q\u00eb p\u00ebrplasja ukrainase me Rusin\u00eb do t\u00eb monopolizonte p\u00ebr nj\u00eb koh\u00eb t\u00eb gjat\u00eb, n\u00eb m\u00ebnyr\u00eb gjith\u00ebp\u00ebrfshir\u00ebse dhe devijante axhend\u00ebn europiane, n\u00eb kurriz t\u00eb interesave t\u00eb tjera legjitime dhe t\u00eb r\u00ebnd\u00ebsishme me karakter funksional apo gjeografik, dhe me nj\u00eb d\u00ebm ndaj efikasitetit, efi\u00e7enc\u00ebs dhe legjitimitetit komplesiv t\u00eb Bashkimit Europian. Sidomos n\u00eb drit\u00ebn e p\u00ebrvoj\u00ebs s\u00eb fundit p\u00ebr t\u00eb cil\u00ebn nj\u00eb shtet shum\u00eb m\u00eb vog\u00ebl si Hungaria ka arritur t\u00eb vendos\u00eb nj\u00eb seri vetosh disfunksionale politikave t\u00eb Bashkimit Europian, skenari i nj\u00eb vote t\u00eb p\u00ebrs\u00ebritur ukrainase n\u00eb prizmin antirus \u00ebsht\u00eb thuajse i sigurt\u00eb n\u00eb nj\u00eb Bashkim Europian t\u00eb paralizuar nga hyrja e Kievit.<\/p>\n Hapi m\u00eb gjat\u00eb se k\u00ebmba<\/strong><\/p>\n N\u00eb shtojc\u00eb t\u00eb rreziqeve t\u00eb sip\u00ebrp\u00ebrmendura, duke par\u00eb me nj\u00eb perspektiv\u00eb historike nga zgjerimi europian ka nj\u00eb nj\u00eb element t\u00eb m\u00ebtejsh\u00ebm strukturor n\u00eb disfavor t\u00eb aderimit t\u00eb Kievit n\u00eb Bashkimin Europian. Pas ekspansionit t\u00eb madh n\u00eb lindje t\u00eb kulmuar n\u00eb 2007 me aderimin n\u00eb Europ\u00ebn Qendrolindore dhe Danubiane, kapaciteti i Bashkimit Europian p\u00ebr t\u00eb integruar shtete t\u00eb reja, edhe t\u00eb vogla, ka r\u00ebn\u00eb: n\u00eb 15 vitet e fundit vet\u00ebm Kroacia (me pothuajse 4 milion banor\u00eb) ka hyr\u00eb n\u00eb Bashkimin Europian. Shqip\u00ebria, Maqedonia e Veriut, Mali i Zi dhe Serbia kan\u00eb marr\u00eb statusin e vendeve kandidate mbi nj\u00eb dekad\u00eb m\u00eb par\u00eb, por procesi respektiv i aderimit \u00ebsht\u00eb i gjat\u00eb dhe i v\u00ebshtir\u00eb aq sa t\u00eb mos i shikohet fundi, p\u00ebr dy motive. Nga nj\u00ebra an\u00eb, n\u00eb shum\u00eb shtete t\u00eb Bashkimit Europian \u00ebsht\u00eb mir\u00ebnjohja se zgjerimet e m\u00ebparshme kan\u00eb qen\u00eb t\u00eb \u201clodhsh\u00ebm\u201d p\u00ebr vet\u00eb Bashkimin Europian dhe se t\u00eb ardhshmet duhen menaxhuar m\u00eb mir\u00eb. Nga ana tjet\u00ebr, n\u00eb vendet kandidate, n\u00eb m\u00ebnyra dhe masa t\u00eb ndryshme, la probleme dhe v\u00ebshtir\u00ebsi dometh\u00ebn\u00ebse p\u00ebr sa i p\u00ebrket korrupsionit, qeverisjes, kontrollit t\u00eb kufijve, rreshtimit me normativat e Bahskimit Europian, themelore socio \u2013 ekonomike tep\u00ebr larg nga mesatarja europiane. N\u00ebse kjo \u00ebsht\u00eb e v\u00ebrtet\u00eb grupi i kandidat\u00ebve t\u00eb Ballkanit Per\u00ebndimor, krejt\u00ebsisht t\u00eb rrethuar nga Bashkimi Europian dhe, 23 vite nga fundi i luft\u00ebrave jugosllave, \u00ebsht\u00eb dramatikisht akoma edhe m\u00eb i v\u00ebrtet\u00eb p\u00ebr nj\u00eb vend t\u00eb madh si Ukraina, q\u00eb ka trefishin e popullsis\u00eb dhe t\u00eb zgjerimit gjeografik, nj\u00eb luft\u00eb shkat\u00ebrrimtare e nisur n\u00eb 2022, nj\u00eb kufi disa mij\u00ebra kilometra me Rusin\u00eb dhe trash\u00ebgimin\u00eb e r\u00ebnd\u00eb socio \u2013 ekonomike sovjetike. Edhe n\u00eb neton e konfliktit n\u00eb zhvillim, historia e Ballkanit na m\u00ebson se Ukraina \u00ebsht\u00eb thuajse me siguri nj\u00eb hap tep\u00ebr i gjat\u00eb p\u00ebr k\u00ebmb\u00ebn Bashkim Europian n\u00eb termat e kapacitetit politik, institucional, ekonomik p\u00ebr ta menaxhuar nj\u00eb zgjerim t\u00eb till\u00eb: nj\u00eb hap q\u00eb do t\u00eb prodhonte disekuilibra t\u00eb thella dhe probleme t\u00eb brendshme n\u00eb d\u00ebm t\u00eb efikasitetit, stabilitetit dhe kohezionit t\u00eb Bashkimit Europian.<\/p>\n Nj\u00eb proces aderimi peng i Mosk\u00ebs\u2026<\/strong><\/p>\n Jo vet\u00ebm hyrja e Ukrain\u00ebs n\u00eb Bashkimin Europian do t\u00eb sillte rreziqe dhe dizavantazhe, por vet\u00eb statusi i vendit kandidat dhe fillimi i nj\u00eb procesi dekad\u00ebsh t\u00eb aderimit \u00ebsht\u00eb i shk\u00ebshilluesh\u00ebm p\u00ebr t\u00eb pakt\u00ebn dy motive lidhur me sigurin\u00eb dhe stabilitetin europian. P\u00ebr sa i p\u00ebrket luft\u00ebs n\u00eb zhvillim, kandidimi i Kievit p\u00ebr t\u00eb hyr\u00eb n\u00eb Bashkimin Europian do ta pengonte ka mund\u00ebsi arritjen e nj\u00eb arm\u00ebpushimi. I vendosur p\u00ebrball\u00eb perspektiv\u00ebs se pjesa tjet\u00ebr e Ukrain\u00ebs jo e pushtuar nga Moska, dometh\u00ebn\u00eb rreth 80% e vendit, t\u00eb hyj\u00eb n\u00eb Bashkimin Europian, Kremlini do t\u00eb ishte i shtyr\u00eb q\u00eb t\u00eb tentonte t\u00eb gjith\u00eb loj\u00ebn me sulmin ushtarak n\u00eb vend q\u00eb t\u00eb konsideronte hipotez\u00ebn e nj\u00eb Ukraine neutrale dhe t\u00eb ndonj\u00eb marr\u00ebveshjeje me Kievin mbi territoret e pushtuara. N\u00eb fakt \u00ebsht\u00eb mir\u00eb t\u00eb kujtohet se hyrja n\u00eb nj\u00eb subjekt politik t\u00eb integruar si Bashkimi Europian nga tregu i vet\u00ebm tek politika treg\u00ebtare, nga monedha unike tel politika bujq\u00ebsore dhe shum\u00eb t\u00eb tjera, p\u00ebrfaq\u00ebson n\u00eb syt\u00eb e Mosk\u00ebs nj\u00eb p\u00ebrkat\u00ebsi gjeopolitike n\u00eb kampin per\u00ebndimor t\u00eb papajtuesh\u00ebm me neutralitetin e Kievit \u2013 aq sa tashm\u00eb perspektiva e nj\u00eb traktati asociimi midis Bashkimit Europian dhe Ukrain\u00ebs n\u00eb 2013 kontribuoi n\u00eb motivimin p\u00ebr Kremlinin para pushtimit t\u00eb 2014.<\/p>\n Nj\u00ebkoh\u00ebsisht, \u00e7uarja p\u00ebrpara e procesit t\u00eb aderimit t\u00eb nj\u00eb vendi pjes\u00ebrisht t\u00eb pushtuar nga Rusia i ekspozon friksh\u00ebm vet\u00eb negociatat ndaj presionit t\u00eb Mosk\u00ebs. P\u00ebr shembull, sikur Rusia t\u2019i intensifikonte me shum\u00eb seanca n\u00eb vite konfliktin kund\u00ebr Ukrain\u00ebs nd\u00ebrsa \u00ebsht\u00eb kandidate e Bashkimit Europian, do t\u2019i vendoste vendet europiane p\u00ebrball\u00eb nj\u00eb udh\u00ebkryqi: ose t\u00eb nd\u00ebrhyj\u00eb ushtarakisht p\u00ebr ta mbrojtur Ukrain\u00ebn \u2013 duke u kthyer n\u00eb skenarin e luft\u00ebs direkte Bashkim Europian \u2013 Rusi t\u00eb m\u00ebsip\u00ebrm, ose ta ndaloj\u00eb procesin e aderimit duke demonstruar se Moska mund t\u00eb veproj\u00eb si arbit\u00ebr mbi zgjerimin e Bashkimit Europian duke p\u00ebrdorur forc\u00ebn. Kjo e fundit do t\u00eb ishte nj\u00eb goditje shum\u00eb e r\u00ebnd\u00eb p\u00ebr Bashkimin Europian dhe nj\u00eb fitore p\u00ebr Putinin shum\u00eb m\u00eb i madh se avantazhi simbolik q\u00eb do t\u00eb siguronte tani nga nj\u00eb mosfillim i procesit t\u00eb aderimit. N\u00eb terma gjeopolitik\u00eb, nuk mund t\u00eb krahasohet sot nj\u00eb zgjerim eventual i Bashkimit Europian n\u00eb Ukrain\u00eb me at\u00eb t\u00eb ndodhur n\u00eb vitet \u201990 drejt vendeve tashm\u00eb neutrale dhe jo ish sovjetike si Finlanda, Suedia apo Austria.<\/p>\n \u2026apo i drejtuar drejt nj\u00eb rrethi vicioz tashm\u00eb t\u00eb par\u00eb<\/strong><\/p>\n S\u00eb fundi, edhe n\u00eb hipotez\u00ebn se Rusia t\u00eb mos e pengonte me forc\u00ebn e aderimit t\u00eb Ukrain\u00ebs n\u00eb Bahskimin Europian, nisja e nj\u00eb procesi aderimi p\u00ebr t\u2019u futur m\u00eb pas n\u00eb nj\u00eb rreth vicioz pas disa vitesh, kur do t\u00eb ket\u00eb kaluar n\u00eb Europ\u00ebn per\u00ebndimore va\u00eba emotive e konfliktit n\u00eb zhvillim dhe do t\u00eb kthehen mbizot\u00ebruese t\u00eb gjitha rreziqet e dizavantazhet e sip\u00ebrp\u00ebrmendura e nj\u00eb hyrjeje t\u00eb Kievit n\u00eb Bashkimin Europian, do t\u00eb ishte nj\u00eb frustrim i tmerrsh\u00ebm p\u00ebr shpresat e klas\u00ebs drejtuese dhe t\u00eb opinionit publik ukrainas, q\u00eb do t\u2019i helmonte raportet reciproke. Bashkimi Europian ka eksperimentuar tashm\u00eb me Turqin\u00eb pasojat negative e hapjes s\u00eb nj\u00eb procesi aderimi t\u00eb destinuar q\u00eb t\u00eb d\u00ebshtoj\u00eb sepse vendi kandidat \u00ebsht\u00eb nj\u00eb hap tep\u00ebr i gjat\u00eb p\u00ebr k\u00ebmb\u00ebn europian dhe nuk do t\u2019i duhet t\u00eb p\u00ebrs\u00ebris\u00eb gabimin nj\u00eb her\u00eb t\u00eb dyt\u00eb dhe n\u00eb nj\u00eb shkall\u00eb shum\u00eb t\u00eb madhe. N\u00eb konkluzion, lidershipi politik europian do ta ndihmonte sigurin\u00eb dhe stabilitetin e Kontinentit t\u00eb Vjet\u00ebr n\u00ebse do t\u00eb mendohej politika e jashtme, e fqinj\u00ebsis\u00eb, e siguris\u00eb dhe e mbrojtjes s\u00eb Bashkimit Europian dhe p\u00ebrtej instrumentit t\u00eb zgjerimit. K\u00ebshtu b\u00ebjn\u00eb vendet e m\u00ebdha demokratike dhe per\u00ebndimore, q\u00eb n\u00eb mb\u00ebshtetjen e luft\u00ebs s\u00eb drejt\u00eb ukrainase p\u00ebr pavar\u00ebsin\u00eb dhe liri\u00eb nuk e p\u00ebrmbysin komunitetin e tyre politik duke f\u00ebn\u00eb n\u00eb rrezik funksionimin e ardhsh\u00ebm.<\/p>\n (nga Affari Internazionali<\/em>)<\/p>\n P\u00ebrgatiti<\/strong><\/p>\n ARMIN TIRANA<\/strong><\/p>\n","protected":false},"excerpt":{"rendered":" Nj\u00eb proces eventual i aderimit t\u00eb Ukrain\u00ebs n\u00eb Bashkimin Europian paraqet nj\u00eb seri rreziqesh t\u00eb r\u00ebnda dhe dizavantazhes dometh\u00ebn\u00ebse p\u00ebr sigurin\u00eb europiane dhe p\u00ebr funksionaliteti, stabilitetin dhe kohezionin e vet\u00eb k\u00ebtij t\u00eb fundit, t\u00eb tilla sa ta shk\u00ebshillojn\u00eb n\u00eb m\u00ebnyr\u00eb realiste fillimin e nj\u00eb rrug\u00ebtimi t\u00eb k\u00ebsaj natyre. Bashkimi Europian me Ukrain\u00ebn n\u00eb luft\u00eb me …<\/p>\n","protected":false},"author":4,"featured_media":15466,"comment_status":"open","ping_status":"open","sticky":false,"template":"","format":"standard","meta":{"om_disable_all_campaigns":false,"_monsterinsights_skip_tracking":false,"_monsterinsights_sitenote_active":false,"_monsterinsights_sitenote_note":"","_monsterinsights_sitenote_category":0,"footnotes":""},"categories":[38],"tags":[],"aioseo_notices":[],"_links":{"self":[{"href":"https:\/\/foltore.al\/index.php\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/posts\/15465"}],"collection":[{"href":"https:\/\/foltore.al\/index.php\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/posts"}],"about":[{"href":"https:\/\/foltore.al\/index.php\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/types\/post"}],"author":[{"embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/foltore.al\/index.php\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/users\/4"}],"replies":[{"embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/foltore.al\/index.php\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/comments?post=15465"}],"version-history":[{"count":0,"href":"https:\/\/foltore.al\/index.php\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/posts\/15465\/revisions"}],"wp:featuredmedia":[{"embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/foltore.al\/index.php\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/media\/15466"}],"wp:attachment":[{"href":"https:\/\/foltore.al\/index.php\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/media?parent=15465"}],"wp:term":[{"taxonomy":"category","embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/foltore.al\/index.php\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/categories?post=15465"},{"taxonomy":"post_tag","embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/foltore.al\/index.php\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/tags?post=15465"}],"curies":[{"name":"wp","href":"https:\/\/api.w.org\/{rel}","templated":true}]}}